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PREFACE
At the annual meeting of the Louisiana Historical 
Association on March 14, 1986 in Shreveport, Glenn Conrad 
and Carl Ekberg presented papers which stirred my interest 
in the commandants and captains who exercised authority over 
local communities during the French and Spanish periods. 
Ekberg's study of colonial Ste. Genevieve suggested that the 
extraordinary power and influence of the Valle family might 
somehow be connected to the militia captain's office.1 I 
had noticed the many references to "captains" in the 
correspondence of French colonial administrators. While 
pursuing the idea that the title involved much more than a 
simple, military rank, I discovered that W.J. Eccles had 
suggested the need for a study of Canadian militia 
captains.2 The references to Choctaw Indian captains in
1Carl J. Ekberg, Colonial Ste. Genevieve: An Adventure
on the Mississippi Frontier (Gerald, Missouri: The Patrice
Press, 1985), 340.
2W.J. Eccles, France In America (New York: Harper &
Row, 1972), 69, n. 1.
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the two volumes of the Mississippi Provincial Archives 
edited by Patricia Galloway beckoned for an explanation.
My archival investigation began at the Center for 
Louisiana Studies in Lafayette. While reading the 
correspondence written in the days following the Natchez 
Massacre, I discovered that colonial officials were so 
overwhelmed by fear of the Indians that they hesitated to 
venture out from the city of New Orleans. Governor Etienne 
de Perier insisted that the safety of the colony required 
"putting sufficient troops in it to cope with the Indians." 
His reference to "officers who state to the Court that they 
will manage the Indians by the devotion and friendship" that 
the Indians will have for them seemed to indicate that 
officers with deeper roots in the colony had a technique for 
dealing with Indians that did not rely completely on 
military force.3
From Lafayette, I traveled to Natchitoches and Austin. 
Impressed by the amazing career of Louis Juchereau de St. 
Denis, I found evidence to support my contention that the 
failure of the French crown to control colonial development
3Mississippj Provincial Archives: French Dominion. 3
vols., ed. Dunbar Rowland and Albert Godfrey Sanders 
(Jackson, Miss., 1929-1932; 2 vols., ed. Rowland and
Sanders, rev. and ed. Patricia Kay Galloway (Baton Rouge, 
La., 1984), 4:102.
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was not rooted in the division of authority between 
commissary and governor. The establishment of financial 
controls was, in fact, the means used by the royal 
government in Versailles to control Canadian officers who 
needed the sovereign power of the French king to promote 
their economic enterprises. The career of St. Denis 
suggested the possibility that royal sovereignty and royal 
control were in some sense dependent on the voluntary 
service of colonial officers.
The old Canadian captains emerged at a time when they 
exercised a form of royal sovereignty that was undiluted by 
the effort to introduce financial controls. The efforts of 
the crown and the Company of the West to control the old 
captains failed, but the work of men such as St. Denis 
created a durable and effective organization of frontier 
territory that survived during the transfer of sovereignty 
from France to Spain and ultimately to the American Federal 
Republic.
St. Denis epitomized the ancien capitaine as an 
intermediary between Indians and Europeans and as an 
independent entrepreneur who presented himself as a servant 
of the crown. At the Natchitoches court house and the 
Eugene Watson Memorial Library, I learned that a militia 
captain could hold many different titles, that the captain's
rank was almost always stated first and followed by the 
titles added to it by official appointments. My perusal of 
the Natchez Trace Collection in the Barker Archives at the 
University of Texas clearly revealed that the militia 
captain played an important role not only in Ste. Genevieve, 
but in all of the frontier posts during the period of 
Spanish Dominion.
I had been interested in maritime captains for a long 
time. Admiralty cases scattered through the Superior 
Council records prompted me to consult Nicolas Valin's 
commentary on the Ordonnance de la marine. My search for 
the roots of the European captain's office led me to Lyons, 
Aix-en-Provence, and Venice, but the relationship 
established between Samuel de Champlain and the Montagnais 
sagamores in Canada provided the key for understanding how 
the anciens capitaines functioned as masters and mediators 
who cleverly forged the links in the chain that connected 
the French king to his people in the New World.
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ABSTRACT
The linkage between king and people in the discourse of 
the ancien capitaine is based on the dual roles of the 
captain as an intermediary representing the people to the 
king and as a royal officer commissioned by the king to 
exercise royal sovereignty. Maritime captains, Indian
chiefs, and French missionaries participated in a discourse 
that advanced and nurtured the village leader and post 
captains as links between France and New France, between the 
king in the old world and his people in the new. Tracing 
the development of the diplomatic language in New France and 
observing the old Canadian captains as they extended French 
dominion into the Mississippi Valley, shows that the chain 
linking the king to his people was strained by the gap that 
developed between the interests of the king's service and 
the welfare of the colony itself.
The city of Natchitoches planted by Louis Juchereau de 
Saint Denis on the border between two empires became the 
nucleus of a viable frontier community. The economic failure 
of the Company of the West created new opportunities for
xiv
those who were ready to learn and apply the techniques of 
the ancien capitaine. and by demonstrating their ability to 
control a vast territory with a handful of soldiers, the old 
captains attempted to bridge the gap between the king's 
interest and the survival of the colony.
The use of words and force by the ancien capitaine 
forged the strong link of the chain that tied the people—  
families, tribes, and traders— of the captain's post to the 
kingdom, confederacy, or federal republic which was best 
able to defend and protect his people and supply their 
needs. The ancien capitaine presented himself as the royal 
agent who could bring the benefits of protection and 
material prosperity to the people who accepted him as their 
spokesman.
The effective frontier commandant was a royal officer 
who commanded the loyalty of the fictive kinship groups 
surrounding his post. The key to Spanish control was the 
enlistment of French captains in the service of the Spanish 
king.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
The discourse of the ancien capitaine. which was to 
become central to the administration of colonial Louisiana 
in the eighteenth century, had its roots in medieval Europe 
and developed along the banks of American river valleys. In 
Europe and America, the ancien capitaine was the head of an 
extended family and a fictive kinship group. He served as 
spokesman for his "people". When he entered the royal 
service he became the personal link in a hierarchy that 
reached from the king of France to the subjects he 
considered his "children". If royal service subordinated 
the local leader to a higher level of authority, it also 
elevated him in his own eyes and those of his people to a 
higher level of public service which enhanced his local 
prestige and power. By smoking the calumet with a French 
captain, the leader of a tribal band identified himself as 
a Frenchman and committed his people to embrace a new French 
identity which brought them into the French empire. There
1
they became children of the French king, the pere de famille 
of the French nation.
The language of the ancien capitaine permits us to see 
Louisiana as a colony where real conflicting needs and 
interests had to be negotiated. Some historians, such as 
Frangois-Xavier Martin and Alcee Fortier, have idealized 
Louisiana and failed to place it in the context of global 
imperialism.1 The publication of Marcel Giraud's 1950 
article "France and Louisiana in the Eighteenth Century" 
called attention to the minuscule importance of Louisiana on 
the scale of imperial priorities. The titles and chapter 
titles of Joe Gray Taylor and Mathe Allain, who (quite 
properly) treat the colony as a peripheral concern of the 
French crown suggest that the pendulum has moved too far in 
the opposite direction. These scholars inspired by the 
research of Marcel Giraud and Charles Edward O'Neill have 
focused on the failure of the French crown to promote and 
foster the economic development of Louisiana. Joe Gray 
Taylor subtitled chapter 1 of his bicentennial history of 
Louisiana "A Study in Failure." "Not Worth a Straw," the 
title of Mathe Allain's recent book on French colonial 
policy, replays the same theme. Donald J. Lemieux's 1978
1Frangois-Xavier Martin, The History of Louisiana from 
the Earliest Period (New Orleans: Gresham, 1882; repr.,
Gretna, La. : Pelican, 1963); Alcee Fortier, A History of 
Louisiana. 4 vols. (New York: Goupil, 1904).
article stressed the marginal position of Louisiana in 
colonial politics.2 My analysis of the discourse of the 
ancien capitaine will not restore Louisiana to its position 
in the center of Martin and Fortier's universe, but it has 
led me to the conclusion that Louisiana was more than a 
token in the struggle between European states. It was a 
world of its own with a unique political culture that 
emerged from the creative interactions of Europeans, native 
Americans, and their captains. Central to this political 
culture was the ancien capitaine.
By focusing on cultural development influenced by —  
but not dependent upon —  national and imperial power, 
Richard White and Daniel Usner have recently explored the 
role played by native Americans and African slaves in the 
Mississippi Valley. White's Middle Ground is a village 
world of "republicans" and "rebels" who were active players 
and not mere "pawns" in the struggle between France and
2Marcel Giraud, "France and Louisiana in the early 
Eighteenth Century," Mississippi Valiev Historical Review. 
36 (1950): 657-674; Charles Edward O'Neill, Church and State 
in French Colonial Louisiana: Policy and Politics to 1732
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966); Joe Gray Taylor,
Louisiana: A Bicentennial History (New York: Norton,
1976); Mathe Allain, "Not Worth a Straw": French Colonial
Policy and the Early Years of Louisiana (Lafayette, La.: 
Center for Louisiana Studies, 1988); Donald J. Lemieux, "The 
Mississippi Valley, New France, and French Colonial Policy," 
Southern Studies. 17 (1978): 39-57;
England.3 Indians also played an active role in the 
culture characterized by Usner as the "frontier exchange 
economy" of the Lower Mississippi Valley.4
In White's terminology, the ancien capitaine was a 
"cultural hybrid" who played an active role in the creative 
process of institutional and social development that began 
before the arrival of the French and extended far beyond the 
waning of the English, French, and Spanish empires in 
America.5 The present study begins by tracing the medieval 
and early modern roots of the ancien capitaine. It then 
takes up the story of the ancien capitaine in the village 
world of the pays d'en haut: the Great Lakes region where
the French made their portage from the St. Lawrence to the 
Mississippi River. The village world of the pays d'en haut 
gave the French captain-traders and their missionary allies 
the opportunity to establish their authority over Indian 
refugees who needed a means to protect themselves from 
stronger, hostile tribes. At the same time, Indian leaders
3Richard White, The Middle Ground: Indians. Empires,
and Republics in the Great Lakes Region. 1650-1815 (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
4Daniel H. Usner, Jr., Indians. Settlers. & Slaves in 
a Frontier Exchange Economy: The Lower Mississippi Valiev
Before 1783 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina
Press, 1992).
5White Middle Ground. 283-284.
5who accepted French sovereignty increased their power over 
their followers.
Chapter 4 describes how Pierre Lexnoyne, Sieur 
d'Iberville and his captains used the techniques of the 
Indian and maritime captains to create the ancien capitaine 
and establish French territorial control in the Lower 
Mississippi Valley. The establishment of the Natchitoches 
Post on the border between two empires is the focal point of 
the following chapter. Louis Juchereau de St. Denis, who 
managed to make Natchitoches a viable community, is the 
model ancien capitaine. St. Denis was able to manage the 
Indians by commanding their devotion and respect — ■ but only 
by presenting himself as the local agent of the wealthy and 
powerful French king.
The ultimate economic failure of the Louisiana colony 
demonstrates the crucial relationship between local 
political authority and financial investment by the state in 
colonial administration. The ups and downs of this 
relationship are explored further in chapters 6 through 8 
which focus on the ongoing struggles between the sword and 
the purse in colonial Louisiana between 1723 and 1763. 
Whereas the recall of Commandant General Jean Baptiste 
Lemoyne, Sieur de Bienville in 1724 after an audit of his 
accounts was a victory of the purse over the sword, the 
Natchez Massacre of 1729, the death of Commissary-General
Jacques de La Chaise, and the continuing need to control the 
Indians, opened the way for Bienville's return only four 
years later. The Louisiana colony, however, only witnessed 
further episodes in the conflict between commissaries who 
were responsible for distributing supplies to meet the needs 
of soldiers and colonists and trade goods for the Indians, 
and commandants who tried to mediate between the two 
communities as ancien capitaine. When Governor Pierre 
Frangois de Rigaud, marquis de Vaudreuil, protested the 
directive of his superior, Minister of Marine Maurepas, to 
restrict the trading activities of the commandants, his 
valiant effort to reconcile royal and colonial interests was 
couched in the language of the ancien capitaine. 
Vaudreuil's correspondence reveals his self-image to be that 
of an ancien capitaine: the crucial link between the king
and his people.
In the end, of course, French colonialism failed in 
North America, but to talk only about French failure and to 
disparage the efforts of the crown to control the colony by 
dividing administrative functions, is to place too much 
emphasis on the control exercised over Louisiana by royal 
officials in Versailles. The real defect was a lack of 
economic and financial resources that produced a reliance on 
the old captains to ensure the loyalty of the Indian tribes.
After the return of Bienville in 1733, the governor was 
always in control if he had the loyalty of the old captains.
Vaudreuil was able to ignore the complaints of Michel 
de la Rouvilliere and he continued to promote the trading 
activities of the old captains. Commissary General Vincent 
de Rochemore gave Governor Louis Billouart, Chevalier de 
Kerlerec a difficult time because he had the support of old 
officers such as Pierre Henri D'Erneville. Kerlerec's 
appeal to popular assemblies and militia captains that set 
the stage for the leaders of colonial factions to organize 
the rebellion of 1768 needs to be understood in terms of the 
crucial role played by the ancien capitaine in the 
administration of colonial Louisiana.
My story ends with the Rebellion of 1768, but in a 
concluding chapter I analyze the persistence of the language 
used of the ancien capitaine at all levels of colonial 
administration to establish and maintain authority over 
Indians and colonists alike. When refugees came to 
Louisiana from Acadia in French Canada in 1765, French and 
Spanish officers charged with their relocation drew upon 
this rich discourse to integrate the new arrivals into the 
culture developed by generations of ancien capitaines. When 
Alexander O'Reilly arrived to retrieve the Louisiana colony 
for the Spanish in 1769, he looked to the Natchitoches Post 
as the training ground for his post commanders, appointing
Frenchmen steeped in the tradition of the ancien caoitaine 
to command frontier posts in the territory of what was to 
become known as the Louisiana Purchase.
This study will reveal the crucial importance of the 
captain's office as a link between the king and his people. 
It seeks to explain the surprising power and influence of 
militia captains in the Mississippi Valley during a period 
when European sovereigns decided to forsake their "children" 
in the New World.
CHAPTER 2
The European Origins of the Discourse of 
the Anciens Capitaines
The term "ancien capitaine" was fashioned by French 
colonial administrators and will be used in this study to 
describe a leader who demonstrated the ability to use words 
and force to mobilize colonial soldiers and Indian allies to 
fight for the crowned European ruler in return for 
protection and European goods. The linkage between king and 
people in the discourse of the ancien capitaine is based on 
the dual roles of the captain as an intermediary 
representing the people to the king and as a royal officer 
commissioned by the king to exercise royal sovereignty. The 
cultural keys needed to unlock the written discourse are the 
theological model of the medieval French monarchy, the 
Italian tradition of the capitano del popolo. the historical 
experience of captains with cities in Spain, and the 
development of maritime ordinances in France.
Syndics (or capitouls. as they were called in 
Toulouse and several other cities) normally performed 
military service, but the close connection between municipal
10
civic duty and military functions can most clearly be seen 
in medieval Italy. It was the captain's office which 
developed in the cities and along the coasts of Europe that 
offered the best possibility of integrating the many 
villages, towns, or cities into the universal res publica. 
The process of integration ultimately failed, but the bond 
established between the captain and his people on the local 
level helped to pave the way for the incorporation of local 
areas into the national "cities" that were to become the 
territorial states of modern Europe. The captain as chief 
syndic linked himself and his city with the king as head of 
the corporate nation.
The relationship of a captain to a company as the head 
is related to the body was a legacy of the Middle Ages that 
had wide ramifications in the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries. The quarrel over the appropriate distribution of 
functions within the Christian corpus climaxed on the 
battlefield between pope and emperor, while Roman law and 
Christian theology produced an administrative theory based 
on the analogy of the head controlling the members of a 
physical body.1 Both Roman law and ecclesiastical doctrine 
originally supported the claims of pope and emperor to
1Ernst H. Kantorowicz, The Kino's Two bodies: A Study
in Medieval Political Theology (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1957; Princeton Paperbacks, 1981), 3-6.
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exercise control over the persons of feudal lords and the 
legal corporate entities of towns and municipalities. The 
ideal of unity persisted, but the breakdown of imperial and 
papal authority in the later Middle Ages put a new emphasis 
on local autonomy. The transition from the medieval res 
publica Christiana to a system of sovereign territorial 
nation-states overshadowed the dramatic role of maritime 
captains in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, but 
urban and maritime captains played an important role in both 
the failure of pope and emperor and the success of the royal 
kingdoms in the struggle for control of European territory.
The high Middle Ages, 1000-1250, unfolded in the 
chaotic atmosphere of warfare between leagues of cities and 
the German emperor. During the ensuing conflict between 
imperial and anti-imperial factions within the cities 
themselves, a variety of offices burgeoned within the 
diverse systems of municipal administration. The podestas 
and captains of the medieval communes performed military and 
judicial functions which brought them to the forefront of 
municipal politics, and both performed executive functions 
during times when they served as heads of the local 
community.2
20n the podesta see Lauro Martines, Power and 
Imagination: City-States in Renaissance Italy (New York:
Knopf, 1979; Johns Hopkins Paperback, 1988), 42.
An institutional structure was evolving which would 
eventually produce the territorial nation-state as an inter­
mediate form of political organization. A Jewish traveler, 
Benjamin of Tudela, and a German chronicler, Otto of 
Freising, noted the autonomy of the Italian cities3, but 
the reality of local government in the later Middle Ages 
must be examined within the context of a mentalite that 
cherished a hierarchical structure. The captain's office 
served as the linchpin that could either connect the local 
community with the medieval hierarchy, defend the 
independence of the local unit, or serve as the connecting 
link between the local population and a larger political 
entity. An examination of the office and function of the 
captain in the Italian city-republics will clarify the 
connection between the later maritime captain's office and 
the local community which are the subjects of this study.
The transformation of the urban captain from mediator 
and agent of the people to master of the local community can 
be seen in the evolution of Italian city-state government. 
In theory, every group or organization occupied a place in 
the corporate structure of the European civitas, but the
3Daniel Waley, The Italian Citv-Republics. 3d ed. , 
(London: Longman Group UK Ltd, 1988), 10.
13
emperors were unable to establish their sovereign 
authority.4 The process of integrating clergy, nobles, and 
cities into the larger European commonwealth (societas 
republicae christianae) ultimately faltered. But while the 
attempt of popes and emperors to orchestrate the activities 
of the European commonwealth languished, strong families, 
guilds, and monasteries actually achieved a degree of 
success in their efforts to arrive at a position of harmony 
between head and members. The agents of these medieval 
corporate bodies exercised the authority of a pater familias 
over their members.5 In essence they were the captains and 
their "families” constituted their "companies."
The military captain was the leader of a company of 
soldiers, and whenever a diverse group gathered together to 
defend a local territory, the headman was often called a 
captain. Consequently, whenever a greater degree of unity 
was achieved either in the city or in the countryside, it 
was only natural for a larger, more heterogeneous group to 
come under the authority of a captain. In a culture where 
the breakdown of authority was endemic, the captain 
maintained order by wielding his sword against external
4See James Bryce, The Holy Roman Empire (New York: 
MacMillan, 1904; repr., Schocken Books, 1961), 94-95, 251.
5For example, the abbot of Cluny exercised paternal 
authority over the family of the monastery. See Marcel 
Pacaut, L'Ordre de Clunv (Paris: Fayard, 1986), 26.
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enemies and performing police functions within the territory 
controlled by the corporation which commanded his loyalty 
and service. His "ministerium" on the local level had been 
to protect the bishop and the church.6 In Italy, the 
defense of the commune depended on militia captains 
responsible in succession to the Consulate, podesta, 
capitano del popolo. and finally to the signoria. In 
medieval Italy a confusing proliferation of titles often 
obscures the fact that vavasors, captains, podestas, 
constables, and signore often performed similar functions. 
Historians of the Italian city-states have identified many 
important functional and chronological differences indicated 
by the variety of titles.7 Yet, in rural areas, and during 
the urban crisis in Italy as the communal form of government 
gave way to the siqnoria. the headman in the local community 
was quite likely to be officially titled "the captain."
Realizing the importance of the office and function of 
a captain during the later Middle Ages makes it easier to 
appreciate the connection between the captain and the local 
community. Prior to the rise of the independent communes in 
northern Italy, the captains served as great vassals of the
6Walter Ullmann, The Growth of Papal Government in the 
Middle Ages: A Study in the Ideological Relations of
Clerical to Lav Power (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1962),
129-131.
7Martines, Power and Imagination. 34-110.
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bishop, count, or marquis. As rural knights they held fiefs 
in return for military service, fidelity, and counsel. The 
commune produced its captains, but the authority of the 
communal captains was rooted in the urban community and its 
body of citizens. In Italy, a city asserted its 
independence when consuls selected as executives of the 
people began to govern the commune as a collegiate body, the 
consulate. When the consulate of the nascent communes began 
to displace the bishop as the supreme jurisdictional power 
in the cities, new opportunities opened up for men with 
military training to organize a defensive force for the 
cities. A man selected to represent a municipal corporation 
in the consulate may have functioned as a captain in the 
city's militia, or consuls without military experience may 
have brought effective military leaders into the city 
government.
The background of the consuls and urban captains is 
difficult to determine. The men who rose to prominence in 
city-government were literate laymen. Some might have 
emerged from the propertied, city-based cives described by 
Lauro Martines as the "thriving popular or plebeian 
element."8 Daniel Waley indicates that the judges came 
from the class of knightly maiores "who had received a
8Ibid., 14.
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training in secular book learning, as opposed to those whose 
upbringing had been primarily military or ecclesiastical."9 
Otto of Freisung writes that consuls were chosen from among 
the captains, vavasors, and commoners.10 Whatever their 
origin, it was the military organization of the people 
(popglo) and the need to train citizens for defense of the 
city that gave a special prominence to the office of 
captain.
If captains were important in rural areas as protectors 
of bishops and counts, they were egually important as 
guardians of the popular commune. Initially, the popolo was 
only one corporation among many within the commune. 
Eventually, in some cities, the guilds developed an identity 
with the popolo. In Florence a practical distinction was 
made between the major guilds which represented the popolo 
qrasso and the minor guilds symbolized as the popolo minuto. 
Originally, however, the popolo was a "societas uniting the 
bodies of regional infantry whose task was to check the 
power of the magnates in time of crisis."11 The popolo 
always had its captains, and when the capitano del popolo 
became the governing authority of a city, his functions were
9Waley, Citv-Republics. 14.
10Ibid., 35.
11Ibid.,131, 134.
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similar to those of a podesta. Indeed they often came from 
the same class of judicially trained knights, and the same 
individual who served as podesta in one city might later be 
employed as capitano del popolo in another.12
The independent commune consisted of many corporations, 
one of which came to be known as the popolani. Its interests 
frequently clashed with those of the powerful magnates. The 
leaders of the popolani were usually men of noble birth and 
only the wealthy members played an active role in the 
corporation. The guild masters suspected the poor masses 
(popolinq) of cooperating with the powerful magnates against 
their corporate interests.13 Clashes between the communal 
corporations created a need for effective military and 
diplomatic leaders who achieved popularity by wielding words 
and force to form alliances and restore stability in the 
community.
In some cities formal alliances bound citizens together 
with an oath of loyalty. These mutual assistance pacts came 
to be known as consorzeria (consortiums). For example, in 
Bologna an oath of 1196 designated nine captains from among 
whom rectors were to be chosen. These captains along with 
other jurors undertook the construction of a tower to be
12Ibid., 135.
13Ibid., 131.
used for their mutual defense. The sons of these men were 
required to "swear a similar oath"14 before their 
fifteenth birthday or at whatever age might be deemed 
appropriate by the rectors. A century and a half later the 
statute of a Florentine consorzeria stipulated that, "if it 
should so happen that one of us receives any outrage or 
offence at the hands of anyone, then each of us is bound to 
help defend and revenge him with his own property and 
person, treating the quarrel as though it involved 
himself..."15 In 1211 Bologna made an attempt to outlaw 
rival associations when it organized the compaanie delle 
armi. These consorzeria and compaqnia usually included men 
recruited from the quartieri (neighborhoods) of the city, 
but occasionally references are made to Lombardi and Toschi 
who were not natives.16
In Milan, military organization enabled the patarini to 
force archbishop Guido and the nobles to withdraw from the 
city in 1057. The Milanese Pataria was a congregation of 
laymen which was organized to reform the clergy. Two 
clerics, Arialdo and Landolfo, served as preachers and 
captains in the effort to wrest control of the city from the
14Ibid.. 122.
15Ibid., 123.
16Ibid.. 143-144.
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archbishop. The predominance of the patarini proved 
temporary. Noble captains and vavasors used armed force to 
restore episcopal authority, but the organization continued 
to influence urban politics. The struggle of the patarini 
against the archbishop was an early attempt to establish a 
commune which can be defined as "a sworn association of free 
men collectively holding some public authority."17
Later other northern Italian cities asserted their 
independence and established consulates. When the authority 
of the consulate disintegrated, warfare broke out among 
families within the city. Neighborhoods were then organized 
and towers for defense were constructed throughout the city. 
At this stage, the consular nobility agreed to vest a chief 
magistrate, the podesta, with powerful judicial and 
executive authority, expecting him to stand above the 
conflict and settle disputes among rival groups. 
Eventually, the conflict of interests within the ranks of 
the nobility as well as between the ruling factions and also 
the community as a whole caused discontented leaders to help 
organize the societas populi. At first the popolo developed 
as one corporation within the commune. Each city had 
different experiences, but a Genoese chronicler indicates 
that the authority of the podesta diminished with the rise
17Martines, Power and Imagination. 16-18.
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of the popolo.18 Perhaps it was dissatisfaction with the 
judicial decisions of the podesta that opened the way for 
the ascendancy of the capitano del popolo. More likely, it 
was the leader who could achieve popularity and win the 
respect and loyalty of the masses who became the primary 
spokesman for the people.
Many of the smaller groups resembled the popolo, and 
when a successful captain managed to gain the loyalty of the 
people, he could establish himself as capitano del popolo. 
podesta, or signore. These diverse offices with different 
names shared the common function of serving as head over the 
members of a corporate society. Another office held by the 
constables who commanded mercenary troops can also be 
included. Occasionally, individuals such as the marquis de 
Montferrat served as "captain and 'lord'" of one city 
(Alessandria in this case) before he captured several other 
cities. Each city agreed to give him the title of captain 
or podesta for varied periods of time.19
To some Italians, such as Machiavelli, the triumph of 
the signori symbolized, a disaster and the loss of liberty. 
The lack of popular virtue brought corruption and tyranny. 
Florence and the other communes had freed themselves from
18Waley, Citv-Republics. 43.
19Ibid., 161-162.
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the stranger appointed by the prince to rule, only to choose 
another foreigner to rule over them. This "captain," as 
they called him, could be corrupted by the powerful 
citizens. "And in the course of the mutations of their 
government that system was changed, and a council of eight 
citizens was appointed to perform the functions of the 
Captain; which only made matters worse."20 An ambitious 
citizen such as Cosimo de' Medici could be prevented from 
usurping power by a government which would "occupy in
advance of him those ways by which he expects to attain the 
rank he aims at." This could be done by "adopting
[Cosimo's] plan of favoring the people."21
Machiavelli was beginning to focus on the natural 
development of the state as a political community, but 
Aristotle had taught him that liberty and tranquillity
depended on adopting a policy grounded in virtue. Marsilius 
of Padua had defined tranquillity as "the good disposition 
of the state for the functioning of its parts." In his 
effort to determine "what the state is in itself, and why; 
what and how many are its primary parts; what is the
function appropriate to each part, their causes, and their
20Niccolo Machiavelli, The Discourses on the First Ten
Books of Titus Livius in The Prince and The Discourses (New 
York: Modern Library, 1950), 240.
21Ibid., 244.
order in relation to one another,"22 Marsilius made a 
crucial distinction between voluntary and involuntary 
subjects, which led to the question of whether government 
rests on the consent of the governed.23 Machiavelli as a 
political theorist and the later kings of France and Spain 
influenced by Italian legal and political doctrine were 
determined to establish tranquillity with the consent of the 
people if possible, or without it if necessary. Indeed, it 
was during the period of dynastic rivalry and civil strife 
that the office of captain became the linchpin connecting 
kings and provinces. Aristotle had enumerated five methods 
of establishing kingly monarchies. One was to appoint the 
ruler "for one determinate function ... such as the leader­
ship of the army." Referring to the appointment of 
Agamemnon as leader of the Greek army, Marsilius recognized 
that in "modern communities this office is called the 
captaincy or constabulary."24 
Castile: Kings and Cities
Outside of Italy, the "captain" was just as deeply 
embedded in the local administrative structures. The
22Marsilius of Padua, The Defender of Peace: The
Defensor Pacis. trans. Alan Gewirth (New York: Harper & Row, 
1967), 9.
23Ibid., 31.
24Ibid.. 30.
barbarians had their chiefs who established control over 
various parts of Europe. Some established sedentary 
dynasties which transformed their tribal organization of 
clans and families into feudal kingdoms. The "knights" who 
became the Carolingian counts and grands seigneurs of 
medieval civilization were originally heads of families 
functioning as military leaders.25 The revival of commerce 
and the advent of the medieval commune produced new, 
heterogeneous bodies of citizens who proceeded to elect 
their civic and military leaders. Meetings held in 
traditional places within the town produced a local "body 
politic", sometimes designated as "la Republica", or "la 
Comunidad." This corporate body of citizens represented the 
"community of town and land"26 that transcended social 
origin, political affiliation, and economic status.
Spanish historian Helen Nader refers to Castilian 
leaders of municipal corporations as "judge," "sheriff," and 
"councilmen.1,27 A town meeting could elect one man or a 
team to function as their agent in negotiations with the
25J.F. Verbruggen, The Art of Warfare in Western Europe 
During the Middle Ages: From the Eighth Century to 1340.
trans. Sumner Willard and S.C.M. Southern (Amsterdam: 
North-Holland, 1977), 65.
26Helen Nader, Liberty in Absolutist Spain: The
Habsburg Sale of Towns. 1516-1700 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1990), 32-33.
27Ibid.. 35-36.
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king. In peninsular Spain this spokesman could potentially 
become a royal captain of the coast, as indicated in the 
maritime ordinances which reflect maritime practices 
developed along the Mediterranean coasts.
The important relationship between kings and medieval 
communal captains, so difficult to see from our modern 
perspective, becomes visible in the context of European 
territorial expansion and colonization. In the medieval 
corporate hierarchy the king and captain had protected the 
priest by exercising disciplinary terror. The "ministerium" 
of the king to rule the "populus Dei" extended to the local 
captain and his "people" as part of corporate "Europa."28
The elusive terminology, the problem of translation, 
and the fragmentary character of documentary evidence make 
it difficult to see how the theory and practical application 
of medieval corporatism fashioned the captain's office as 
the key for unlocking the door of territorial expansion and 
control. John Beeler makes virtually no mention of the 
captain's office in his Warfare in Feudal Europe. 730-1200. 
He refers to kings and counts, and he lists the levels of 
nobility as ricos hombres. hidalgos, and caballeros. 
Mounted commoners increased in number and importance with 
the establishment of new towns in conquered territories.
28Ullmann, Papal Government. 106-114, 129-131.
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These non-noble knights who received land grants and "lived 
as nobles" were called caballeros villanos.29 Beeler 
notes that there is a serious lack of information about 
medieval military organization,30 but the noble commanders 
performed the functions of captains as did the men who 
commanded smaller contingents.
In the Middle Ages, the source of authority and control 
lay in the body, not the head. The local corporation was a 
real entity. It had to assemble and develop an executive 
structure. Beeler suggests as much when he concludes that 
in Leon and Castile, "the nobles and the free men of the 
towns exercised an influence that often overshadowed that of 
the monarchy."31 When the executive structure came under 
the control of the municipal corporation's agent, —  name, 
number, and title notwithstanding —  the king could 
negotiate an agreement with that agency which would then 
perform the function of a royal captain. Kings could, of 
course, use military force to subjugate the town and country 
and install their own captains, but the lack of royal 
military and financial resources usually produced alliances 
which were mutually advantageous to crown and town.
29John Beeler, Warfare in Feudal Europe. 730-1200 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1971), 166-169.
30Ibid., 165.
31Ibid.. 166.
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Helen Nader's analysis of the municipal organization of 
Castile and its implantation in the Americas focuses on the 
importance of town meetings and municipal councils. Her 
study provides a clear indication of how the captain's 
office operated as a bridge between Castilian kings and 
their cities.
A popular leader might refuse to obey the governor of a 
province, have himself elected as "captain" by the people, 
and present himself to the king as the man who could govern 
the territory in the name of the king. This was possible in 
Spain because the Castilian kings exercised political 
authority "through town and city councils in an 
administrative structure that linked towns directly to the 
monarchy but not with each other."32
While describing the Castilian municipality "as the 
basic territorial unit of the monarchy", in which "crown and 
town formed a single body that flourished or withered as 
one,"33 Nader suggests that the territory acquired by 
Spain in the New World should be viewed administratively as 
a "patchwork quilt of municipalities."34 In Castile the 
bond established between a Trastamara king and a village
32Nader, Liberty in Absolutist Spain. 4.
33Ibid., 6, 9.
34Ibid., 41.
often opened the door for the village to liberate itself 
from a city upon which it depended.35 In America,
Hernando Cortes defied the royal governor's instructions by 
establishing the new city of Veracruz and extending his 
authority over the Indian villages around the new town. He 
bypassed the authority of the governor by having himself 
elected as captain. With the support of the town council, 
Cortes then petitioned the king directly for 
recognition.36 The authority of a popular assembly, a 
town meeting, thus became the means, first, of defying the 
royal governor and then of establishing a bond between the 
new city, its dependencies, and the king.
France: Captains and Crown
In France the relationship between noble lords and 
local assemblies developed in a different manner. The 
French kings did not have to undertake a reconquista to 
reclaim territory taken by Moslems, but they did have to 
subdue powerful vassals to convince them to accept royal 
authority and justice. Ecclesiastical organization and 
urban development played an important role in the 
establishment of French monarchical sovereignty, and in 
France, as in Italy and Spain, the captain's office bridged
35Ibid., 71.
36Ibid., 95-97.
28
the gap between noble and non-noble, rich and poor, country 
and town. The royal captain offered protection to the local 
church and linked the leaders of the local community to the 
state.
Medieval historian Joseph R. Strayer defined a kingdom 
as "people who recognized a certain royal family as their 
royal family, just as a kin-group was composed of people who 
recognized the founders of a certain family as their common 
ancestors." The kings of France transformed the local urban 
and ecclesiastical officials into servants of the crown by 
converting captains into provincial governors and then using 
intendants to impose royal financial controls. The 
historical development of the royal military office which 
produced the modern rank of captain was part of a broader 
institutional evolution. The conceptual framework
associated with the "Christian assembly", enhanced by the 
categories of Roman Law, grew more sophisticated with the 
passage of time. Theologians and legal scholars, however, 
did not envision the development of the modern state as a 
means "of incorporating new territories and new populations" 
into an existing structure.37 They did, nevertheless,
37Joseph R. Strayer, On the Medieval Origins of the 
Modern State (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970),
11, 25; See also his "France: The Holy Land, The Chosen
People, and The Most Christian King," Theordore K. Rabb and 
Jerrold E. Siegel, eds., Action and Conviction in Early 
Modern Europe:____Essays in Memory of E. H. Harbison
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construct a theological model of the earthly and heavenly 
cities which spawned and defined the orders and offices 
associated with the genesis of the territorial state.
The captain's office mediated between orders and 
classes. Long before the captains (military leaders) became 
royal officers, they performed administrative functions as 
clan leaders. Just as clan and household headship served to 
organize and mobilize the people on a tribal level, so, too, 
did the captain as the head of his company or corps operate 
as an effective means of administrative and social control 
in developing the dynastic state of the Medieval period.
In the theological model, the family not only extended 
beyond the kinship group of husband, wife, and children, but 
the Greek and Roman principle of household administration in 
which a master-servant relationship existed between husband 
and wife was applied to all social and administrative 
relationships. Augustine's principle that the soul should 
rule over the body was drawn from scripture, but the 
translation of Aristotle's Politics in the thirteenth 
century reinforced it.38 The intellectually and morally
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969), 3.
38The impact of Aristotle's social theory on European 
political discourse has been examined by Otto Brunner, "Das 
'Ganze Haus' und die alteuropaische 'Okonomik'", in Neue 
Wecre der Verfassunqs- und Sozialqeschichte. 2d ed. 
(Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1968), 103-27; In a
recent article David Herlihy explains that authority, not
30
superior master had a natural duty to protect and rule over 
the servant who performed his or her duties of office as a 
member of a lower order of the same body. Both order and
office must be interpreted as branches of a hierocratic 
system fashioned with bonds of personal fidelity. Each 
order comprised a segment of the universal Christian 
assembly, and each order had its "captain". To assemble and 
motivate the "captains" and give them their proper rank 
within the "republic" or "monarchy" was a task ultimately 
undertaken by the king of France.
The conceptual framework of French political discourse 
was based on the ideal of gathering one people under one 
ruler, but the concept of sovereignty had to be developed 
and redefined before effective, centralized, bureaucratic 
control could be exercised.39 The king performed the 
duties of his office on behalf of the people of France. 
Strayer concludes that Philip the Fair relied more on 
persuasion and propaganda than the use of force in his 
exercise of sovereign power.40 J. Russell Major maintains 
that Renaissance monarchs "were obeyed when they could get
consanguinity, "was at the core of the ancient concept of 
family." "Family," American Historical Review 96 (February, 
1991): 2.
39J. Russell Major, Representative Government in Early 
Modern France (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980), 3.
40Strayer, "France," 8.
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the bulk of the population to support their cause." His 
careful examination of the procedures followed in selecting 
deputies to attend provincial and general assemblies was 
undertaken to support his contention" that there was an 
increase in popular participation in government" between 
1484 and 1560.41 Yet the monarch did not receive his 
authority from the people, and his right to rule depended 
more on his claim to superior wisdom due to its divine 
origin.
A thread of continuity can be traced in the theological 
model of the monarchy. Starting with Augustine's concept of 
the res publica Christiana. the principle that "God shall 
rule the man, and the soul shall rule the body"42 was 
extended to any master-servant relationship. The ranking of 
first, second, and third estates was based on this 
principle. During the seventeenth century, venal officials 
rationalized their resistance to the king's new agents and 
claimed that they were safeguarding royal authority at a 
time when the "true situation in a disordered state"43 had
41J. Russell Major, Representative Institutions in 
Renaissance France. 1421-1559 (Madison: University of
Wisconsin Press, 1960), 14. Representative Government. 1.
42Augustine, The City of God (New York: Modern
Library, 1950), 708.
43Roland Mousnier, "The Financial Officiers During the 
Fronde," in P.J. Coveney, trans. and ed., France in Crisis: 
1620-1675 (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1977), 219.
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been masked. In this instance, to defend the king's
subjects from unjust exploitation was tantamount to serving 
the king. Yet these same venal officials recognized the 
need for governors and intendants who would exercise royal 
authority to protect and provide justice for the king's 
provincial subjects. One report noted that the "disorders" 
created a situation in which the "people begin to taste the 
need for intendants in the provinces, and that by comparing 
past times with the present, the wisest of them consider 
that a province is without a soul if it is deprived of a 
qouverneur or an intendant■"44 At issue between the old 
and new agents of the king was not the acceptance or 
rejection of royal authority, but rather the protection of 
the king's people.
Different assemblies had different officers, but the 
king exercised his office by performing his functions on 
behalf of the various assemblies that together represented 
the French people. His duty was to serve God by protecting 
the people of France.45 In that capacity the king 
functioned both as captain-general and as pere de famille of 
the French people.
44Quoted by Mousnier, Ibid.. 220.
45Strayer, Medieval Origins. 56.
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The assertion of royal sovereignty and effective 
implementation of royal edicts in an expanding realm 
entailed the separation of military and administrative 
functions. The enlargment of the polis into the corporate 
organism of the French kingdom produced a distinction 
between civil "household" administration on the lower, 
material level and the sovereign crown on a higher 
intellectual plane. What Otto Brunner has called the 
"herrschaftliche Prinzip" provided for the "domination of 
the ruler ... in the polis" and the domination of the master 
in the household. The crown was the "organizing soul" of 
the estates.46 The function of the king was to provide 
justice and protection for the people gathered into his 
great household.
Originally vassals performed royal service and 
established their position in the social and political 
hierarchy by "fighting for the king", but the development of 
a money economy permitted magistrates and financiers to 
acquire honor in the king's service. The increasing 
importance of judicial and financial officers provided an 
alternative pathway to honor and glory, but the medieval
46Brunner, "Das 'Ganze Haus'," 112-114. See also Claude 
de Seyssel, The Monarchy of France, trans. J.H. Hexter (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1981).
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pattern of local independence was difficult to break.47 
Captains and provincial governors resisted the efforts of 
intendants to dilute their power by taking over their 
functions.
Regional commercial development and the increasing 
importance of money revenue gave royal judicial and 
financial officials the opportunity to use their offices to 
build official fiefdoms. The triumph of monarchical 
absolutism in the seventeenth century has obscured the 
popular buttresses of the French monarchy that Strayer and 
Russell Major have labored to expose. These historians have 
focused on the transformation of a royal dynasty into a 
modern state, but the proliferation of venal offices in the 
sixteenth century converted public offices into private 
property. Under Louis XIII and Richelieu, the king's 
council continued its centralizing activities but moved away 
from the doctrine of contractual government which was 
ultimately embraced by venal officials.48
47See Roland Mousnier, The Institutions of France Under 
the Absolute Monarchy. 1598-1789: Society and the State,
trans. Brian Pearce (Chicago: University of Chicago Press),
216-221.
48Russell Major maintains that "the emergence of the 
bureaucracy did not take place until the late sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries when it proved to be as much a 
hindrance as a help in creating a more absolute monarchy." 
Representative Government in Early Modern France (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1980), 5. For the role of the king's 
council in the process of centralization see James D. Hardy,
35
Royal, provincial, and municipal officials were the 
agents of their respective corporate bodies. The process of 
subjecting local pens, robes, and swords to the authority of 
the king is the story of political centralization. In a 
dynastic state the bonds of kinship, loyalty, and mutual 
interest supported the king's authority and enabled the 
crown to exercise a degree of control over the various 
corporate bodies which constituted the monarchy. A vassal's 
compensation for performing the duties of his office was his 
land or fief which produced revenues which would be shared 
with the crown only on a contractual basis. When the pen 
and the robe began to produce revenues, it was only natural 
that the holders of judicial and financial offices would 
begin to create bureaucratic fiefdoms. As one moves from 
duke or count to captain-general or governor in the 
historical development of the French royal bureaucracy, the 
basic function of the captain's office as the significant 
link between the king and his people, between the crown and 
local corporations, becomes visible. From this perspective 
it can be seen that the commissioners, later intendants, 
were royal agents who exercised the king's sovereign
Jr., Judicial Politics in the Old Regime; The Parlement of 
Paris During the Regency (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State
University Press, 1967), v-vi and Jerry A. Micelle, "The 
King's Council in the Old Regime: An Edict Concerning
Procedure," M.A. Thesis, Louisiana State University, 1967.
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authority by taking over judicial, financial, and police 
functions of recalcitrant officeholders without completely 
relieving them of their rights of office.49 The 
collection of money taxes and establishment of financial 
controls dramatically transformed the methods of royal 
service and the exercise of sovereignty, but the incentive 
of service as the pathway to honor and higher degrees of 
nobility continued to attract both nobles and commoners to 
offices.
The first important steps in this centuries-long 
process were taken by Philip Augustus. In 1204, when 
William du Hommet transferred his loyalty from the king-duke 
of Normandy to the king of France, the separation of 
financial and judicial functions had not yet begun to take
4 9 The hostility of the "traditional" royal fiscal 
agents, the tresoriers de France. toward the intendants they 
accused of being instruments of the traitants (tax farmers) 
during the years before the outbreak of the Fronde was 
symptomatic of the rivalry between royal agents who 
justified their actions in the provinces by reference to the 
interests of the crown and concern for the people they 
claimed to represent. See Roland Mousnier, "The Financial 
Officiers During the Fronde," 209. By the eighteenth 
century, the royal commissioners who had been accused of 
destroying the people by exercising extraordinary judicial 
authority had become, "within each generality . . . the 
personal embodiment of the monarch's sovereignty and the 
supreme executor of the Crown's will." (Ibid., 204) By 
then, according to Vivian Gruder, they fulfilled their 
responsibility for "governing the provinces in the interests 
of the Crown and with concern for the people who lived 
there." The Roval Provincial Intendants: A Governing Elite
in Eighteenth-Centurv France (Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 1968), 209.
place within either household. Only gradually after the 
reign of Philip Augustus did the constable become the 
commander of the king's feudal army.50 During the 
centuries of state- formation in France, the captains- 
general, who became provincial governors, used their swords 
to protect the interest of local corporations. Royal 
judicial and financial officers administered justice and 
collected fees from those local bodies who agreed to accept 
royal justice and contribute monetary resources to the 
crown, initially on a contractual basis. Theoretically, the 
head of each corporate assembly was subject first to the 
"lord" of the local territory, and through the local lord to 
the king. The duties performed by royal officials within 
the local territory represented a division of functions 
which derived from the one monarchical office of the king at 
the head of la chose publique. The medieval society of 
orders consisted of many different "bodies" —  monasteries, 
towns, guilds, universities, confraternities, etc. —  each 
of which was led by a potential "captain." When any local 
company was recruited for military service, the company and 
its captain could be placed under the command of a captain- 
general or governor by means of royal letters of provision.
50Charles Petit-Dutaillis, The Feudal Monarchy in
France and England; From the Tenth to the Thirteenth
Century (London: Kegan, Paul: 1936; repr. New York: Harper
Torchbooks, 1964), 161, 164, 235.
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According to letters of provision issued by a municipal 
maritime administration in 1318, a council of barons and 
prelates exercised control over captains and fleets.60 In 
Aristotelian and Augustinian terminology, royal authority 
emanated from the soul in the person of the king.61 
Consequently, maritime captains submitted to the authority 
of the provincial governor as captain-general carried out 
the duties of their office. Whether it was logical or not, 
the king's right to rule his kingdom was theoretically 
rooted in his ministerium to rule the "populus Dei" as head 
of the royal household administration. The cooperation of 
popular municipal bodies was secured for the king by 
captains who were able to lead their companies and guide 
their members in the performance of royal service. The 
leadership of the army belonged to men who could effectively 
wield a sword in the service of the king, but those who wore 
judicial robes, carried the purse, and wielded the pen in 
the service of the king were also royal agents who expected 
to acquire nobility and bask in the light of royal majesty 
as rewards for their work.
60Charles de La Ronciere, Histoire de la Marine 
Francaise. 6 vols. (Paris: Plon, 1898-1932), 1:220.
61Aristotle, Politics 1.5.1254; Augustine, City of God. 
705-708.
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The captain's office became the primary link between 
the French king and his people during the late medieval and 
early modern centuries when cooperation and conflict 
produced the liaisons and alliances that shaped and 
established the relations between the king and his estates. 
The relationship between the king and his counts and dukes 
was based on the theological model which recognized the 
ultimate authority of the king while actually depending on 
the bond of fidelity. Official rank in the society of 
orders depended on the connection established with the 
king's council as well as meritorious service. As soul and 
head of la chose publique. the crown directed the lower 
members in the provinces. The office of captain-general or 
governor provided a greater degree of centralized control by 
giving royal authority to one man who would rule the 
province according to principles spelled out in his letters 
of provision. The captain-general was essentially the royal 
official who commanded all the particular captains 
exercising authority over all corporate bodies carrying on 
activities in his province. In effect, the letters gave the 
captain-general the duty of bringing all the provincial 
corporations under control of the king.
The theological model of the French monarchy acknowl­
edged the right of the king to make final judgments, but 
provincial military commanders continued to assert their
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prerogatives over administrative officials exercising civil 
jurisdiction. Commissaires directly responsible to the 
king's council could be used to report on the activities of 
the captain-generals just as the missi dominici had been 
dispatched by Charlemagne to superintend the affairs of his 
counts. Nevertheless, the captains-general belonged to a 
higher order than the civilian officers because military 
service was traditionally more meritorious than civil 
service. The governors and intendants did not represent two 
different social classes,62 but they did perform their 
functions as members of two different orders during the time 
when the medieval society of orders was being transformed by 
long-term economic development, and the absolute monarchy 
was attempting to bring the French provinces under 
centralized control. The institutional reality of 
overlapping jurisdictions and the inclination of royal 
officials toward the creation of bureaucratic fiefdoms meant 
that the establishment of effective centralized control 
based on payment of salaries through a bureaucratic system 
depended on the social, economic, and political changes that 
took place in the wakes of the Hundred Year's War, the Wars 
of Religion, and the Fronde.
62Gruder, Provincial Intendants. 208.
Richelieu's intendants served as agents of the crown, 
but royal sovereignty required a division of administrative 
functions. No matter how the division of authority was 
made, no matter whether the royal agency operating in a city 
or province was a single individual, a council, or an 
assembly of notables, the basic relationship between 
magistrate and people was the relationship between officer 
and corps. The officer performed his duties and received his 
benefit from the corps of which he was the executive agency. 
Each executive agency, single or collective —  duke, 
captain-general, or municipal or provincial council —  was 
a little king presiding over its people and exercising royal 
jurisdiction over its part of la chose publique.
The city of Toulouse provides an excellent example of 
the evolution of local institutions and the acceptance of 
royal authority. The magistrates (capitouls) of the 
medieval commune represented the various districts and 
corporate bodies, forming a consulate which exercised 
sovereign judicial and legislative authority. Originally 
there were twenty-four capitouls who functioned as the 
captains or syndics of administrative districts. Their 
number was reduced to eight at the beginning of the 
fifteenth century. During this crucial period of state- 
formation in France, the capitouls became the link between 
the populace of the city and the French monarchy. Service
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to the king of France during the Hundred Years War opened 
the way for the city to be incorporated into the French 
state. Royal service by officials acting as agents for the 
municipality created a bond of loyalty between the king and 
the people and their captains. The process reached a climax 
in 1459 when the crown conferred nobility on the consulate 
of Toulouse.63
The king acknowledged the noble status of the capitouls 
of Toulouse because of their service just as earlier kings 
had recognized the nobility of counts and dukes and later 
kings would confer nobility on councillors serving as 
intendants. Length of service and noble birth determined an 
individual's status in the social hierarchy, but military 
service as a captain of a company opened the door to the 
higher orders.64 An appointment as captain-general could 
be given to any male regardless of his birth or status, but 
when that individual or his descendants became the governor 
of a province, the noble status of his family was assured.
As corporate bodies families, companies, and cities 
were linked to the crown when their agents recognized the 
authority of the king's agent. Each region of France had a
63Robert A. Schneider, Public Life in Toulouse. 1463- 
1789: From Municipal Republic to Cosmopolitan City (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1989), 14-15.
64La Ronciere, Marine Francaise. 1:513-514.
different history, but according to Robert Harding, the men 
first recognized as governors of Languedoc, Dauphine, 
Guyenne, Champagne, Lyonnais, Ile-de-France, Normandy, and 
Picardy between 1337 and 1504 were "successors to a long 
line of captains-general and lieutenants-general who had 
[previously] commanded the military forces and maintained 
the defenses in the province without the title of governor." 
The connection between the captains-general and the people 
of a province represented an extension of the officers' 
leadership role as captains of the gendarmerie. As Harding 
writes the "men in the companies were . . . personally tied 
to their captain, who controlled recruitment and promotion." 
The captains of various provincial towns received their 
commissions directly from the provincial governor.65
By the sixteenth century, the medieval captains-general 
had been given the new title of governor, and between 1515 
and 1560, fifty-one out of fifty-two French provincial 
governors were former captains.66 Robert Harding argues 
that the provincial governors were intentionally chosen from 
the most prestigious provincial families "to coopt the
65Robert R. Harding, Anatomy of a Power Elite: The
Provincial Governors of Early Modern France (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1978), 9, 22, 97.
66Ibid.. 9, 21.
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traditional local power of the Aristocracy."67 Viewed 
from the other direction, however, powerful leaders of local 
communities agreed to become creatures of the king to 
enhance their status in their provinces. The governors 
appropriated the royal mystique to project what a contem­
porary author described as the "image of God and one of his 
ministers on earth." The greater the distance of his post 
from Paris, the rarer the visits of the king, the easier it 
was for a captain-governor to play the role of a surrogate 
king.68
In the early modern period the crown extended royal 
sovereignty by placing the captain-general within a 
hierarchy in which the governor represented the person of 
the king as commandant-general. The letters of provision 
for new governors stipulated that the governor was the 
king's personal representative "in all the affairs of the 
province." In that capacity the governor was responsible 
for the security, peace, and tranquillity of the subjects 
residing in the province. Each governor was surrounded by 
an entourage of fiddles, satellites, and compagnons. These 
members of his community were the chiefs of their respective 
companies or corporate bodies. Just as the captain's name,
67 Ibid., 15.
68Ibid.. 11-13.
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reputation, and colors had been the "focus of company pride 
and morale" in the Middle Ages, the governors served to 
mobilize and motivate the local community. Indeed they 
functioned as mediators between the local community and the 
royal court.69
It was the captain-general and then the governor of the 
province who was ultimately responsible for the order and 
tranquillity of his province. In addition to power, the 
office provided opportunities to gain wealth by means of 
brokerage and the distribution of offices, but many 
governors borrowed money and incurred tremendous debts in 
the royal service. Honor, prestige, and wealth were 
powerful motives. There were, of course, different concep­
tions of honor, but the monarchy used the distribution of 
offices to identify honor with royal service.
Honor required the governor above all to maintain his 
place, which meant the territory he held for the king. The 
worst thing that could happen to a governor was to lose his 
place.70 A governor could be rewarded for gaining or 
holding a place by being installed in a knightly order. For 
example, in 1469 the order of St. Michel was created to 
reward valor and promote loyalty to the king. In 1693, the
69Ibid.. 14-15, 21-22.
70Harding, Provincial Governors. 69-70.
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order of St. Louis became part of what Harding has termed 
the inflation of honors.71
The identification with the royal person and the need 
to maintain one's place provide the key for understanding 
the survival of local autonomy in an age of absolutism. On 
the one hand, nothing mattered except honor and service to 
the king. On the other hand, the interest of the king was 
not as important as holding one's place in the service of 
the king. In 1591, Hurault took note of the extreme 
localization of the governors' concerns when he wrote that 
once a governor was installed in his office, the place no 
longer belonged to the king.72 
France: The Crown and the Sea
Maritime organization was the key to French expansion 
overseas. Coastal cities and fleets had to be brought under 
royal control. During the period of state formation, local 
captains and constables came under the authority of the king 
and his constable, but coastal cities had their captains who 
often either controlled or were responsible to municipal 
councils.73 Royal service performed by port cities and 
their captains spanned the long period when royal justice
71Ibid. , 81. See also Mousnier, Institutions of France.
232.
72Harding, Provincial Governors. 70-71.
73La Ronciere, Marine Francaise. 2:160.
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and the royal financial administration developed as 
instruments of political centralization. The coastal 
captains were brought together under non-royal captains- 
general who ultimately bound themselves to the king of 
France by an oath of loyalty to the admiral of the fleet who 
himself was ultimately linked to the king by an oath 
administered by the parlement of Paris.74
Port cities produced substantial revenues during the 
Crusades and later during the Hundred Years War. During 
these conflicts the Norman navy came under the control of 
the Admiral of France who functioned as a powerful vassal of 
the king. Yet the historical tradition of "Viking equality" 
was difficult to overcome. For a time Norman princes 
coveted the title of due des pirates.75 The Norman kings 
and dukes had adopted the methods used by the Arabs to bring 
the fleet under one chief, but after the conquest of 
Normandy by Philip Augustus, the medieval French kings had 
difficulty establishing harmony between the constable and 
the admiral. Under Louis XI and Charles VIII, unity of 
command over the fleets broke down completely. Command and 
control continued to depend primarily on the bond of loyalty 
between the king and the admiralty. Yet at the dawn of the
74Ibid.. 2:48.
75Ibid.. 1:95,124.
48
sixteenth century, the French king had to reckon not with 
one but with four different admiralties.76
Armed merchant fleets faced the perpetual threat of 
Mediterranean pirates. Royal funds were used to build 
fleets and ports during wartime. For example, Louis IX 
promoted the development of Aigues-Mortes in preparation for 
his famous crusades. The keenest example of the linkage 
between king and captain in France occurred when the "ancien 
capitaine du peuple de Genes" agreed to enter French royal 
service to develop and govern the new port in return for 
half the revenue.77 The Levant continued to have its own 
admiral until Provence and Languedoc were joined to the 
French crown. The letters of provision issued to Rene of 
Savoie in February, 1515, specified that, as "governor and 
lieutenant general over land and sea in the county of 
Provence", he would exercise sovereign jurisdiction over the 
admiralty. Frangois I suppressed the governor's sovereign 
rights in judicial matters and gave the Parlement of 
Provence the right to exercise judgment in the last 
resort.78
76Ibid., 1:134-137; 2:439-40. Petit-Dutaillis, Feudal 
Monarchy. 214-26.
77Ibid.. 1:191.
78Ibid.. 2:448-449.
The admiral of France was a commander in chief of the 
French navy in only the broadest sense of the term. At best 
he commanded a coalition of forces that broke up 
periodically even during wartime. He functioned as a 
powerful officer who exercised, in his jurisdiction, as much 
control over the administration of justice, the collection 
and disbursement of revenue as the king himself.79 All 
maritime officials appointed by the king were given the 
title of lieutenant to affirm their subordination to the 
admiral's authority.80 The powerful garde du clos des 
galees du rov. functioning as commissary-general of the 
marine, performed many of the same duties that would be 
assigned by Colbert to royal naval intendants.81 
France: Louis XIII/ Richelieu, and the Admiralties
By the edict of October 162 6, Richelieu combined in his 
person the office of admiral of France and Brittany held by 
Charles de Montmorency-Dampville, with the admiralty of 
Guyenne, and the vice-royalty of New France. He also 
proclaimed his authority over the fleets of Languedoc and 
Provence.82 In doing so, Richelieu attempted to establish
79Ibid., 1:400-401; 2:46.
80Ibid.. 1:401.
8•‘•Ibid. . 1:401-02.
82Ibid.. 4:559-61.
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royal control by means of a system in which the admirals' 
agents expected to extract value from the sea and share the 
proceeds with their commanders just as tax-farmers collected 
revenue in the name of the king.83
Even so Richelieu continued to rely on traditional 
methods of command and control and on procedures established 
in the ordinances and edicts of 1373, 1517, 1544, and 1584 
to exercise control over French naval resources. Local 
customs had to be respected to insure the cooperation of 
captains and municipalities who participated in royal 
activity more as a coalition of forces than as part of a 
national navy. Even Richelieu's employment of naval 
intendants was not completely new. He formed commercial 
companies whose members included captains of ships and 
ports, secretaries of the king, treasurers, as well as 
echevins and syndics of port cities. Richelieu invited 
these entrepreneurs to subordinate their "individual 
interests to the general interests of the state",84 but 
the development of a naval bureaucracy with strict financial 
controls did not begin until the reign of Louis XIV.
Richelieu's naval policy actually produced a new form 
of feudal structure for France's army and navy, a personal
83Ibid.. 4:558.
84Ibid.. 4:583-85, 503-04.
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hierarchy of civil and military captains serving the king. 
As the self-proclaimed grand maitre de la navigation. 
Richelieu continued to depend on personal liaisons and 
alliances to marshal the naval resources of France against 
the enemies of the French state. In his Testament 
Politigue. Richelieu employs an extended metaphor of head 
and body to articulate the relationship between the king and 
his people that reinforced the traditional role of the 
captain in European society.
For Richelieu command and control emanated from the 
head of the state whose will was translated into action via 
a complex nerve system. Maritime administration provided 
the king with a powerful arm, controlled by the nerves, 
which linked the maritime provinces to the head. In an age 
when the structure of the human body was becoming an 
important object of scientific interest and when knowledge 
of the human nervous system was practically non-existent, 
Richelieu developed a crude analogy to explain the 
relationship between the king and his people and the need to 
use land and sea power for the tranquillity and welfare of 
the state.
In chapter 7 of the Political Testament. Richelieu 
articulated the relationship between the state and the royal 
household by using the analogy of the human body. For 
Richelieu as for Aristotle, Isidore of Seville, and Claude
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de Seyssel, the state was an enlarged household. Cities and 
provinces could not experience tranquillity until they 
submitted to royal captains obedient to the king as head. 
Each family or city was a microcosm of the universal res 
publica ruled by the king as pere de famille.85
As pere de famille the king was responsible for
revitalizing and reforming a corrupt and disintegrated 
society. The reform of the state had to begin with the 
reformation of the royal household. Reason dictated that 
the king receive service from and give sustenance to the 
estates which consisted of Church, Nobility, and officers
who marched at the head of the people. In order to
accomplish his task, an effective king needed three things: 
good counsel, the authority of Rome, and sea power.86 The 
king had to command the faithful service of his officers 
who, in turn, functioned as the nerves controlling the
various families or companies which made up the body of the 
state.87
85Armand-Jean du Plessis, cardinal de Richelieu, 
Testament Politique, ed. Louis Andre, 7th ed. (Paris, 1947), 
256-279.
86Ibid.. 401.
87In his memoirs, Richelieu used the word "company" to 
refer to the estates of Languedoc. Major, Representative 
Government. 555.
A robust body would respond to the initiative and
control of the head.88 In a parallel fashion, the power 
of the local prince was necessary for the greatness of kings 
and the welfare of their government.89 Richelieu insisted 
that the ultimate point of a prince's power was the
possession of the heart of his subjects.90 This assertion
runs parallel to the modern theory that the authority of the
prince was derived from the community and that the people 
were subjects of the crown represented by their 
deputies.91 The difference lies in the intermediary role 
of the officier who had to respond to the rational authority 
of the head as opposed to the emotional impulses of the 
people. In the provinces and on the sea, the primary link 
between the king and his corps was the royal captain-general 
or governor.
Richelieu engaged in the process of bringing 
recalcitrant provincial officials to the point of responsive 
obedience to the king with the ultimate objective of 
transforming a disordered corps into a tranguil state under
88Richelieu, Testament. 396.
89Ibid., 372.
90Ibid.. 430.
91Major, Representative Government. 183-184.
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the authority and control of the rational king imbued with 
divine wisdom.
Loyalty, fidelity, and the determination to place the 
interest of the state above private interests were required 
of all the king's servants, but those officers motivated by 
reason served on a higher level. Richelieu made a 
distinction between nobles who served the king on the 
battlefield and the gens de guerre destined for 
administrative affairs. The king, who was ultimately 
accountable to God, had to seek the counsel and service of 
officers who performed their duties with reason, steadiness, 
and zeal. Passion and impatience may have been desirable in 
ordinary sailors and soldiers, but administrative officials 
had to guard against fickleness and channel the energy of 
lower members of the corps for the benefit of the king and 
his people.92
Richelieu endeavored to transform the material 
interests of companies and cities into the land and sea 
power of the kingdom of France. Administrative gens de 
guerre functioned as rational links of a hierocratic system 
fashioned with bonds of personal fidelity.93 As the
92Richelieu, Testament. 301, 374, 380-382, 396.
93J. Russell Major makes the same point in "The Crown 
and the Aristocracy in Renaissance France," American 
Historical Review 69 (April 1964): 637-639.
"head” of the state, the king governed and guided the well- 
ordered state.94 As his "arms" royal captains linked the 
orders to each other and to the head. Loyalty and obedience 
of captains to the king promoted and produced the 
rationality and nobility which were the gauge of a tranquil 
and healthy body politic. In his analysis of the power
of the French king on land, Richelieu stressed the need for 
"chiefs worthy to command."95 The elimination of the 
intermediaries between the king and his people was not as 
important as rendering them and their companies responsive 
to the head of the body. The same reasoning informed
Richelieu's maritime policy. Sea captains, their crews, and 
ultimately the colonial companies that emerged from the 
maritime expansion of the French state extended the power of 
the French king into overseas provinces as "arms" of the 
state. Richelieu's plan for challenging Dutch and English 
naval superiority was not to finance and build a national 
navy from scratch, but rather to bring the merchant fleets 
under royal authority and insure that maritime revenues and 
expenditures be channeled in the national interest.96 
Maritime provinces and port cities made up the lower organs
94Richelieu, Testament. 395.
95Ibid.. 379-388; quotation, 388.
96Richelieu, Testament. 127, 247.
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of the body politic. Concern with private interest on that 
level spawned corruption. Obedience and reasonable service 
would promote health. Yet bringing urban maritime 
enterprises under royal command and control was no easy 
task.
Richelieu's navy disintegrated during the Fronde. In 
1669 Jean Baptiste Colbert, then Louis XIV's controller- 
general, created a new Ministry of Marine and established 
financial controls by submitting it to his own ministry. In 
so doing Colbert established a modern naval bureaucracy.
Maintaining control of sea captains was no easy task, 
however, as Kenneth Andrews has shown for England, where the 
navy developed in similar fashion.97 Dissension was a 
perennial problem, and there was a narrow line between 
privateering and piracy. Acts of insolence and factions 
abounded. Some captains saw their companies split in two, 
and it was not uncommon for seamen to set up another master 
or elect a new captain.98 While parliamentary sovereignty 
blossomed in London and bureaucratic absolutism bloomed in 
Paris, a new form of feudalism persisted at sea.
97Kenneth Andrews, Ships. Money and Politics; 
Seafaring and Naval Enterprise in the Reign of Charles I 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 3, 13, 75.
98Ibid.. 63-64.
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Maritime Administration
In an important book on the survival of feudalism in
the age of Louis XIV, Eugene Asher has observed that the
concept of duty and obedience to the state . . . 
was present in the minds of naval captains and 
admiralty lieutenants only insofar as it suited 
their personal interests, and then only in direct 
proportion to the ability of the central power 
and its agents to control their actions."
The naval captains and admiralty lieutenants continued to
resist the efforts of Colbert and his successors in the
Marine Ministry to establish centralized control.
When Colbert appointed the two-year old Count de
Vermandois as Admiral of France in 1669, he assumed the
functions previously performed by an old-style noble officer
of the crown, presiding over the navy as an independent
corps rooted, grounded, and funded by coastal cities and
provinces.100 The predecessor of the young count was the
Duke of Beaufort who had held Richelieu's title of Grand
Maitre. Louis XIV had reprimanded Beaufort for his failure
to cooperate with the intendants and other "civilian
administrators", but Beaufort continued to resist the
crown's agents. In June, 1669, the duke expelled a royal
commissioner sent to inspect his ships and replaced him with
"Eugene L. Asher, The Resistance to the Maritime 
Classes: The Survival of Feudalism in the France of Colbert
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1960), 31.
100Ibid., 39. See also La Ronciere, Marine Francaise. 
5:359-360.
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his own appointee. Less than a month later, Colbert took 
advantage of Beaufort's death in battle to suppress the 
position of Grand Master and recreate the office of 
Admiral.101 The appointment of a child as admiral was
actually a subtle means of securing the control of the crown 
over the admiralty. Still, the problem of bringing the 
naval captains and admiralty lieutenants under state control 
remained to be solved.
The naval captains continued to resist the efforts of 
the marine minister to regulate the recruitment and payment 
of sailors as well as the provisioning of ships. When naval 
intendants attempted to prevent the profiteering practices 
of the commanders, the captains "contended that they were 
entitled to a share of the seamen's pay as 'compensation' 
for their efforts in the levy."102 In March 1670, Colbert 
convinced the king to transfer the provisioning duties of 
the captains to Sieur Jacquier as munitioner-general of the 
fleet, but captains continued to profit from the sale of 
provisions even if they had to intimidate and starve their 
crews to do so.103
101Asher, Maritime Classes. 39-41.
102Ibid., 33.
103Ibid., 34.
59
Colbert made important changes in maritime administra­
tion, but his famous Ordonnance de la Marine of 1681 was 
essentially a codification of time-tested principles that 
had been used along the coasts of Europe since ancient 
times. The really significant change entailed transferring 
control of the French navy from the admiral, who was a 
powerful "vassal" commissioned as a royal officer by letters 
of provision, to the Ministry of the Marine controlled by 
the crown.
The Ordonnance de la Marine was based on the
development of the legal theory and practical experience of 
Europe. It represented a codification of principles 
established in every port of the continent. Source material 
for drafting the Ordonnance included the Laws of Rhodes and 
Rome, the ordinances of Charles V and Philip II, the
judgments of Oleron, the Venetian Consulate, ordinances of 
Wisby, and the Teutonic Hanse as well as edicts and
regulations drafted by Cardinal Richelieu.104 Because 
France was now a colonial power, this European tradition was 
being applied to French America. The significance of the 
term ancien capitaine and the connection between the French 
provincial governors, the old medieval office of captain-
104Rene Josue Valin, Nouveau Commentaire sur 
1' Ordonnance de la Marine, du mo is d'Aout 1681 ... (La
Rochelle, 1766), l:iv-v.
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general, and the capitaines de la c6te of Canada emerges in 
the provisions of the maritime ordinances regulating the 
appointment and service of coast-guard officers. Coast­
guard captains and other officers referred to in the Marine 
Ordinance were called captains-general, majors and aides- 
major, or coast guard lieutenants. These officers formed 
the general staff of each capitainerie.
The Ordinance of 1584 confirmed the admiral's customary 
prerogative of nominating and installing coast-guard 
officers, but in 1669 the king reserved the right to fill 
these offices by royal commission.105 The Ordonnance de 
la Marine made it possible for a militia captain to be 
commissioned as a capitaine aarde-cote. or capitaine de la 
cote, as he would be called in Canada.106 Thus he would 
enter the royal service and receive standardized 
compensation. The right to appoint all marine officers was 
exercised by the Minister of the Marine.107 According to 
title V, article 1 of the Ordinance of 1681 the capitaines 
garde-cotes. their lieutenants, and ensigns were obliged to 
take an oath in the presence of the admiral or his
105Ibid.. 2:481.
106Benjamin Suite, "The Captains of Militia," Canadian 
Historical Review. 1 (1920): 241.
107Valin, Nouveau Commentaire. 2:496.
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lieutenant at the headquarters where the captain would 
serve.108
These capitaines qarde-cotes came under more specific 
rules in 1716. By the regulation of 28 January (title I, 
article 1) they were given the rank of capitaine 
d'infanterie. In case they were serving in a higher 
capacity, their commissions might give them the rank of 
major, but along with the higher grade, they would "have 
also the rank of capitaine d'infanterie."109 Service 
under this rank might open the way into the Order of Saint 
Louis. By title II, article 1, Capitaines gardes-cotes were 
required to accumulate pertinent data relating to their 
captaincies. This would include information about terrain, 
roads, and other information that would be essential in time 
of war. They also maintained a roll of all inhabitants aged 
eighteen to sixty. Article VII provided that the senior 
captain of the highest rank would take command when forces 
were combined.110
Colbert's Ordonnance and subsequent amendments fostered 
royal control of French maritime captains, but traditional 
practices persisted. The ordinances of 1734 and 17 3 5
108Ibid.. 2:481.
109Ibid.. 2:509.
110Ibid.. 2:510.
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established rules for determining seniority and giving 
preference to noble officers. Rene Valin stated in his 
commentary on the Ordinance of 1681 that it was understood 
that the captain-general would function under the authority 
and with the approval of the commandant-general of the 
province and the general and particular officers that he 
commanded.111 Colbert's naval reforms provided a
financial lever for the French crown, but centralized 
control in France's territorial and commercial empire still 
required the loyalty and obedience of maritime captains 
serving as intermediaries between the king and his subjects 
in the provinces and overseas.
French Sovereignty in New France
The men who developed the diplomatic language and 
established the tradition of the ancien capitaine in Canada 
were experienced frontiersmen who exercised effective 
control over villages in New France. Colbert's maritime 
ordinance of 1681 placed them under the authority of the 
commandant-general of the province. The novelty of the new 
ordinance, however, rested not in the subordination of the 
captains to the commandant-general but rather in the 
financial controls of the new civilian administrators. 
These new administrators were royal commissioners who
111Ibid.. 2:491.
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replaced the municipal officials of the port cities which, 
during the period of state formation, made financial 
contributions to the admiral and to the crown.
The captain's office provided the original link between 
the crown and the provinces. Under Colbert's Ordonnance. 
the maritime captains were bound to resist financial 
controls implemented by naval intendants because the 
division of administrative functions diluted the traditional 
authority of ship captains. The old captains exercised the 
authority of peres de famille. but the new rules required 
them to conform to a higher, rational level of authority. 
In theory the naval intendants would protect the king's 
subjects from those who would take advantage of them, even 
when it was royal officials who abused their authority.112 
In practice the captain exercised his traditional 
prerogative of reconciling loyalty and service to the king 
with the mutual obligation of protecting and providing for 
the king's people. As the primary link between the king and 
his people, the effective officer was the one who balanced 
the interest of his people with the interest of the king.113
112According to Russell Major, Henry IV "restrained his 
own demands and protected his earliest subjects from his own 
officials." Representative Government. 375.
113In 1622, the duke of Ventadour called upon his
people to eradicate every "passion and individual interest" 
and place foremost the public good. Then he called upon the 
king to extirpate "abuses if you wish to lighten the burden
Richelieu's description of the corporate structure of 
France represented the king as the head, the maritime 
administration as the powerful arm, and the officers as the 
nerves controlling the muscles of the body politic. 
Obedient and loyal officers were the key to a healthy body, 
but the crude analogy of extended families as miniature 
"republics" was not compatible with absolutist political 
ideology. In the New World, the maritime captains 
established themselves as peres de famille. symbolically 
adopted the Indians as members of their families, and became 
the primary link between the king and his colonies. 
Obedience to the king and responsibility to his people 
depended on an identity of interests between king and 
people. In the end, the old captain would be forced to lie 
to his people, deceive the king, or find another sovereign 
willing to accept a more substantial degree of local 
autonomy.
The discourse of the old Canadian captains reveals the 
stratifications of urban, national, and imperial 
institutional structures. Motivated by the domination 
principle French captains used words and force to forge a 
relationship between the king and his "children." Tracing 
the development of the diplomatic language in New France and
on the people and establish the public good." Quoted by 
Major, Representative Government. 473.
observing the old Canadian captains as they extended French 
dominion into the Mississippi Valley, will show that the 
chain linking the king to his people was strained by the gap 
that developed between the interests of the king's service 
and the welfare of the colony itself.
CHAPTER 3
Mediation and Mastery in the Language of 
the Ancien Capitaine
French traders and missionaries used and developed a 
language in Canada that must be interpreted by reference to 
European social, religious, political, and intellectual 
culture. Functioning within the framework of their 
respective village and urban institutional structures, 
French captains, Indian chiefs, and French missionaries 
participated in a discourse that advanced and nurtured the 
village leader and post captains as links between France and 
New France. In the middle ground of the pays d'en haut where 
Frenchmen made contact with native Americans, village elders 
and European officers contributed to a written record that 
reveals the historical significance of the "captain" in the 
pyramid of power improvised in seventeenth-century Canada. 
The fragmented threads of the discourse have to be pieced 
together from the narratives of captain-traders and 
missionaries who took forgranted the existence of a 
corporate state composed of families linked to the royal 
head by commercial, military, and ecclesiastical officers.
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Between the opposite poles of king and people, the 
fragmented thread included references to the masters 
(captains and chiefs) who struggled to bridge the gap 
between the head and members of a disordered commonwealth. 
The diplomatic language amalgamated disparate elements 
including the customs and tradition of native American 
tribal organizations, the procedures and protocol of village 
assemblies and regional councils, and the principles of 
French sovereignty. Village leaders and Great Captains came 
under the umbrella of the French crown by using the language 
to bridge the gap between popular leader and royal agent.
The strong desire of the Canadian Indians for stability 
during a period when villages were being uprooted by hostile 
invaders provided an opportunity for French maritime 
captains to establish imperial control while presenting 
themselves as mediators between the French king and those 
native American refugees or village leaders who were willing 
to be "adopted" into the royal household. The intermediary 
relationship between "rational" Frenchmen and "barbarian" 
refugees requiring sustenance and protection from their 
enemies was expressed in terms of a relationship between 
fathers and children, masters and servants, rational men and 
brute beasts.
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French missionaries gradually became conscious of 
important differences between French officers and Indian 
tribal leaders, but maritime captains and Indian chiefs had 
one common characteristic from the moment of contact: the
need to establish a personal relationship with someone who 
could supply equipment and provisions for the protection and 
sustenance of their followers. This need facilitated the 
French alliance with the Algonquian Indians and secured the 
primary personal bond between the French king and the 
Canadian colony. The royal captain represented the state on 
the local level prior to the development of bureaucratic 
institutions. In the pays d'en haut. the attempt to 
transform Indian chiefs into French officers produced a 
hybrid offspring in the person of the ancien capitaine. 
Maritime Captains, Indian Chiefs, and French Missionaries
As a maritime captain, Samuel De Champlain was 
affiliated with many different companies as a trader and 
explorer before he established the city of Quebec in 1608 
and developed a reputation as "Father of Canada" and the 
first "governor" of New France.1 Champlain began his
1Samuel Eliot Morison notes that no one in authority 
referred to Champlain as "Father of New France" before the 
nineteenth century. Samuel de Champlain: Father of New
France (Boston: Little, Brown, 1972), 225-226. Moreover,
the founder of Quebec, was never officially appointed 
governor of the new colony, though many authors, including
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exploration of the St. Lawrence Valley as a partner of a 
commercial enterprise, but he exercised royal authority 
because his partner, Pierre de Gua, sieur de Monts, held 
successive titles of vice-admiral and lieutenant-general of 
Acadia. De Monts was also given a 10-year monopoly over the 
fur trade, and Champlain became a partner in the company he 
formed to exploit this privilege. The company dissolved 
after Champlain negotiated alliances with the Indians and 
founded the city of Quebec. After the new colony had been 
established, Champlain was designated commandant of New 
France.2
In the early stages of the colony's development, 
Champlain's authority rested less upon recognition by the 
crown than upon his dynamic leadership. The city of Quebec 
was established as a French post. With no intendant it was
Charelvoix, classify the commandant of the colony as the 
actual governor. Pierre Frangois-Xavier de Charlevoix, S. J. , 
History and General Description of New France, trans. John 
Gilmary Shea (New York, 1870; repr., Chicago: Loyola
University Press, 1962), 2:64.
2William J. Eccles, France in America (New York: Harper 
& Row, 1972), 14. Champlain, Voyages of Samuel De Champlain. 
1604-1618. ed. W. L. Grant (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1907), 
220; Marc Lescarbot, The Conversion of the Savages Who Were 
Baptized in New France During This Year, 1610 (Paris, 1610) 
in The Jesuit Relations and Allied Documents: Travels and
Explorations of the Jesuit Missionaries in New France. 1610- 
1791. (hereafter referred to as JR) ed. Reuben Gold Thwaites 
(New York: Pageant Book Co., 1959), 1:63.
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up to Champlain as commandant to establish the foundation 
for patriarchical authority and gain recognition by the 
Indian tribes as their friend and protector. When a crisis 
of authority enveloped the regency of Marie de Medici in 
1616, Champlain's right to command had to be reaffirmed.3 
In America, his prowess as a warrior protecting friendly 
Indians against the attacks of the Iroquois did more to 
cement his relationship with his Indian allies than did his 
credentials as a royal officer, though royal recognition 
became more and more important as the colony developed.
Actually, Champlain's authority in the New World rested 
on two pillars: service to the king and service to the
Indians. On the basis of his service in navigation, which 
he called "the most useful and excellent" of all arts, 
Champlain established his connection to the crown through 
the admiralty. He reinforced that bond at court through a 
marriage alliance with the daughter of an official of the 
king's chamber.4 His letters addressed to the young Louis 
XIII and the regent mentioned the "sense of honor [he] 
received during the last ten years in commissions, not only, 
Sire, from your Majesty, but also from the late king, Henry
3Morison, Champlain. 176.
4Champlain to the Queen Regent (Marie de Medicis) in 
Voyages, 17; Morison, Champlain. 123.
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the Great." His treatise and maps would "serve as an 
example in your kingdom for increasing the glory of your 
Majesty, the welfare of your subjects, and for the honor of 
the very humble service" owed by Champlain to the king.5 
Service to the king and provision for the welfare of the 
king's people, including the native Americans, promoted the 
health of a corporate structure which encompassed the king 
as head and the Indians and colonists as members.
Champlain's military and civil authority derived from 
the admiral of France, but as a gentleman entrepreneur, he 
exercised the authority of a pere de famille. The urban 
foundation of French maritime institutions can be seen in 
the parallels between the etiguette required of apprentices 
and sailors. Four basic principles governing the behavior 
of an apprentice in the home of his master were summarized 
in the third quarter of the seventeenth century by Jacques 
Savary: the love and fear of God; fidelity toward his
master; blind obedience in the performance of everything 
commanded by the master, provided that he demands nothing 
contrary to the service of God; and paternal respect. The 
apprentice, or servant, was supposed to remove his hat when 
speaking to his master, just as he would when addressing his
5Champlain to Louis XIII, Voyages. 16.
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father. A master, whether he was a merchant or a captain, 
was expected to govern his servants in accord with the
principles of a good pere de famille.6 The maritime
ordinances actually transformed the popular leader into a 
royal agent. The four principles governing the relationship 
between masters and apprentices were applied to the
relationship between a captain and his crew and could be
applied to the relationship between a village leader and his 
people.
Compare these four principles with Champlain's
description of the duties of a good seaman. A "good and
finished navigator," he wrote,
should above all be a good man, fearing God and 
not allowing on his ship His holy name to be 
blasphemed .... He should be pleasant and
affable in his conversation, absolute in his
orders, not communicating too readily with his
shipmates, unless with those who share the
command.7
Savary, of course, described the appropriate behavior of an 
apprentice, while Champlain described the duties of a 
maritime officer. Both, however, outlined roughly similar 
principles of a master-servant relationship including the
6Jacques Savary, Le Parfait Neqociant in Oeuvres. 2
vols. (Paris, 1713), 1:41-42.
7Treatise on Seamanship and the Duty of a Good Seaman 
appended to Morison, Champlain. 24 0-241.
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fear of God and absolute obedience which were to govern the 
relationships between peres de famille and their families, 
masters and apprentices, and captains and crews.
No doubt there was a great cultural chasm between the 
old world and the new, but the village world of the American 
Indians was not as distant from the urban base of the 
maritime captains as Richard White's recent work on native 
American culture would have us believe. Because nothing 
"resembling a state existed in the pays d'en haut."8 the 
agents of the French monarchy acted less like modern 
bureaucrats and more like paternalistic masters of urban 
trade "families." As such they had much in common with 
their native American counterparts.
On both sides of the Atlantic there were big chiefs and 
little chiefs. The Jesuits adopted the term "Grand 
Capitaine" to describe any Indian chief who exercised 
authority over several villages, but they gradually came to 
realize that the native Americans gave more lip service than 
substance to the principle of hierarchical authority 
cherished by Europeans. Nevertheless, the knowledge and 
experience of governing the Indians can be traced back to 
the Indian captains who were the original "captains" of the
8White, Middle Ground. 16.
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"savages". As represented by European mediators, the Indian 
discourse reflects the importance of the captain's office in 
the bonding process by indicating that allegiance to a 
French captain brought with it a fictive kinship with the 
king.
Jesuit missionaries applied the domination principle 
and interpreted the fictive kinship established between the 
Canadian Indians and the French king according to the 
European principle of state sovereignty. The Jesuit priest 
who reported the conversion and baptism of the Grand Sagamos 
in June, 1610 explained that this grand capitaine. as the 
French rendered his title, was the chief and sovereign of 
New France before the arrival of the French.9 This great 
sagamore encountered by Champlain during his second voyage 
was an old man named Membertou who claimed to be over a 
hundred years old. After the voyage when Champlain related 
that Membertou promised to take care of the two Frenchmen 
who volunteered to remain in Canada, the "captain of the 
savages" had declared "that they should be treated as kindly 
as his own children."10 The kinship bond established
9Father Bertrand, "A Letter Missive in regard to the 
Conversion and Baptism of the Grand Sagamore of new France, 
who was before the arrival of the French, its chief and
sovereign," JR 1:120-1.
10Champlain, Voyages. 85.
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between the sagamore and Champlain involved a deeper 
relationship than a simple alliance with a technologically 
superior partner, but Canadian tradition had no concept of 
a chiefdom with supreme power over wives, children, and the 
village community. The wide gap between native American 
custom and the European concept of the pater familias would 
have to be bridged by the ancien capitaine.
Capitanal, Membertou's successor, continued to maintain 
friendly relations with the French. In 1633, this chief of 
the Montagnais made an impressive speech, as Pere Paul Le 
Jeune reported at the time and recalled two years later, had 
"delighted all his hearers."11 Capitanal's speech, as 
recounted by the Jesuit priest, provides a sample of the 
discourse describing the relationship between Frenchmen and 
Indians.
I am ... only a poor little animal, crawling 
about on the ground; you Frenchmen are the great 
of the earth, who make all tremble. I do not 
know how I dare to talk before such great 
Captains .... Thou hast assisted us in our wars, 
we love thee all the more for it.15
The Indian captain related that the Montagnais invited the
French to make their home at Quebec and that the French
settled there promising to defend and protect them from
1;L"Le Jeune's Relation," 1635, JR 8:55.
15JR 5:205-207.
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their enemies.16 The relationship established between the 
great French captains and the Indian sagamore implied the 
acceptance of French sovereignty, but the Jesuits gradually 
discerned that the Indian captains lacked the power to 
command and that the tribes were reluctant to submit to any 
yoke.
Marc Lescarbot, whose report on The Conversion of the
Savages Who Were Baptized in New France was published in
Paris in 1610 and included in the Jesuit Relations. compared
the authority of the Great Sagamore over his subjects with
that of the French king.
He has under him a number of families whom he 
rules, not with so much authority as does our 
King over his subjects, but with sufficient power 
to harangue, advise, and lead them to war, to 
render justice to one who has a grievance, and 
like matters.17
More apt would be to compare the Great Sagamore with the 
governor or commandant-general who exercised the king's 
authority, and the village sagamores with the post 
commandants. Lescarbot referred to each village as a 
company of savages. No taxes were imposed on the people, 
but Lescarbot reported that the village sagamores did share
16Ibid., 5:207.
17Lescarbot, Conversion of the Savages. JR 1:75.
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"any profits of the chase" with the Great Sagamore.18 
Likewise French commandants profited from the trading 
activities carried on in their posts.
The baptism of the Great Sagamore provided an important 
cornerstone of the new structure established by Champlain in 
Canada. The anciens capitaines became the agents of "great 
chief" who lived in the "big village" across the water. 
After all, according to Charlevoix the French king derived 
his authority from the same God who, as pere de famille sent 
missionaries into his vineyard.19 Baptism was important 
because, according to Pere LeJeune, souls formed the 
materials of a new edifice designed to be inhabited by one 
people. LeJeune recognized, nevertheless, that the 
conversion and transformation of the "savages" was a long­
term process.20 He pointed out that the needs of the body 
were the door to the soul of the Indian.21 From the 
French perspective the process of Christianization and
18Ibid.
19Charlevoix, New France. 2:95
20"This metamorphosis is not accomplished by a word nor
in a moment." "LeJeune's Relation," (1636), JR 9:91. Pere 
LeJeune envisioned that the converted Indians and the French 
would become "little by little, only one and the same 
People." 9:265.
21Ibid.. 9:107.
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civilization required a radical change of behavior on the 
part of the native Americans. The starving Indians received 
food and supplies from the French, but the Jesuits exacted 
courtesy in exchange.22
As reported by optimistic Jesuits, the Indian discourse 
indicates that the idea of becoming one people was a 
mutually acceptable goal. Admittedly, the Jesuits made only 
slightly more progress than the Franciscans in their efforts 
to convert the Indians, but Pere LeJeune had a plan. A 
hospital would draw adult Indians who would willingly seek 
nursing care for their bodies. Seminaries would be filled 
by the children of those who died in the hospital regardless 
of whether or not the souls of their parents were saved. A 
second approach involved supporting young girls and 
providing dowries to help them to marry. By these means, the 
Jesuits hoped to progress toward the goal of becoming one 
people.23
The major obstacle standing in the way of unity was the 
stubborn reluctance of the Indians to depart from their 
culture. The tactic employed by Pere Lejeune was to
tell them that, if they are going to be stubborn
about their customs, we will hold fast to ours;
22Ibid., 9:261.
23Ibid.. 9:101, 103.
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that, if they do not care enough for us to give 
up some of their acts of cruelty for our sake, we 
will certainly not do them any harm, but we will 
not cherish them to the extent of taking the 
morsel from our own mouths to assist them in 
their needs; that we will observe very carefully 
those who perpetrate any public indecency, or who 
take part in these outrages and insane acts, so 
that we may close our doors against them and open 
them to those among them who are good.24
LeJeune was referring here to the practice of Indian women
receiving scalps as "great trophies." They were also said
to torture prisoners by cutting off fingers and roasting
them for their children.25 In view of Indian dependence
on the French for food and supplies, Lejeune went on to
suggest that more "civilized" behavior could be promoted "if
we all should agree to exclude without doing them any harm,
those who commit acts so at variance with reason and
nature."26 He first chided an Indian leader who had taken
an enemy prisoner and then
explained to him that he ought to take all I had 
said to him as a mark of my affection for him 
that I was heartily sorry that he, who professed 
to love the French, should permit to [have] done 
in their presence deeds that they hated like 
death; that our soldiers, upon returning to 
France, would say to our countrymen that these
24Ibid.. 9:263.
25Ibid.. 9:253, 257.
26Ibid., 9:263.
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People here are dogs; — and that I, who love
them, would be annoyed at such statements.27
Pere LeJeune reminded the Indian captain that Monsieur le
General (the French commandant) had protected and aided him
in quarrels among the Indians. By arranging for him to
spend time in Quebec near '"the great Captain of all the
French Captains" who are in Canada, LeJeune hoped to
convince the Indian captain that French leaders were gentle
and humane men, "not fond of blood nor of carnage, unless in
the fury of war."28 The Jesuit bargained for a radical
behavioral change. "We sometimes grant you what you ask of
us; grant us also what we ask of you, so that we may come to
be, little by little, only one and the same People."29
Neither the Montagnais nor the Hurons had any problem
with accepting the protection and benevolence of a great
father, but the native American concept of fatherhood
diverged from the French concept of the pere de famille on
the principle of absolute obedience. Authority among the
Indians was based more on reciprocal giving than on rank in
a hierarchical structure. For the Indians, the willingness
to shed one's blood in defense against mutual enemies was
27Ibid., 9:263, 265.
28Ibid.. 9:265.
29Ibid.
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essential to the maintenance of the alliance.30 The great
captain wielded powerful arms and inspired the loyalty of
his warriors and allies. When "the Savages came in a body
to see Monsieur the Commandant," the Indian leader who had
captured a young Iroquois woman gave the following speech
upon presenting her to the Commandant in compensation for
three Frenchmen who had been killed.
Listen, Frenchmen, I am going to chide you, for 
what else could be done by a great beast like me, 
who has the boldness to speak in the presence of 
Captains? If I were Captain, I would have the 
right to speak; I am only a dog, yet I must 
speak, and have a friendly quarrel with you. Our 
Fathers and our old Captains loved each other; 
they are dead now; we love each other, both 
French and Savages; we love each other, yes, we 
love each other; therefore it would have been 
very fitting to see some of your young men with 
us in the war; but as that failed us, we have 
done as well as we could.31
An Indian earned his right to speak and command by
generosity and service to the village or tribe. The French
Captains had more military resources, but by the Indian
captain's standards, they should have been willing to do
more. Even so, the Indian captain presented the young
Iroquois woman.
Here is a young female prisoner whom we present 
to you, to take the place of one of the three
30Ibid.. 10:231; 9:233.
31Ibid., 9:267.
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Frenchmen who was killed quite near here, some 
time ago. I still see the deep red blood that 
accuses the cruelty of our enemies and of yours; 
this present will conceal a part of it; it is a 
little thing, but it is all we have, the rest 
having been killed; if we had been helped, we 
would have done more, but we were deserted on all 
sides.32
The young woman expressed gladness for being "given to so
gallant a Captain." Arrangements were made to send her to
France "accompanied by some girls of this country." Pere
LeJeune told her that she should inform the Captain or one
of the Jesuits if anyone insulted her during the passage.
She replied that she was now of their Nation; 
that she did not fear they would do her any harm; 
that, if she were commanded to marry, she would 
obey; but that no one, except he to whom she had 
been given, should approach her.33
Male prisoners were customarily tortured and killed by their
enemies. Women who were fortunate enough to be spared often
married into the tribe of their protector. By accepting the
national identity of their captors, women prisoners played
a role in the process of merging different peoples.
The native Americans expressed a willingness to embrace 
the French nation. Pere LeJeune placed emphasis on 
increasing French glory in the New World so that the
32Ibid.
33Ibid.. 269.
barbarians "will respect them, and the more fear they will
have of offending them."34 Yet he also fretted that the
French might not measure up to the challenge. What if the
French failed to live up to the image of "power, ingenuity,
and morality" that great captains like Champlain had
projected into the Canadian wilderness?
The goal of convincing the Canadian Indians to accept
French standards of rationality and humanity constitutes an
important strand of the discourse. Champlain had exhorted
the Hurons to embrace the Christian religion as a means of
cementing a very close alliance with the French.35 By
listening "attentively in their assemblies," the great
French captain had discovered that the Indians carefully
evaluated the spiritual and rational standards promoted by
the French. Champlain summarized what he heard them say:
You say things that pass our knowledge, and which 
we cannot understand by words, being beyond our 
comprehension; but if you would do us a service 
come and dwell in this country, bringing your 
wives and children, and when they are here we 
shall see how you serve the God you worship, and 
how you live with your wives and children, how 
you cultivate and plant the soil, how you obey 
your laws, how you take care of animals, and how 
you manufacture all that we see proceeding from 
your inventive skill. When we see all this, we 
shall learn more in a year than in twenty by
34Ibid.. 97.
35Ibid.. 10:27.
84
simply hearing you discourse; and if we cannot 
then understand, you shall take our children, who 
shall be as your own. And thus being convinced 
that our life is a miserable one in comparison 
with yours, it is easy to believe that we shall 
adopt yours, abandoning our own.36
The Jesuits responded to the challenge of providing the
Indians with the choice of adopting a comparatively better
lifestyle, though they expressed concern about whether the
French could measure up to the European spiritual and
rational standards that were demanded by the native
Americans. For example, when Pere Jean de Brebeuf
established his mission among the Hurons, he learned that
"the French who had been here had never spoken to them of
God, but had been as much addicted as they to run after and
dally with ... women."37 Although Champlain and the
Jesuits enunciated and promoted the acceptance of French
standards, the cultural chasm that remained had to be
bridged by mediators who used and developed the language of
the ancien capitaine.
Barbarian Customs and French Discourse
The old captains used language to bridge the gap 
between popular leader and royal agent. Tribal leaders
36Champlain, Voyages, 323.
37Ibid., 10:63. Volume 10 is a continuation of
LeJeune's relation of 1636, which contains Brebeuf's report 
from the Huron mission.
bound by village customs were enticed by "rational" French 
captains to embrace a "superior" lifestyle based on loyalty 
and obedience to a European monarch committed to serving his 
"adopted" people. By acknowledging the fatherhood of the 
French king, the people were gaining a provider and 
protector, but the Indian leader and the French captain had 
to combine mediation with mastery to bridge the real gap 
between native American and European culture with a 
diplomatic language that permitted the captain to exercise 
sovereign power in the name of the king or resist imperial 
pressure by appealing to the needs and interests of his 
people.
Office and language were used by French and Indian 
captains to exercise authority and control over their local 
communities, but the cultural chasm described by Champlain 
and the Jesuits was too wide to cross. By accepting the 
"civilization" of the French, the Indians would emerge from 
barbarism. By civilizing native Americans, the Jesuits 
hoped to produce one people. In Augustinian terms, it would 
be a "superior people in proportion as it [was] bound 
together by higher interests, inferior in proportion as it 
[was] bound by lower."38 France was a country full of
38Augustine, City of God. 706.
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comfort and politeness while Canada was to French eyes a 
country of rudeness and barbarism.39 Pere Brebeuf noted 
that the Hurons spoke of "overturning the Country." In this 
way, he pointed out, the Indians styled "the change from 
their Pagan and Barbarous life to one that is civilized and 
Christian."40 The old captain as spokesman for his people 
developed a language to bridge an unbridgeable gap.
The captain secured his authority by professing to 
accept the higher rational standards of the French and by 
demanding that the French provide the iron and protection 
needed to retain the affection of his people. The Indian 
leader earned his privilege of "speaking" for his people by 
exhorting his followers to do what must be done "for the 
good of the village." Before the arrival of the French, the 
feeble authority of the Montagnais and Huron captains 
derived from the affection they could generate by advocating 
policies to promote the welfare of village and nation.41
39LeJeune's Relation of 1636, JR 9:103.
40Ibid.. 10:27.
41Ibid, 10:231-235. In his Relation of 1633, Le Jeune 
wrote that "the Captain is elected for his eloquence alone, 
and is obeyed in proportion to his use of it, for they have 
no other law than his word." JR 5:195.
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The language used to bridge the cultural chasm issued 
from the interaction between Jesuit priests and Canadian 
Indians. The Jesuits resolved to "overturn the country" by 
putting a flea in the ear of Indian leaders who desired to 
exercise authority over their own people. The simple 
process of learning to communicate with the Montagnais and 
Huron Indians created opportunities for Pere Le Jeune and 
his fellow missionaries to demonstrate the power and 
knowledge available to those who would accept French 
standards.
Pere Brebeuf had wintered among the Montagnais and 
spent three years with the Hurons before the English 
captured Acadia and Quebec in 1628. When Pere Le Jeune, 
learned in Greek and Latin, arrived in Canada in 1632, he 
took up residence at Notre Dames des Anges the little Jesuit 
house just outside of Quebec which had been ransacked by the 
English. Greeted as brother, he was asked by curious 
Indians if he was "captain." "Ania Kir Capitana?" literally 
means "My brother, art thou Captain?" but they meant to find 
out if he was the "Chief of this house?"42 One of his 
visitors was Manitougache. His son and a little Negro left
42Edna Kenton, With Hearts Courageous (New York: 
Liveright, 1933), 28, 35-36; Le Jeune's Relation, 1632, JR 
5:59.
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behind by the English became the Jesuit's first pupils.43 
Not only did Pere Le Jeune have to learn the language and 
customs of the Montagnais Indians among whom he had taken up 
residence, but he and his fellow missionaries had to compete 
with Indian sorcerers.
The language and authority of the old captain emerged 
as the bridge between French imperial and native American 
culture. The terminology developed in the competition 
between Huron shamans and Jesuits lengthened and 
strengthened the old maritime chain linking nation and city 
in Northern Europe. The discourse of the ancien capitaine 
emphasized the use of both words and force, but the ability 
of the old captains to straddle the wide crevice between 
European and native American culture depended heavily on the 
meaning of words that emerged from contact and conflict 
between the Jesuits and those who resisted their cultural 
imperialism.
When Pere Brebeuf returned to Huronia in the summer of 
1634, he and his fellow missionaries had to contend with 
sorcerers who were quick to point out the incompatibility 
and inconsistency of European ways. As far as Huron 
religious leaders were concerned, native American practices
43Kenton, Hearts Courageous. 38; JR 5:63.
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were effective and the Jesuit way of living made no sense at 
all. The desire for trade goods and presents and the 
competition between Huron villages to attract a missionary 
who might open opportunities to bring prosperity to their 
people encouraged Huron leaders to journey to Quebec to 
invite Brebeuf. back to their land.44 To overcome 
resistance of those villagers who opposed their peculiar 
activities, the Jesuits took advantage of the curiosity and 
material needs of any native who was receptive to their 
teaching.
The Jesuits charmed their students by bringing them 
into their cabin. Upon entering the dwelling which appeared 
much like a Huron cabin on the outside, the natives were 
intrigued by the small hall leading to different rooms.45 
The new language developed as the curious guests tried to 
assimilate the marvelous things they saw into their world 
view and communicate with men whose goal was to transform 
the native world by establishing a principle of hierarchical 
authority and structure.
Just as the reputation of Frenchmen as great captains 
stemmed from the deeds of Champlain, the fame of Frenchmen
44Le Jeune's Relation, 1633, JR 5:259-263; 6:19.
45Kenton, Hearts Courageous. 109-110.
as masters of iron can be traced to "wonders" performed by 
the Jesuits. The guests were astonished by mattresses, a 
little steel mill for grinding corn, a prism which 
multiplied single objects, and a magnifying glass. The 
missionaries astounded great "medicine men" by inviting them 
to hold the corners of a sheet of paper. Some needles were 
placed on the paper. One of the Jesuits would then use a 
magnet concealed in the palm of his hand to move the 
needles, making them stand up and lie down with a wave of 
his hand. The Jesuits did more than demonstrate that 
Frenchmen were masters of iron. They also painted speech on 
paper that other Frenchmen could "hear" with their eyes.46 
Within the framework of their animistic religion, the 
natives interpreted all these things as manifestations of an 
animating spirit.
The best example of this animistic interpretation was 
the Huron appellation of the Jesuit clock. The Jesuits 
responded to the clock and expected their guests to obey its 
voice. When the clock "spoke" the priests would pray, eat, 
call the children to school, or send them home. Throughout 
the day, all were expected to obey its commands. No wonder,
46Ibid., 110-114.
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the Hurons named it the "Captain of the Day."47 Q u i t e  
often the leaders feigned the decision to embrace French 
culture and the Christian religion, agreeing to worship the 
spirit that taught the French because they hoped to "obtain 
all the knowledge that the French had."48 Brebeuf 
observed that the barbarians were content to approve the 
beauty of truth "without embracing it." They would justify 
the refusal to change their ways by saying that "Such is the 
custom of our country."49
According to the Jesuits, the Indians appealed to their 
customs and tradition to justify cruelty and torture. 
Champlain at one time attempted to convince his Indian 
allies that their treatment of women and children prisoners 
was "foreign to the kindness natural to man."50 An Island 
native responded by taking a nursing child by the foot and 
striking "its head against a rock or a tree."51 After
47Ibid., 112-113.
48Claude Charles Le Roy, Sieur de Bacqueville de La 
Potherie, History of the Savage Peoples Who Are the Allies 
of New France, in Emma Helen Blair, ed., The Indian Tribes 
of the Upper Mississippi Valiev and Region of the Great 
Lakes. 2 vols. (Cleveland: Arthur H. Clark, 1911), 1:332.
49LeJeune's Relation of 1636, JR 10:19.
50Ibid.. 9:259, 261.
51Ibid., 261.
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recalling the incident, LeJeune recommended that the French 
and their Indian converts should "agree to exclude ... those 
who commit acts so at variance with reason and nature."52 
The distinction between "reasoning men" who eschewed such 
behavior and "brute beasts" committing inhumane acts became 
an important element in the discourse of the ancien 
caoitaine.53
The Jesuits and Governor Montmagny, Champlain's 
successor, encouraged the Indian leaders to abandon their 
traditional customs by granting favor and intimacy to those 
who showed an inclination to accept French instruction and 
authority.54 By becoming a "Frenchman" an Indian captain 
could enhance his authority and obtain French merchandise. 
By allying with the French an Indian captain stationed 
himself on the middle ground. Whether or not Indian leaders 
were willing to accept European standards of rationality, 
intelligence, and authority, the French captains who came to 
trade under the sovereign authority of their king produced 
a cultural legacy that owes more to the American natives 
than their common discourse would lead us to believe. To
52Ibid., 263.
53Champlain, Voyages. 308.
54LeJeune's Relation of 1637, JR 11:149.
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move the muscle of Canada in the interest of the king French 
captains had to embrace Indian ways even as the Indians had 
to adopt French ones.
Speech, Office, and the Derivation of Authority
The Indian leader earned his right to speak by 
demonstrating his ability to do something for the village, 
tribe, or nation he wished to represent. The Jesuits used 
the word "Captain" to describe any one of a number of tribal 
leaders. Some captains were bigger than others, but every 
Indian leader had to obtain merchandise and protection to 
sustain and defend his band, company, village, or villages - 
- in short, his nation —  from enemy attack. Yet when any 
Indian captain embraced French culture he would face the 
consequence of having to abandon tribal rules and customs 
which might ultimately cost him the support of his "people" 
from whom his "office" was derived.55
In her description of Huron government, Elizabeth 
Tooker has observed that there "were as many kinds of chiefs
55LeJeune's description of Makheabichtichiou, the 
Montagnais captain, who "gave the young Hiroquois woman whom 
Monsieur the General took to France," refers to his position 
in his tribe in terms of office and function: "he is strong
and hardy, a good warrior, and has a very ready tongue. It 
is for this reason that, although he is not really the 
Captain of his Tribe, yet, as it divides into squads he is 
generally taken as the chief of his band. From this he 
derives his title of "Captain," since he often performs the 
office of one." LeJeune's Relation of 1637, JR 11:149.
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as there were 'affairs'.56 The language developed by the 
Jesuits and their native American guests effectively 
promoted the development of a hierarchical structure 
designed to house one people. There was a multiplicity of 
captains, all of whom could potentially function in a 
hierarchical structure under the authority of one great 
chief or "grand capitaine." The language of the ancien 
capitaine bridged the gap between the two cultures by 
permitting the spokesman of each band or tribe to enhance 
his position by accepting the authority of and beginning to 
speak in the name of the French king.
The peace and prosperity of a village or company 
depended upon the ability of its leader to speak and obtain 
gifts and merchandise. The leader derived his power to 
exercise authority over men and nature from the spirit that 
enabled him to speak.57 The Hurons spread the news about 
the return of E-chom (Pere Brebeuf) to Huronia by explaining 
his deeds by reference to O-Ki, the "Great Spirit." "E-
56Elisabeth Tooker, An Ethnography of the Huron 
Indians. 1615-1649. Bureau of American Ethnology, Bulletin 
190 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964), 43.
57Cornelius J. Jaenen, "The Role of Presents in French- 
Amerindian Trade," in Duncan Cameron, ed., Explorations in 
Canadian Economic History: Essays in Honour of Irene M.
Spry (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 1985), 232;
White, Middle Ground. 36; JR 10:193-197.
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chom's cabin is built! He is O-ki!" they said. "He lives 
with the Captain of the Day which speaks and tells him when 
to put on the kettle! He paints speech! He hears with his 
eyes! He is O-ki!" The association of the concept of 
captain (okima) with the idea of a wealthy and powerful 
father who was "Captain of all captains" opened the door for 
Indian leaders to become powerful spokesmen for their people 
while professing obedience to the French king and placing 
themselves under the umbrella of his protection.58
An ongoing discussion between Pere Lejeune and 
Makheabichtichiou, the Montagnais captain who presented the 
Iroquois woman prisoner as a gift to take the place of three 
dead Frenchmen, helps us to understand the references to 
obedience in the speech of the old captains. As part of the 
captain's instruction concerning the articles of the 
Christian faith, Lejeune explained "how the animals would 
have been obedient to man if man had been obedient to 
God."59 Although he seemed inclined to accept the basic 
teaching, Makheabichtichiou found it difficult to adapt his
58Kenton, Hearts Courageous. 99, 261-262; James
Clifton, "Potawatomi Leadership Roles: On Okama and other
Influential Personages," in William Cowan (ed.), Papers of 
the Sixth Alqonquian Conference. 1974. National Museum of 
Man, Mercury Series, Canadian Ethnology Paper no. 2 3 (Ottawa 
National Museum of Canada, 1975), 53-54.
59LeJeune's Relation of 1637, JR 11:151.
behavior to the French standard of rationality. He promised 
"in the presence of his compatriots ... that he would never 
give eat-all feasts, that he would not summon the Sorcerers 
to treat him in his sicknesses, that he would no longer 
believe in dreams, and that he desired to be baptized and to 
believe what the French believe." LeJeune observed that 
after "all that he still crawls upon the ground; his 
understanding acknowledges what his will, accustomed to 
evil, cannot or will not wholly embrace."60 The professed 
desire of Makheabichtichiou to embrace French values may or 
may not have been genuine, but the persistent practice of 
equating savagery and barbarism with the behavior of animals 
and children is a persistent theme of the written record.
Anger, insolence, and rebellion made breaches in the 
wall of authority. To defend his rationality after an 
emotional outburst, Makheabichtichiou assured Sieur Olivier 
"that anger had carried him away, that he was not a child." 
He expressed a desire to acknowledge his fault to the 
governor. "No, I am not a child, I will remain firm in the 
promise I have given you."61
60Ibid.. 179.
61Ibid.. 173.
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Later in the century, Nicolas Perot reported that
Indian captains in the Western wilderness used strictness
and severity "against those who failed to obey" village
procedural rules for hunting buffalo.62 Indian captains
acknowledged the value of steadfastness and obedience, but,
according to Pere Lejeune, they were often unable to
discipline their followers.
Being kind to the Savages, helping them in their 
need, doing them no wrong or injury, exercising 
some kind of Justice toward those individuals who 
are insolent, especially if their Captains cannot 
make them listen to reason,— these are the means 
of holding these Barbarians a long time in the 
line of duty.63
The Indians, he wrote, refer to all those who have authority 
as "captains."64 The Indians and the Jesuits associated 
captains with arms and the use of force. Indeed, the 
Jesuits purported to have only their voice to counteract 
insolence and cruelty whereas the natives were bold enough 
to insult a captain whose arms were within reach.65 Yet 
Pere Brebeuf reported that Huron captains "do not govern by
62Nicolas Perot, Memoir on the Manners. Customs, and 
Religion of the Savages of North America, in Blair, Indian 
Tribes. 1:120.
63LeJeune's Relation of 1636, JR 9:199.
64Ibid., 9:201.
65Ibid., 9:261.
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means of command and absolute power; they have no force at 
hand to compel them to their duty."
The principles of obedience and royal sovereignty were 
used by French captains and Jesuits as measures of 
rationality, but the Indian captains had to obtain gifts and 
protection for their companies to maintain their position 
and increase their stature in the village and tribal 
assemblies. To maintain the affection of his people, the 
Indian captain brought gifts and merchandise to distribute 
in his village. Speaking through gifts at regional councils 
was a means of motivating leaders and prompting their 
followers. The gifts restored the losses suffered by a 
village. The right to replace a dead captain could be 
earned by presenting gifts to the "Old Men" in a village 
assembly.66 The Indians recognized the ability to restore 
and replace dead warriors as a manifestation of O-Ki. The 
deeds of Champlain and the Jesuits established the 
reputation of the French as "masters of life" and their king 
as "the Great Captain." With the power of oratory and the 
use of rituals which reflected a knowledge of Indian 
languages and customs, French captain-traders and
66Le Jeune's Relation, 1636, JR 10:235; Kenton, Hearts 
Courageous. 151.
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missionaries developed the ability to advise and lead tribes 
and nations as units of a French imperial structure.
The ancien capitaine built a linguistic bridge between 
himself as a popular leader and the French crown by using 
words and gifts to secure obedience to the great French 
father who provided protection and iron for his "children." 
La Potherie quoted Tioskatin, the chief of the Sioux: "All
nations have a father who gives protection and iron, but I 
am a bastard searching for a father."67 The use of iron 
in the form of knives, hatchets, and guns was associated 
with spirit, rule, and protection. The giving of gifts and 
smoking the calumet ritualized the transfer of spiritual 
power over nature and men.68 La Potherie, who tells us 
more about the deeds of Nicolas Perot than the trader's own 
Memoir does, relates that Perot worked to establish peace 
between two rival tribes by explaining that God gave iron to 
the French to distribute to those willing to live as men and 
not as beasts.69
67La Potherie, Histoire de L'Americme Septentrionale. 
4 vols. (Paris: Chez Brocas, 1753), 4:31. Emma Helen
Blair's edition contains only vols. 2 and 4. Hereafter the 
French edition will be cited as La Potherie, Histoire.
68La Potherie, History of the Savage Peoples, in Blair
(ed.) Indian Tribes. 1:307-09.
69Ibid., 1:312.
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I have come to embrace all the men whom Onontio 
. . . , the chief of all the French who have settled 
in this country, has told me to join together, in 
order to take them under his protection.70
In another place, La Potherie quotes a chief who approached
the Comte de Frontenac, governor of New France from 167 2 to
1682. He expressed his joy for the Count's protection and
referred to him as the "the great captain, the one who is
the master of iron."71 Among the many different and
diverse tribes of American Indians, there were leaders who
could be described as great "chiefs" or "captains,"72 but
70Here La Potherie uses the more general term— le 
chef— to refer to the Canadian governor, who at the time was 
de Coursel. La Potherie, History of the Savage Peoples. 
1:312; Histoire 2:93. Many times the governor is referred 
to as the great captain of all the French in America. Here 
he is called Onontio and described as le chef, the "chief of 
all the French who are established in this country." 
Richard White explains that Onontio "was an Iroquois word 
meaning great mountain. It was the Mohawk rendering of the 
name of Charles Jacques de Huault de Montmagny, an early 
French governor. Both the Iroquois and the Algonquins 
applied the name to all later French governors. Middle 
Ground. 36.
71La Potherie, Histoire 4:34.
72The Great Chief of the Miamis exercised more 
extensive authority than most Indian leaders in the pays 
d'en haut. but the changing leadership patterns are 
indicated by the decline of the power of these hereditary 
chiefs during the eighteenth century. White, Middle Ground. 
217. In his study of European contact in the Southeast, 
Jerald T. Milanich refers to "one chief who ruled 90 vassal 
villages and another who could summon thousands of 
warriors." "The European Entrada into La Florida," in David 
Hurst Thomas, ed. , Columbian Consequences. (Washington: 
Smithsonian Institution Press, 1989-1990), 2:17. But even
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the Indian rulers of the pavs d'en haut sought refuge in the 
arms of the French primarily to gain the mastery of iron and 
come under the umbrella of sovereign authority. The Indian 
leader needed to defend and supply his people to command the 
respect and obedience of his followers. A community leader 
who found a father to provide protection and iron 
automatically became a company commander who exercised 
effective control of his "people."
Assemblies and Councils
The native-American version of the head and members of 
a body politic is reflected in the Huron tradition which 
referred to a worthy captain as Enondecha. "the same name by 
which they call the Country, Nation, district, —  as if a 
good Chief and the Country were one and the same thing."73 
Like the medieval European village the native-American 
village was a crucible of diverse tribal interests. The 
traditional authority of the elders was rooted in age and 
courage in the service of the community. Family structure,
the more powerful chiefdoms of the Southeast fluctuated in 
size and stability as individual chiefs competed "with 
varying success for status and power in the arenas of 
warfare and ritual." Janet E. Levy, J. Alan May, and David 
G. Moore, "From Ysa to Joara: Cultural Diversity in the
Catawba Valley from the Fourteenth to the Sixteenth 
Century," in Consequences 2:156.
73LeJeune's Relation of 1636, JR 10:231.
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tribal custom, and rational authority shaped the choice of 
an agent to act in the best interest of the community. 
Smoking the calumet symbolized peace among brothers and 
unity against enemies.74 An irrevocable bond of loyalty 
was cemented by the ritual. The ability to reciprocate with 
gifts and produce a new tribal identity created a fictive 
kinship legitimized by the breath of ancestors inhaled 
through the calumet.75 The Indian leader acted as a 
spokesman before he could aspire to become a company 
commander.
James Clifton describes how a Potawatomie chief stood 
up and acted as a "speaker" for five tribes at a meeting in 
Montreal. The "chief" acknowledged that "he has little 
power over his own tribesmen himself, but wants to derive it 
from the Governor."76 Richard White writes that this same 
chief "identified so strongly with French chiefs" that he 
told Governor de Callieres that "Perrot was his 'body,'
74La Potherie, History of the Savage Peoples. 1:311,
313.
75Kenton, Hearts Courageous. 275; Le Jeune's Relation, 
1636, JR 10:219.
76Clifton, "Potawatomi Leadership Roles," 68.
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aiding him in all the lands of Algonquins to autoriser the 
parole of Onontio."77
Assemblies and Councils sanctioned the authority of the 
spokesman or captain who earned his right to speak by 
service to his tribe or confederation. General assemblies 
included people from distant regions. If the council 
involved the nation, it usually met in the village of the 
principal chief of the entire country and sometimes in the 
house of this chief.78 La Potherie informs us that the 
Saut de Sainte Marie became the place where the general 
assemblies of all the tribes were held.79
Decisions in the assemblies were made by a plurality of 
votes, but this was not necessarily a democratic process. 
Brebeuf relates that the "authority of the Captains draws 
over many to their views" and that "the usual way of coming 
to a decision is to say to the Old Men, Do you give advice; 
you are the Masters.1180 According to Peter Farb, Iroquois 
council decisions had to be unanimous, so representation did
77White, Middle Ground. 40.
78Tooker, Ethnography of the Huron Indians. 48-49.
79La Potherie, History of the Savage Peoples. 1:343.
80LeJeune's Relation of 1636, JR 10:251.
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not matter.81 Whatever the mechanism for group decision 
making within the various tribes and councils, the function 
of the leader was to speak and act for the welfare of the 
village and service of the community.
French Sovereignty and the Canadian Amalgam
Among the Canadian Indians, effective, popular leaders 
became royal agents. The combination of tribal leadership 
and royal sovereignty produced a Canadian amalgam in the 
person of the old captain. Despite appearances of eguality 
on the middle ground, however, French sovereignty in the New 
World was based on the potential of exercising overwhelming 
force. The Indians were told that the French would not 
tolerate quarrels among Indian allies.82 They would only 
go to war strong and powerful and not return until they had 
destroyed entire villages.83
The exclusive right to use overwhelming force is an 
important characteristic of a modern nation exercising 
control over the territory of its state. As the French 
monarchy was expanding such control over its European
81Peter Farb, Man's Rise to Civilization: The Cultural
Ascent of the Indians of North America. Rev. 2d ed. (New
York: E.P. Dutton, 1978), 91.
82Ibid., 9:269
83Ibid.
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possessions in North America, it was forced to rely on the 
old Indian and maritime captains who in turn were dependent 
upon the affection of their people. The old captains were 
mediators who promoted themselves as masters performing 
services for both the king and the people they served. 
Onontio was the "Great Captain" of all the French and his 
chiefs exercised his authority over their local territories. 
The old captain was both mediator and master. By using 
language and ritual to establish a linkage between the 
people of his post and the king of France, he was able to 
exercise sovereignty over the territory of his post in a way 
that permitted him to escape the limitations on his 
authority rooted in local traditions and customary 
practices.
The Montagnais sagamores and the Huron captains 
presented themselves to French commandants and Jesuit 
missionaries as spokesmen for their people. Further west, 
Onanghisse, a Potawatomi leader, assumed that his adoption 
by the French governor would increase his power over his 
tribesmen. The Sioux chief, Tioskatin, presented himself to 
the French as a bastard searching for a father.84 With 
words and ritual they established mutual assistance pacts
84Clifton, "Potawatomi Leadership Roles," 68; La 
Potherie, Histoire. 4:31.
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with the French maritime captains who counted on the French 
crown to support their own commercial and missionary 
activities in Canada.
The discourse of the ancien capitaine bridged the 
cultural chasm between the village world of the pavs d'en 
haut and the urban base of European maritime captains. The 
diplomatic language permitted the captains to exercise 
sovereign power in the name of the king. At the same time 
the need to motivate and retain the loyalty of his followers 
allowed the old captain to resist imperial pressure by 
appealing to the needs and interests of his people.
The identification of French captains as animating 
spirits opened the way for them to mediate between hostile 
tribes and establish the domination of the French king who 
was represented as the fountain of life and the producer of 
iron. The authority of the old captain depended on the 
giving of gifts associated with the right to speak for his 
people. The language of mediation and mastery linked the 
king to his people in the New World, but the old Canadian 
captains would resist any attempt of the crown to introduce 
bureaucratic controls to regulate commerce and the 
distribution of gifts.
CHAPTER 4
Canadian Captains: Defense and Territorial Expansion
The contrast between the old decentralized Canadian 
system through which a handful of Frenchmen allied 
themselves with friendly Indians to defend the early 
settlements and the more centralized system of Louis XIV 
became apparent with the arrival of Alexander Prouville, 
Marquis de Tracy in 1664. While the French crown weathered 
the crisis that had led to the Fronde, New France 
experienced a time of troubles. War with the Iroquois 
disrupted commerce, and the Church, through its 
missionaries, became the mainstay of the colony. 
Meanwhile, the Company of New France worked to eliminate 
unprofitable ventures to stave off the bankruptcy which 
came anyway in 1645.1
A Communaute des Habitants, largely supported by the 
Jesuits, shouldered the administrative costs of the colony
•^Eccles, France in America. 38, 52; Gustave Lanctot, 
L'Administration de la Nouvelle-France (Paris: Honore
Champion, 1929), 83.
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during this time of troubles.2 Serious divisions within 
the Communaute became evident as the Jesuits and the 
Congregation of St. Suplice struggled over the right to 
nominate the first bishop of New France in 1657.3 The 
Jesuits prevailed with the appointment of Frangois de Laval 
in 1659.
The new bishop of Petraea used his influence in France 
to secure a stronger royal commitment to support the colony 
of New France. The bishop recommended the appointment of 
Augustin de Saffray de Mezy as governor. When Mezy failed 
to live up to his expectations and began to exercise 
tyrannical authority, the bishop requested his recall. In 
the meantime de Tracy was sent with vice-regal authority. 
The arrival of Daniel de Remi, seigneur de Courcelles as 
governor and Jean Talon as intendant ushered in a new era 
of centralized government.
Whereas the successors of Champlain had exercised 
judicial authority in what was termed by Charlevoix "quite 
a sovereign style,"4 the Sieur Gaudais who had been sent 
as commissary along with de Mezy began the process of
2Eccles, France in America. 52.
3Ibid., 54.
4Charlevoix, New France. 3:66.
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establishing a Superior Council. This redistribution of 
authority was designed to place the military commander 
under financial and judicial controls. Both the governor 
and the intendant would serve on the Council, but the 
intendant was given primary responsibility for justice, 
police, finance, and commerce.5 The sovereign authority 
of the governor was diluted by the division of functions. 
The governors were bound to resist this diminution of their 
prerogative. Traditionally the governor exercised full 
royal power as head of the provincial community, but the 
appointment of an intendant responsible directly to the 
king represented a major step taken by the crown to 
restrain the governors from acting as miniature kings, to 
divide their jurisdiction, and to establish bureaucratic 
controls.6 Further removed from royal control, the 
commandants of the small frontier posts would continue to 
exercise effective sovereign authority by promoting 
themselves as mediators and the king as master of the 
people they served. Tradition and local customs did place 
real limits on the authority of post commanders, but these
5Ibid.. 67.
6Lanctot describes the attempt of the crown to 
diminish the "civil1 authority of the governor as a true 
"diminutio capitis.1 Administration. 21.
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limitations could be overcome by coaxing the native 
Americans to accept the sovereign authority of Onontio, the 
great captain and master of iron.
The loyalty of the Indian captains who welcomed de 
Tracy was no doubt based more on self-interest than the 
chivalrous ideal of honor, but their willingness to render 
homage "to the greatest of all Onontios on earth" echoes in 
the discourse of the French captains who adopted Indian 
ways and offered their talent in the service of France and 
ultimately of Spain. The following narrative of the words 
and deeds of French and Indian captains participating in 
the defense and expansion of New France in the St. Lawrence 
and Mississippi river valleys of America reveals how 
leaders who presented themselves as mediators actually 
established themselves as masters in the territories where 
they established military outposts for the French king. 
The old Canadian captains expected their father to provide 
the things they needed, but they were not always willing to 
obey their sovereign's wishes concerning when, where, and 
how they should conduct their trading activity.
Defending Canada Against the Iroquois
De Tracy reached Quebec in June 1664 with four 
companies of the Carignan-Salieres regiment famous at that
Ill
time for its exploits in the war against the Turks.7 The 
settlers and the Indians at Three Rivers welcomed the 
regular troops commanded by de Tracy and the company of 
volunteers brought along as reinforcements from Quebec.8 
The king was making good his commitment to protect his 
children from their enemies, the Iroquois. The relation­
ship between the Huron Indians and the crown described in 
the speech of the Huron captain is essentially the same as 
that developed between the crown and the posts in the lower 
Mississippi Valley. In French North America from the time 
of Champlain until the British conquest of Canada and the 
transfer of Louisiana to Spain, the post-commandants 
maintained the conviction that the contract established 
between the captain and the king was based on their mutual 
obligations to provide for the tranquillity and welfare of 
the local community.
The French crown took charge of New France during the 
interregnum between the Company of a Hundred Associates and 
the new West India Company. The Jesuit Relations heralded 
the arrival of de Tracy as indicative of the monarch's
7 Jack Verney, The Good Regiment: The Cariqnan-
Salieres Regiment in Canada. 1665-1668 (Montreal: McGill-
Queen's University Press, 1991), 80-81.
8JR 49:235-239.
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determination to restore the life of the colony and rescue 
New France from "the fires of the Iroquois."9 Jesuit 
reports of the excitement stirred by the arrival of such a 
large regiment of regular soldiers may well have sparked 
the development of a "golden haze" of legend about the 
"Good Regiment."
With the advantage of hindsight, Jack Verney has drawn 
a more realistic picture of the Carignan-Salieres regiment 
as "a workaday seventeenth-century infantry unit sent to 
fight overseas."10 At full strength the regiment 
consisted of twenty captains commanding companies each of 
which included a lieutenant, an ensign, and fifty enlisted 
men recruited and paid by the captains with funds provided 
by the minister. Those who enlisted in the Carignan- 
Salieres regiment were designated as volunteers in France 
but were considered regular soldiers in Canada by way of 
contrast with the Canadian volunteers led by the capitaines 
de milice.
The regiment was not well-equipped for warfare on the 
Canadian frontier, and the lack of snowshoes and blankets 
contributed as much as poor leadership to the fiasco of the
9Ibid., 49:213.
10Verney, Good Regiment, ix.
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first winter campaign. Courcelle's expedition against the 
Mohawks, one of the five Iroquois nations, lost its way in 
the blinding snow and attacked a few Indian cabins on the 
outskirts of Schenectady, an Anglo-Dutch settlement. After 
a skirmish in which the Mohawks had the advantage, the 
burgomaster notified Courcelle that he had wandered into 
English territory and offered no resistance to the 
occupation of his village. Fearing diplomatic
complications and not knowing that war had broken out 
between France and England, Courcelle returned to Canada. 
Fewer than one hundred soldiers survived the campaign. 
Possibly as many as four hundred had died, most of them 
casualties of the Canadian winter.11 The Canadian 
volunteers proved more effective in the wars against the 
Iroquois, and when the regular soldiers learned from them 
the techniques of warfare and survival in the Canadian 
wilderness, the campaign against the Iroquois made some 
headway.12
Despite the limited success, the excitement about the 
arrival of the regiment is understandable. Champlain had 
won the respect of the Indians by his courage in the face
n lMd. , 45-53.
12Ibid., 55, 71.
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of danger and by the fear he instilled in the enemies of 
his Indian allies by the use of firearms.13 One of the 
most effective techniques of the ancien capitaine was to 
convince a potential enemy that he could call upon the 
governor and the great chief of all the French to send a 
force so powerful that it would be impossible to resist. 
The arrival of six ships with over six hundred men 
encouraged the Canadians and their Indian allies and gave 
them good reason to celebrate.
The relation of 1664-1665 describes de Tracy's 
reception by the Hurons. When the Indians assembled at 
Quebec, ten or twelve of their chiefs constituted a 
welcoming delegation. One of these elders acted as 
spokesman. Using gestures and a symbolic presentation of 
gifts, the old Huron captain hailed the "arrival of so many 
soldiers" as evidence of the monarch's willingness to 
preserve and protect the Hurons from their enemies.14 
His speech began as he dropped a moose-skin at the feet of 
de Tracy.
Great Onontio, thou seest at thy feet the wreck 
of a great country, and the pitiful remnant of a 
whole world, that was formerly peopled by 
countless inhabitants. But now thou art
13Eccles, France in America. 20-21.
14JR 49:229.
115
addressed by mere carcasses, only the bones of 
which have been left by the Iroquois, who have 
devoured the flesh after broiling it on their 
scaffolds. There was left in us nothing but the
merest thread of life; and our limbs, most of
which have passed through the boiling cauldrons 
of our foes, had no more strength, ■—  when, 
raising our eyes with extreme difficulty, we saw 
on the river the ships that were bringing thee, 
and, with thee, so many soldiers sent us by thy 
great Onontio and ours.15
He continued to present a series of six gifts. The last
gift was the mutual understanding to be used "to promote
the continued firm union of the French and Algonquin
nations." Upon presenting the last gift, the Indian
captain signaled the Algonquin chiefs "to step forward, and
offered them to M. de Tracy, to march with him and attend
him on the expedition that he was about to undertake." The
Huron "captain" stressed that the French and Algonquins
were "both Christian peoples" united in a common cause with
"one and the same end in view —  the destruction of the
Iroquois and the publication of the Gospel."16 The
15Ibid., 49:227, 229.
16JR 49:227. For details concerning what the Ursuline 
nun, Marie de 1'Incarnation termed the "great progress" of 
the gospel among the Hurons see her letter to Mere Ursule 
de Ste-Catherine, Superieure des Ursulines de Tours, 29 
September 1642 in Marie De L'Incarnation. Ursuline (1599- 
1672): Correspondance. ed. Dorn Guy Oury (Solesmes: Abbaye
de Saint-Pierre, 1971), 167-169.
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Indians were allies bound by a profession of loyalty to 
march with their French brothers against a common enemy.
The arrival of the soldiers displayed the ability of 
Champlain's successors to deliver on their promise to 
defend their Indian allies based on their relationship to 
the king. With the very visible show of force that so many 
soldiers and ships furnished, the Canadian militiamen who 
represented forty per cent of the adult male population of 
New France,17 along with their Indian allies, proved to 
be very effective during the course of three campaigns. The 
French settlers and their Indian allies successfully 
employed a tactic which later anciens capitaines continued 
to use effectively. They convinced their Mohawk enemies to 
sue for peace by presenting them with a convincing 
demonstration of the vast and powerful military resources 
of their lord and master, the French king.
It is now known that the peace did not last because 
there were deep factional divisions within the Mohawk camp. 
Jack Verney has noted the failure of the French to pursue 
the enemy and eliminate the three or four hundred Mohawk 
warriors who survived,18 but the question of when to end
17Verney, Good Regiment. 43.
18Ibid.. 71-72.
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a conflict is always a difficult decision, and the anciens 
caoitaines were always quite conservative. In spite of 
their blustery rhetoric, they exhausted every possible 
alternative before they entered into a conflict, and they 
were always willing to halt a war when they were presented 
with tangible evidence of satisfaction for the insult or 
injury incurred. They needed only to maintain the respect 
of the Indians and habitants for the Great Chief who was 
responsible for the justice essential for the tranquillity 
of his vast territories.
The caoitaines de milice were the oeres de famille in 
their village communities. By starting families and 
engaging in trade, some of the soldiers of the Carignan- 
Salieres Regiment built on the European tradition of 
village assemblies and perhaps adopted the practices of the 
Indian village assemblies.19 When they performed a 
military function they were under the authority of the 
governor. Civilian service was performed under the 
authority of the intendant who was given responsibility for 
police, justice, and finances. Yet on the Canadian 
frontier every subject of the king was a potential soldier, 
and the legal distinction between military and civilian
19Ifeid., 104-112.
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duties gave way to the practical performance of whatever 
needed to be done by Canadian habitants and their Indian 
allies.20
The anciens capitaines were volunteer officers —  
experienced frontiersmen responsible for recruiting, 
mustering, and leading their militia companies. Under the 
old maritime system, most of them made their living in the 
fur trade.
Members of the Carignan-Salieres regiment remained on 
the Canadian frontier to become peres de famille. Not only 
did they adopt frontier tactics for fighting in the 
wilderness, but some remained in Canada, engaged in the fur 
trade, and established their families there.21 In the 
New World French soldiers were encouraged to become 
settlers to populate the colony and relieve the king of 
heavy military expenses.
With or without rank and salary under the Ordonnance 
de la Marine, the Canadian pere de famille. responsible for 
the defence and protection of his family and constantly 
participating in frontier conflicts, performed functions
20Ibid.. 92.
21Verney, Good Regiment. 104-112.
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analogous to those of the medieval militia captains in the 
cities of northern Italy and the Sagamores of Canada.
The old Huron captain who brought his warriors to 
welcome de Tracy at Quebec conducted a ceremony designed to 
symbolize the bond of loyalty established between the 
French king and his people. The French captains would 
employ similar language and symbols. They became adept at 
performing civic rituals on the American frontier devised 
to symbolize and promote peace and tranquillity among the 
allies of the French monarch while instilling fear in the 
hearts of any enemy who would insult the French and their 
allies and disturb or threaten the welfare of the king's 
people.
The distribution of gifts became part of the bonding 
process that was designed to transform many different 
nations into one "obedient" city. The Indians expressed 
their willingness to sacrifice their persons and their 
goods in the service of the French king, but the acceptance 
of French sovereignty was always contingent upon the 
ability of the great French captains to insure the peace 
and tranquillity of their adopted people. As in the cities 
of northern Italy, peace was the ultimate goal of the 
mutual assistance pact. On the Canadian frontier peace 
required reparation rather than punishment. In the case of
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murder, for example, French justice required the execution 
of the murderer, but the Indian tradition demanded that the 
dead be "covered" or "raised" by the gift of a slave or 
valuable goods.22 Pere Brebeuf reported that among the 
Hurons
the relatives of the deceased pursue not only 
him who has committed the murder, but address 
themselves to the whole Village, which must give 
satisfaction for it, and furnish, as soon as 
possible, for this purpose as many as sixty 
presents, the least of which must be of the 
value of a new Beaver robe.23
Local justice also required that the ancien capitaine be
able to harangue, advise, and lead his people to war.
Village and provincial liberty depended on the faithful
performance of duty by members of each "obedient" company
forming an "elect" nation under the "anointed" French king.
Expanding the French Frontier: Henri de Tonti
The language of the Canadian captains who claimed and
possessed in the name of their sovereign king the lands
drained by the Mississippi River stressed obedience and
service. The relationship between the king and people was
built on service, but the Canadian captains established
new posts under royal sovereignty by mediating between
22White, Middle Ground. 77.
23LeJeune's Relation of 1636, JR 10:215, 217.
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Indian tribes and administering royal justice to the 
provincial inhabitants. The identity of the "old" captain 
developed when the Canadian captains resisted bureaucratic 
controls by acting in accordance with their interpretation 
of colonial interests. The technique of using words and 
force to shape the development of new European posts on the 
American frontier was reflected in the activities and 
discourse of Henri de Tonti, Pierre Le Moyne, and Pierre- 
Charles Le Sueur.
When Governor Frontenac built Fort Frontenac on Lake 
Ontario in 1673 as part of a complex scheme for gaining 
control of the western fur trade, he was flouting the 
directives of the minister of marine. Colbert was not 
interested in new settlements which would be difficult and 
expensive to protect, and Louis XIV was preoccupied with 
foreign policy. When Rene-Robert Cavelier de La Salle 
undertook two missions to the French court —  the first in 
1675 to gain the approval of Louis XIV for the new fort and 
the second after his famous journey to the mouth of the 
Mississippi in 1683 —  he used the standard arguments
linking economic advantages and missionary activity to the 
service of God and king.24 Judging from the king's
24Allain, French Colonial Policy. 39-42.
122
response, La Salle quickly learned that the strategic 
argument highlighting the harassment of the king's enemies 
proved most effective. How could Louis XIV pass up an 
opportunity to conquer New Biscaye at the cost of a few 
ships, two hundred men, and the enlistment of fifty 
freebooters from Saint-Domingue? After all, La Salle 
intended to recruit 15,000 Indian warriors to defeat the 
Spanish.25
After the disappearance of La Salle in 1686, Tonti 
tried to establish a post where the Arkansas river drains 
into the Mississippi. Tonti received his authority from La 
Salle who had himself advanced well beyond Colbert's 
compact colony policy.26 Tonti chose an excellent
location where later commandants would be able to 
supplement their meager salaries with profits from the 
Indian trade. Tonti's early effort failed, however, 
because he needed soldiers to establish military control 
over the territory and his retainers deserted him. He then 
petitioned the king for a captain's office to tide him over
25Ibid., 40, 44.
26Allain, French Colonial Policy. 32-33. See also 
Colbert's letter to Jean Talon (April 5, 1666) in Pierre 
Margry, ed., Decouvertes et etablissements des francais 
dans 1'ouest et dans le sud de l'Ameriaue septentrionale. 
1614-1754. 6 vols. (Paris: D. Jouaust, 1876-1886), 1:77-
78.
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until the volume of trade would begin to offset the heavy 
overhead costs of territorial control.
If he had successfully occupied the land, Tonti 
would have held it under the indirect authority of the 
French king who would not even impose taxes on the
land. As a seigneur he would be expected to fight as a
vassal to protect the land and could himself collect
"feudal dues" from the concessions granted to his men.
La Salle and Tonti opened the way for French expansion 
into the lower Mississippi Valley, but Pierre Le Moyne, 
sieur d'Iberville, convinced Louis XIV and his minister of 
marine, Jerome Phelypeaux, Comte de Pontchartrain, to 
support his project to establish a colony and develop the 
Mississippi River as an avenue of commerce. Iberville 
lived as a soldier of fortune before his appointment as a 
royal naval captain in 1691.27 As commander of the 
expedition to establish a military outpost near the mouth 
of the Mississippi in 1698, he exhibited the basic 
qualities of a man of action who could instill loyalty in 
a band of followers by engaging in exploits and developing 
a reputation for achieving success against overwhelming 
odds. A brief examination of his early career and a review
27MPA:FD 2:10, n. 1.
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of his relationship with his subordinates reveals that 
Iberville engaged in private enterprise and and performed 
royal service in the fashion of an old Canadian captain.
The purpose of Iberville's expedition was to thwart a 
possible English attempt to establish control of the 
river's mouth,28 but his ability to control his men 
depended as much on personal and familial loyalty as on the 
exercise of royal authority. Jack Holmes has recently 
described Iberville as a "French army officer and colonial 
explorer and administrator," the heir of a "remarkable 
Norman family whose exploits helped create permanent French 
Canadian settlements from the pristine wilderness."29
As a young adventurer in the American skirmishes of 
the Anglo-French conflict known as "King Williams' War" in 
1686, Iberville used two canoes and eleven men to capture 
an English ship with twelve canons. Given command of the 
entire Hudson Bay in 1688, he defended his crude fort
28Marcel Giraud, Histoire de la Louisiane Francaise. 
5 vols. (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1953-
1990). A History of French Louisiana. Vol. 1, The Reign of 
Louis XIV. 1698-1715. trans. Joseph C. Lambert (Baton 
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1974), 16-24.
29Jack D.L. Holmes, "Pierre Lemoyne, Sieur d'Iberville 
et d'Ardillieres: Colonial Explorer, 1699-1702" in Joseph
G. Dawson III, ed. , The Louisiana Governors: From Iberville 
to Edwards (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 
1990), 1.
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against an attack by three English vessels. He did not 
receive his appointment as captain of a frigate until he 
went to France in 1691.30 In the American wilderness 
royal recognition and royal authority often came after an 
aspiring adventurer performed exploits in the name of the 
king with his own limited resources.
In 1698 Iberville took advantage of an opportunity to 
follow the trail blazed by La Salle when he was given 
command of the expedition to establish a colony at the 
mouth of the Mississippi. He was able to accomplish his 
mission because he had the assistance of his brothers and 
kinsmen such as Louis Juchereau de St. Denis, as well as 
the ability to gain the loyalty of adventurers like Henri 
de Tonti and others. His success, according to Jack 
Holmes, lay in having "blocked both the English and the 
Spanish expansion into North America's heartland." 
Iberville, Holmes explains, "coordinated initial Indian 
policy and created the economic base on which later French 
governors and intendants could build and expand" while also 
setting the stage for an "international struggle for 
control over the Gulf of Mexico.31
30MPA:FD. 2:10, n. 1.
31Holmes, "Iberville," 1-3.
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Iberville built his case for the establishment of a 
French colony at the mouth of the Mississippi River with 
essentially the same arguments used by La Salle to overcome 
the reluctance of Colbert to permit the expansion of French 
Canada.
Iberville profited from La Salle's experience. He 
stressed the reality of the English presence and the 
possibility of an English establishment on the Mississippi 
or at Mobile Bay, and gained command of the Mississippi 
expedition intended by the French crown to establish a post 
near the mouth of the river designed to prevent the British 
from occupying the area. Pontchartrain postponed the 
decision to support a "prolonged occupation" until after 
Iberville's second voyage in December 1699.32 Even then 
the crown's commitment to colonization was, according to 
Allain, "half-hearted, at best."33 It would maintain 
Louisiana only as a strategic outpost.
Iberville began his expedition in June 1698 with two 
ships armed and manned with funds provided by the marine 
ministry. Charles Le Vasseur, a Canadian officer who had 
served in Louisiana with La Salle was added to the crew of
32Giraud, History. 1:36.
33Allain, French Colonial Policy. 54.
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Iberville's ships along with other men with experience on 
the American frontier.34 To provide additional 
protection, two warships commanded by the Marquis de 
Chdteaumorant also sailed from La Rochelle to Saint 
Domingue.
Iberville gingerly bypassed the best harbor at 
Pensacola when he discovered that it had been occupied by 
the Spanish. After making his initial contact with the 
Bayougoula Indians he chose a site for the first French 
post, named Fort Maurepas, on Biloxi Bay. Except for 
Ensign de Sauvole, who was placed in command by Iberville, 
the major officers of the small garrison were Canadians. 
The roll of the garrison, dated August 25, 1699, listed
Iberville's brother, Jean Baptiste Le Moyne, Sieur de 
Bienville, as Lieutenant of the King with a salary of 100 
livres and Le Vasseur as major. The roll indicated 
expenditure of 326 livres for five petty officers, 63 
livres for four sailors, 719 livres for eighteen Canadians, 
425 for thirteen freebooters, 229 for ten laborers and 66
34Giraud, History. 1:23.
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for six cabin boys. The twenty soldiers would not be paid 
until the end of the year.35
The list of officers at Fort Maurepas on May 28, 1700 
includes Mr. de Boisbriand, major, and Mr. de St. Denis, 
Canadian officer. Le Vasseur is listed this time as a 
Canadian officer along with St. Denis. Pierre Sidrac Dugue 
de Boisbriand and Louis Juchereau de St. Denis, described 
as "captains of the Canadians," by Intendant Begon, were 
officers of a contingent of sixty Canadians who "arrived 
from Newfoundland with Serigny." Pontchartrain ordered 
Begon to keep them as reinforcements for Iberville who 
subsequently returned with the Canadians and their captains 
to Fort Maurepas in December 1699.36
Iberville and his captains needed the king to supply 
the capital for the start-up costs of the colony. Royal 
funds were used not only to equip the ships and pay the 
recruits but also to supply the king's warehouse with gun 
powder and gifts for the Indians along with food supplies.
Despite the fact that Iberville and Bienville served 
the interest of the colony in a struggle against disease
35"Roll of officers, petty officers, sailors and other 
persons, left in the garrison at Fort Maurepas, in the Bay
of Biloxi," in Jay Higginbotham, Fort Maurepas; The Birth 
of Louisiana (Mobile: Colonial Books, 1968), 81-82.
36Giraud, History. 1:34-36.
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and hostile Indians,37 it suffered from the neglect of a 
mother country preoccupied with continental power politics 
and more often than not either unwilling or unable to 
sustain and protect the new colony. Iberville took 
advantage of the window of opportunity that opened between 
the Treaty of Ryswick, which ended the War of the League of 
Augsburg in 1697, and the outbreak of the War of the 
Spanish Succession in 1701 to secure the royal resources 
required by a frontier captain to establish a post. For 
Iberville and his captains the harassment of the enemies of 
France was important but the ultimate goal was to establish 
a French peace that would provide an atmosphere conducive 
to their commercial activities. They followed the 
directives of the crown to concentrate on the search for 
mines, but when it became clear that mining in the 
Mississippi Valley would never support the colony, and that 
the Canadians could not be induced to develop agriculture, 
the question of the trading interests of the Canadian
37John Brice Harris, From Old Mobile to Fort 
Assumption; A Story of the French Attempts to Colonize 
Louisiana, and Destroy the Chickasaw Indians (Nashville: 
The Parthenon Press, 1959), 7, 14. Patricia Dillon Woods, 
French-Indian Relations on the Southern Frontier. 1699-1762 
(Ann Arbor: UMI Research Press, 1980), 171. Holmes,
"Pierre Lemoyne, Sieur d'Iberville, 3; and "Jean Baptiste 
Lemoyne, Sieur de Bienville," in Dawson, ed. , Louisiana 
Governors. 12.
130
officers and the poverty of the people became a central 
issue in the rivalry between the commissioners and the 
military commandants.
The Canadian officers were placed on the original 
payroll lists because of their ability to control the 
Canadians and their frontier experience.38 Tonti and Le 
Vasseur, however, died during the yellow fever epidemic. 
Bienville began his service in Louisiana as King's 
Lieutenant, and later reguested to be commissioned as 
captain of a ship with the added honor of the Cross of St. 
Louis. Louis Juchereau de St. Denis separated himself from 
the king's service rather than obey Bienville's order to 
abandon a fort and did not request another commission until 
1720. St. Denis and Boisbriand were called captains of the 
Canadians because they knew how to muster a troop of 
coureurs de bois and place themselves at the head of Indian 
warriors to harass the king's enemies.
St. Denis has achieved fame through his exploits 
described in detail by Penicaut and since recounted by 
numerous Louisiana historians, but his memoirs have never 
been found, and his surviving correspondence is skimpy. 
Consequently, the best sources for an analysis of the
38Giraud, History. 1:23, 35, 39, 147.
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discourse of the anciens capitaines are Iberville's journal 
and especially the report of Pierre-Charles Le Sueur's 
conversations with the Indians contained in the journal 
originally thought to have been written by J. B. Bernard de 
la Harpe. These experienced Canadian captains, their 
children, and the French officers who learned from them, 
exercised royal authority in the Mississippi Valley and 
established the French king as the great father of the 
Indian nations. The expenses of maintaining good relations 
with the Indians began with Iberville and proliferated 
later because it was important for an experienced captain 
to impress the Indians with the wealth and power of the 
king he represented.
Iberville's Journal
No doubt there is a wide gap between the rhetoric of 
Iberville and the reality of the actual relations between 
the captains, the Indians, and the king. Nevertheless, his 
account suggests how the French made their initial contact 
with the Bayagoulas, the Houmas, and the Sioux and it 
illustrates how the experienced captain established his 
control over the Indians by distributing presents and 
promising trade while the king received loyal servants who 
expressed a willingness to harass the king's enemies.
On February 12, 1699, as Iberville traveled in a small 
boat along the coastal islands searching for the mouth of 
the Mississippi, he saw a campfire. The next day he found 
fresh Indian tracks which he followed until nightfall. 
Knowing that the two Indians he was tracking had returned 
to observe him at daybreak, Iberville placed "two hatchets, 
four knives, two packages of porcelain beads, and a little 
Vermillion" at the site where he and his men had camped. 
Later that day, when he sighted a canoe and the Indians 
fled into the woods, he crossed over to a place where the 
Indians had concealed their canoes. Not far from there he 
encountered an "ancient and very ill Indian." The 
explorers gave him something to eat and smoke. 
Communicating by sign language, the old Indian requested a 
campfire which they provided. Two days later Bienville 
captured an Indian woman in the woods a few miles away, and 
that night Iberville brought her to the sick Indian where 
he left her after giving her presents and tobacco to take 
to her people.39
39Carl A. Brasseaux, ed. , A Comparative View of 
French Louisiana. 1699 and 1762: The Journals of Pierre Le
Movne d'Iberville and Jean-Jacaues-Blaise d'Abbadie 
(Lafayette, La.: Center for Louisiana Studies, 1979), 31.
Hereafter cited as Journals.
The next day the old Indian died and five Indians 
(including two women) who had been captured by Iberville's 
Canadians began chanting. The Indians remained distrustful 
in spite of the gifts, but the next day Iberville coaxed 
three Indians to come on board one of his ships. There he 
"greatly impressed them" by firing several cannon loaded 
with solid shot.40 When Iberville arrived at Bienville's 
campsite on February 17, he found a Bayougoula "chief or 
captain" who greeted him at the seashore by rubbing his 
hands on Iberville's face and chest. After the greeting 
ceremony, the explorers and the Indians gathered near 
Bienville's tent where they all smoked an "iron peacepipe, 
made in the form of a ship with a white flag marked with a 
fleur de lvs. and embellished with beads." While 
presenting the Indians with "hatchets, knives, blankets, 
shirts, beads, and other things valued by them," Iberville 
"made them understand that with this calumet I had rendered 
them united with the French and they were now one 
nation."41 When Iberville and his Bayagoula brothers
arrived at the Houma village on March 20, the Houmas began
40Ibid., 33.
41Ibid.. 34. On the history of the calumet ceremony 
see Donald J. Blakeslee, "The Origin and Spread of the 
Calumet Ceremony," American Antiquity 46 (1981): 759.
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singing and the Bayagoulas sang on his behalf. They 
greeted the French in their customary manner and escorted 
them to a village assembly where they smoked the peace pipe 
and participated in festivities which lasted until 
midnight.42
Iberville thus began the process of establishing a 
French peace among the Indian tribes. Once again he was 
able to build on the work of La Salle and Tonti. He noted 
in his journal that the Houmas "spoke very highly of Tonti, 
who had spent five days at their village."43 His Indian 
allies provided guides to lead him further up the river. 
With information provided by a Taensa warrior, he was able 
to compose a chart of the various tribes and calculate the 
distance in leagues from one tribe to the next along the 
Mississippi. He traveled north from the Houma village 
until he was certain that a fork of the river reported in 
several accounts of the Mississippi explorations did not 
actually exist and that he was indeed on the great river.
Iberville departed the Houma village to return to his 
ships on March 23. On April 8 he began construction of
42Journals. 53-54.
43Ibid., 56.
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Fort Maurepas. He set sail for France on May 4 and reached 
Rochefort on July 2, 1699.44 
Le Sueur's Account
Pierre-Charles Le Sueur, born in Artois in 1659, made 
the voyage to Canada as a young man. Initially involved in 
the fur trade, he was commissioned by the Comte de
Frontenac, the governor-general of Canada, to construct a
fort on an island in the Mississippi in 1695. Le Sueur 
began immediately to bring the Indian tribes under royal 
control. He brought a Sioux chief to Montreal so that the 
Comte de Frontenac could receive his tribesmen "among the 
number of his children, as he had done to all the other 
nations." Things did not go smoothly, however. The chief 
died before he left Montreal, and Le Sueur feared that the 
Governor might interfere with his effort to exploit the
lead and copper mines he had discovered. He traveled to
France where the crown granted him permission to open the 
mines in 1697, but he was captured by the English on the 
return voyage and he destroyed his commission authorizing 
him to exploit the mines to prevent it from falling into 
the hands of the English. After securing his release Le 
Sueur returned to France where he was awarded a new
44Higginbotham, Fort Maurepas. 24, 31-32; Journals.
72, 76.
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commission in 1698. Another transatlantic crossing proved 
fruitless so the year 1699 found Le Sueur back in France 
where he learned of Iberville's Mississippi enterprise.45
Le Sueur sailed with Iberville on his second voyage. 
He arrived at Biloxi along with St. Denis and Boisbriant by 
January, 1700. Pontchartrain authorized Le Sueur to join 
the expedition to develop the mines he had previously 
discovered in the Illinois country.46 His name does not 
appear on the Biloxi officer lists, and there is no 
indication that he was paid a salary. Apparently it was 
after completing the Illinois expedition where Le Sueur 
established a post called Fort Huilier that Iberville gave 
him the rank of "lieutenant general of the jurisdiction of
45[Jean-Baptiste Benard de La Harpe], Historical 
Journal of the Settlement of the French in Louisiana, ed. 
Glenn R. Conrad, trans. Virginia Koenig and Joan Cain 
(Lafayette: University of Southwestern Louisiana, 1971),
28-29. The manuscript of the journal is signed by Benard 
de La Harpe, but Marc de Villiers says in his Histoire de 
la Fondation de la Nouvelle Orleans [(Paris: Imprimerie
nationale, 1917), 24] that it was not written by La Harpe. 
His suggestion that it might have been written by the 
Chevalier de Beaurain is accepted as a fact by Marcel 
Giraud in Histoire de la Louisiane francaise. 3:399. 
Conrad notes, however, that "neither Villiers nor Giraud... 
offer documentary proof" on behalf of Beaurain's 
authorship. See the editorial note on p. 1 of his 
translation of the Historical Journal.
46Giraud, History. 1:36.
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Mobile" in July 1702.47 Le Sueur was sixteen years older 
than St. Denis and Boisbriant, described as captains of the 
Canadians and listed on the officer roll of the garrison at 
Fort Maurepas. His age, experience, and extensive exercise 
of royal authority place him on the same level as Iberville 
and Tonti. Marcel Giraud characterizes Le Sueur and Tonti 
as examples of men who "contributed effectually to the 
diffusion of French influence by their loyalty and 
achievements."48
Serious obstacles had delayed Le Sueur's effort to 
open the mines in Illinois, but now he would be able to 
pursue his project under the umbrella of Iberville's 
authority. He was related to Iberville and Bienville by 
his marriage to their aunt. His son, Jean Paul Le Sueur, 
would later mobilize the Choctaw against the Natchez in 
1730 and play an important role in Bienville's campaign 
against the Natchez and Chickasaws.49
Through his experience in Canada Pierre-Charles Le 
Sueur learned how to control and maintain the loyalty of
47Ibid., 1:47.
48Ibid., 1:6.
49MPA:FD. 2:16, n. 1 and Ibid.. 4:52, n. 2.
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men who had taken up "the ways of the Indians."50
According to Sauvole, there would be "no lack of French
travelers" in Louisiana, but the men he termed "Canadians"
were hard to manage and not very helpful. On August 4,
1701, Sauvole informed the Ministry of Marine that
Mr. Iberville will doubtless agree about their
unruliness and their inconstancy on his arrival when
his brother and the other Canadian officers will 
assure him of their disobedience and of the 
independent air that they would like to assume.51
Sauvole felt that they had left Canada to wander around the
Mississippi Valley "only in order not to work at all and
not to be dependent on any one whomsoever." He was
convinced that regular soldiers "are unquestionably more
suitable to guard posts and ... would cost the King much
less." Yet if the minister "thought that it was not
possible to do without them," Sauvole indicated that the
best of the Canadians might be selected for duty.52
After all, Le Sueur had demonstrated that they could be
controlled. Sauvole went on to say:
There were bets here that the people whom he had 
brought from France for his journey to the Sioux 
would not take him to the Bayagoulas.
50Sauvole to [Pontchartrain?], August 4, 1701, MPA:FD.
2:13.
51Ibid., 2:12.
52 Ibid.
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Nevertheless he went where he wished and 
returned with the same men. I would agree, 
however, that the Canadians are strong, quick 
and alert for journeys but it is necessary that 
the game please them. They take up the ways of 
the Indians, but the surest way among them is to 
have something to give them.5-*
Sauvole equated Canadians with savages, characterizing them
as motivated by greed, hate, and a strong desire for
revenge. Noble Frenchmen, by contrast, were motivated by
honor, justice, truth, and service of the king.
Tonti, Iberville, and Le Sueur not only demonstrated
their ability to control the Canadians, but convinced the
crown that Canadian militia units and loyal Indians could
supplement the few regular troops sent over from France.
Canadian officers constituted a separate classification
during the early years of the colony. The king could
depend on them to control the Canadians who were not
classified as regular soldiers. Pontchartrain and his
successors, however, remained suspicious of the Canadians.
The minister would probably have preferred to depend on
regular officers and troops, but neither Ponchartrain, nor
Antoine Crozat, nor the Company of the West were willing to
underwrite the cost of additional regular troops.
Iberville, Bienville, Boisbriant, St. Denis, and a well-
53Ibid.. 2:13.
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connected relation by marriage like Le Sueur could use 
Canadian recruits and Indians to supplement the few regular 
troops.
Effective control over the territory of the 
Mississippi Valley was established by Iberville with the 
help of Tonti, St. Denis, Bienville, and Le Sueur. They 
all used similar methods in dealing with the Indians. Much 
later, these methods were described by Pierre Frangois de 
Rigaud, Marquis de Vaudreuil as part of the knowledge and 
experience necessary to deal effectively with the Indians 
that he, as governor of Louisiana, attributed to the ancien 
capitaine.54 The effectiveness of these methods was 
recognized by George Rogers Clark who was able to adopt and 
use the same basic procedure to establish control over the 
Illinois country during the American Revolution.55
The basic procedure used by Le Sueur during his 
expedition in 1700 is described in La Harpe's journal. La 
Harpe shows that Le Sueur was sensitive to the needs and 
desires of the Indians. For example, upon his arrival at
54Vaudreuil to Rouille, April 28, 1751 in MPA:FD.
5:69-70.
55George Rogers Clark, Col. George Rogers Clark's 
Sketch of His Campaign in the Illinois in 1778-9. 
(Cincinnati: Robert Clarke & Co., 1869; repr., Arno Press
& The New York Times, 1971), 38.
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a Sioux village on July 30, 1700, Le Sueur presented its
chief with "some merchandise to persuade him to maintain
the peace." He had previously promised the Illinois chief
that he would establish a peace with the Sioux. After
distributing the gifts, Le Sueur informed the chief "that
the king of France did not wish anyone to bloody further
this river, and that he had sent him to tell the chief that
if the Indians were obedient to his message, the Frenchmen
would give them everything they needed."56
La Harpe also records that on September 5, Le Sueur
met five Canadians who had been attacked by Indians. When
the Canadians recognized their attackers, Le Sueur had his
men shout to them "not to approach nearer or they would
shoot." When the Indians acted surprised by the hostility
of the French, Le Sueur
responded that after what they had done to the 
five [Canadians] who were present, there was 
reason to be distrustful of them. For the 
security of his commerce, however, it was 
absolutely necessary to be at peace with all 
nations, and so he did not insist that the 
Indians pay for the pillage they had committed.
He added that the king, their master and his, 
wished all his subjects to be able to navigate 
this river without fear of being insulted.57
56Historical Journal. 45.
57Ibid.. 47.
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Another group of Indians threatened Le Sueur's 
expedition on September 15. He tricked them into thinking 
he had more men than he actually did. The Indians moved 
toward the Frenchmen with a calumet. They explained to Le 
Sueur that a member of their tribe had accidentally killed 
a Canadian deserter. The Indians then produced the 
companion of the accident victim as a witness. Le Sueur 
used a name recognized by the Indians as referring to the 
governor of Canada. He said to the Indians that Onontio, 
"being their father and his, they only needed to go to the 
governor as soon as possible" and the Frenchman's blood 
would be washed from their hands.58 Le Sueur explained 
to them that the king "had sent him to find the entrance of 
the river" and that he "wished the nations who were living 
along it, as well as anyone under his protection, to live 
in peace."59
Le Sueur was careful to respect the hierarchy that 
existed among the Indian tribes that he encountered. One 
tribe requested that he "settle on the Mississippi in the 
area around the mouth of the Saint Pierre River, where the 
Ayavois, the Otoctakas, and the Sioux, as well as the
58Ibid., 50.
59 Ibid.
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French could come and go freely." These Indians made their 
speech and "began, as was their custom, to weep on the head 
of M. Le Sueur and said ... have pity on us." Le Sueur was 
aware that "his settlement on the Blue River would not 
please the eastern Sioux who are, so to speak, the masters 
of the other Sioux ... probably because they were the first 
provided guns by the French." Le Sueur carefully explained 
his situation. He "told the Indians that he was sorry not 
to have known their wishes sooner, since he had come 
expressly for them and had settled on their land." He 
explained why it would be difficult to change his plans, 
gave them gifts, and "invited them ... to the fort that he 
was going to build." He went on to say "that when all were 
assembled there, he would instruct them about the wishes of 
the king, their master and his."60
The French had introduced the concept of the king as 
pere de famille to the Indians in Canada. Champlain and 
the Jesuits certainly instilled in the Canadian Indians the 
idea that they consider themselves children professing 
obedience to a powerful father. One finds in the Indian 
dialogue reported by the French a recurring reference by 
the Indians to themselves as obedient children.
60Ibid.. 51.
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When the Mantantous and the Oujalespoitous reached 
Fort Huilier on November 26, 1700, Chief Quacantapai
reported to Le Sueur that Tioseate, the chief who had died 
in Montreal in 1696, had asked Le Sueur "to forget the 
insult of the Mendeouacantous and to have pity on his 
brothers by giving them powder and bullets." Pointing out 
that powder and bullets were necessary both for defense 
against enemies and for hunting game to feed their 
families, Quacantapai said: "here are your children, your 
brothers and sisters. It is up to you whether they live or 
die. [They] will live if you give them powder and bullets 
and, on the contrary, they will die if you refuse 
them."51
Le Sueur was adept at taking advantage of the Indians' 
respect for the patriarchal authority of the king as well 
as their need for European goods. Too weak to subdue the 
Sioux and recognizing their traditional propensity for war, 
Le Sueur gave them the task of cultivating the land. He 
promised them the king's protection if they would "abandon 
their wandering life and come form a village near his 
fort." Le Sueur was also able to find a way around a royal
61Ibid.. 55.
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order preventing Frenchmen from hunting for beaver. He
explained to the Indians that the
king, their chief and his, ... had forbidden him 
to traffic in beaver skins, knowing that hunting 
obliged the French to separate and expose 
themselves to being attacked by their 
enemies.62
As a result Le Sueur settled in an area where there was an 
abundance of animals. The Indians could bring the skins 
and exchange them for the supplies they needed. Le Sueur 
warned the Indians that "they could not get along without 
French merchandise, and that the only way to secure it was 
to cease waging war on the nations allied with the 
French.1163
On December 1, the Mantantous entertained Le Sueur at 
a feast in their village. The speech of Quacantapai, chief 
of the Mantantous, recorded in La Harpe's journal makes it 
clear that since the Mantantous and the French were the 
children of the same father, his tribe and the 
Mendeouacantous whom he would invite to unite with the 
French, should no longer be viewed as Sioux but as 
Frenchmen. "The few men that you see in this tent accept 
the present that you gave them, and have decided to obey
62Ibid., 56.
63Ibid.
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this great chief of all nations of whom you have spoken,"
Quacantapai said.
Thus, you no longer need look upon us as Sioux, 
but as Frenchmen. Instead of saying that the 
Sioux are unfortunate men who are not properly 
disposed, and who are only suited to pillage and 
stealing from the French, you will say, 'My 
brothers who do not have the proper disposition 
are unfortunate; we must try to change this.
They steal from us, but to prevent them from 
doing so, I shall see that they do not lack 
iron, that is to say, all kinds of merchandise.'
If you do that, I assure you that in a short 
time the Mantantous will become French, and they 
will no longer have the vices with which to 
reproach them.64
The exchange between Le Sueur and the Sioux chiefs 
focused on the need of the Indians for European merchandise 
and the determination of the French to maintain peace among 
the Indian tribes so that the Mississippi river could be 
used as an avenue of commerce. As obedient children, the 
Indians had to avoid "insulting" the French by injuring 
Canadians and interfering with their commerce. Then the 
king and their Canadian father would have pity on them and 
provide the powder and bullets that meant the difference 
between life and death. The purpose of the new French post 
was not only to provide protection for the Indians whose 
task was to cultivate the land. The Indians could also
64Ibid.. 57.
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bring skins to Le Sueur's fort to exchange for the things 
they needed.
The dialogue between Iberville and his captains and 
the Indians in the Mississippi Valley clearly reflects 
methods and procedures that originated in Canada with the 
social interaction of maritime captains, Indian leaders, 
and missionaries. The calumet ceremony was used to open 
the door for the trading of European merchandise in 
exchange for pelts and deerskins and set the stage for the 
experienced Canadian captains to establish frontier posts 
as part of a colonial infrastructure which would not only 
support, but also extend well beyond the immediate 
exigencies of a strategic military outpost. The career of 
Louis Juchereau de St. Denis provides more insight into the 
functions of the old captain as a link between the king and 
his people in the new Louisiana colony.
CHAPTER 5
Louis Juchereau De St. Denis, Ancien Capitaine
Louis Juchereau de St. Denis used the techniques of 
the ancien capitaine with amazing effectiveness. With the 
Natchitoches Post he created a frontier institutional 
structure that provided a means for controlling frontier 
territory under French, Spanish, and, eventually, American 
dominion. But although St. Denis has achieved fame in 
Louisiana as the founder of Natchitoches, the first French 
settlement west of the Mississippi, his true historical 
significance lies in the way he embodied the ideal of the 
ancien capitaine. In this chapter I will discuss St. 
Denis's position as a royal officer responsible for Indian 
relations and the connection between his trading activity 
and royal service which typified that of the ancien 
capitaine. It will then become clear why, by the time St. 
Denis died in 1744, the Natchitoches Post had developed 
special importance in Louisiana History. As its 
commandant, St. Denis had successfully defended his post 
during the Natchez revolt which had threatened the very
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survival of the colony from 1729 until 1732. He had also 
established a clandestine trade with Mexico against 
overwhelming odds, and under his leadership Natchitoches 
supplied New Orleans with cattle, horses, and other 
commodities.
St. Denis' career demonstrates first that in the 
eighteenth century a young man's opportunity to gain wealth 
and territory in Louisiana depended as much on his position 
in the Canadian kinship network as it did on his rank as an 
military officer of the crown. St. Denis was a cousin of 
Iberville and the eleventh child of a father who received 
letters of nobility for service in defense of Canada. 
Members of the Juchereau-Duchesnay family were prominent 
jurists near Chartres when Louis's grandfather emigrated to 
Canada. There Nicolas Juchereau, Louis's father, 
established a seigneurie at Beauport located across the 
river from Quebec.1
As a young Canadian captain in 1700, St. Denis joined 
Iberville on his second voyage to Louisiana at the head of 
his own company. He presented himself to French and Indian 
refugees in Louisiana as the father who would supply the
1Ross Phares, Cavalier in the Wilderness: The Story
of the Explorer and Trader Louis Juchereau de St. Denis 
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1952), 58-
59.
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things they lacked. He retained Canadians and Indians in 
his personal militia company because men were willing to 
follow a "master of iron" who mastered also their languages 
and symbolic rituals. He presented himself as a noble 
servant of the French king, but he earned the respect of 
friends and enemies as the "Great White Chief." St. Denis 
needed the support of the French crown to create his 
trading station which developed as a microcosm of the 
French kingdom. The king, in turn, needed the loyal 
service of St. Denis and his successors to maintain royal 
control of the frontier territory and its diverse 
population.
St. Denis gained the loyalty of a band of Indians and 
Frenchmen that eventually became the basis for a legend 
expressed vividly in the "Ballad of St. Denis," but his 
reputation for being a "valiant Frenchman" aspiring to 
"prove his monarch's claim,"2 must be critically assessed 
as a product of nationalistic thinking that places too much 
emphasis on the role of the modern state and has caused 
many historians to overlook the importance of local
2Germaine Portre-Bobinski and Clara Mildred Smith, 
Natchitoches: The Up-to-Date Oldest Town in Louisiana (New
Orleans: Dameron-Pierson, 1936), 57. See the Appendix for
the complete text of Grace Tarleton Aaron's "Ballad of St. 
Denis."
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autonomy in colonial Louisiana. St. Denis's success as an 
ancien capitaine depended less on his loyalty to France 
than his ability to satisfy his people with the power, 
prestige, and material goods they demanded.
At the dawn of the new century, St. Denis explored the 
river valleys of Louisiana and with Bienville chose a site 
to build the first French fort on the Mississippi. He led 
several expeditions up the Red River after his first trip 
with Bienville. In 1702 he assisted Tonti in diplomatic 
negotiations with various Indian tribes which produced a 
temporary cessation of hostilities between the Chickasaws 
and Choctaws. Only after Bienville went to Biloxi in 1701 
to take command of the colony at the death of Sauvolle was 
St. Denis placed in command of Fort St. John, the fort he 
helped Bienville build on the Mississippi.3
When a decision was made to abandon the fort in 1707, 
St. Denis took up residence along the river. There he 
exercised control over the Indians under Bienville's 
authority, but he refused to obey his commander's order to 
rejoin his company at Mobile. He informed Bienville that
3Phares, Cavalier. 27-33.
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he did not wish to serve the Icing any longer.4 St. 
Denis's action was a response to the crown's failure to 
provide adequate funds for the salaries of officers and 
soldiers during the critical years of the War of the 
Spanish Succession, 1703-1712. Bienville had been advised 
to compensate the officers with goods from the king's 
warehouse, but supply ships were never on time and for 
several years not a single ship reached Louisiana from 
France.5 Apparently St. Denis felt that he stood to gain 
more by trading with the Indians than by living on an 
unpaid salary.
St. Denis thus went to live among the Indians. The 
Indians supplied food, and though there was little in the 
way of goods that could be exchanged, he somehow gained the 
loyalty of the Indians, perhaps by helping defend them from 
their enemies. St. Denis may well have established contact
4Bienville to Pontchartrain, October 27, 1711, MPA;FD 
3:166; Giraud, History. 1:216; Phares, Cavalier. 34; Jay 
Higginbotham, Old Mobile: Fort Louis de la Louisiane.
1702-1711 (Mobile, Ala.: Museum of the City of Mobile,
1977), 293.
5Marcel Giraud, "France and Louisiana in the Early 
Eighteenth Century," Mississippi Valley Historical Review 
36 (1950), 662.
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with the Spanish in Pensacola,6 and it could have been in 
response to his initiative that Antoine de La Mothe 
Cadillac, appointed governor in 1712, ordered him to go to 
Natchitoches to find Father Francisco Hidalgo and establish 
trade with the Spanish.
The Natchitoches Post and The Western Trade
Father Hidalgo was a Franciscan missionary who had 
written a letter to the governor of Louisiana when Spain 
decided to abandon his mission in Texas in 1711.7 By 
seeking French help to support his work among the Tejas 
Indians, the Franciscan friar may have been motivated by 
the desire to take advantage of the competition between 
France and Spain to convince the Spanish government to 
maintain his mission.8 For whatever reason and from
6Andre Penicaut, Fleurs de Lvs and Calumet: Being the
Penicaut Narrative of French Adventure in Louisiana, trans 
and ed. Richebourg Gaillard McWilliams (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 1953), 104-105.
7Abstracts of Letters from Cadillac, Dirigoin and 
Bienville to Crozat, October, 1713, MPA:FD 3:176.
8Phares, Cavalier. 39; Donald E. Chipman, Spanish 
Texas. 1519-1821 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1992), 
110-111; Robert S. Weddle, San Juan Bautista: Gateway to
Spanish Texas (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1968), 
93-97; Elizabeth A. John, Storms Brewed in Other Men's 
Worlds: The Confrontation of Indians. Spanish, and French
in the Southwest. 1540-1795 (College Station: Texas A&M 
University Press, 1975), 196-198, 203-205; Carlos E.
Castaneda, Our Catholic Heritage in Texas. 7 vols. (Austin: 
Von-Boeckmann-Jones, 1936-1958), 2:21-23, 45-69.
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whatever source it came, the letter was placed in the hands 
of the newly-appointed governor.
Cadillac had instructions from Antoine Crozat, the 
wealthy French financier who agreed to relieve the king's 
colonial financial burden in return for a trading monopoly. 
As head of the colony's proprietary government, Crozat 
ordered the new governor to search for mines and establish 
trade with Mexico.9 St. Denis was ready to assist the new 
governor at a time when Bienville nursed jealous feelings 
toward the man who had been placed in command of the 
colony.10 In supporting Bienville, St. Denis was acting
9Ibid., 37-38; Lamothe Cadillac to Pontchartrain, 
October 26, 1713, MPA:FD 2:180-181; Historical Journal. 89- 
90.
10Bienville had never actually been appointed governor 
of Louisiana. From the death of Sauvolle to the appointment 
of Cadillac in 1710, he served in the capacity of 
commandant-general, but as late as 1711 his official rank 
was that of a naval guard. Bienville to Pontchartrain, 
October 27, 1711 in MPA:FD 3:169. Giraud, History 1:225. 
O'Neill, Church and State. 113, n. 42. By 1715 Bienville 
had been promoted to the rank of captain commanding the 
Mississippi river area. Technically he was no longer 
commandant-general, but he functioned as such and even 
presented himself to the Indians as governor while Cadillac 
was absent in Illinois. Bienville to Pontchartrain, 
September 1, 1715, MPA:FD. 184-189. Historical Journal. 89- 
90. At the time he was commissioned as Commandant General 
of Louisiana on September 20, 1717 Bienville was addressed 
as "our King's Lieutenant in our said province of 
Louisiana." Commission For Bienville As Commandant General 
of Louisiana, September 20, 1717 in MPA:FD 3:224-225.
Bienville to the Regency Council, May 10, 1717 in Ibid.. 
219-220.
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as an ancien capitaine. as more of an independent operator 
than his status as a soldier would suggest. And that is 
precisely what Governor Cadillac needed when he called on 
St. Denis to lead the expedition to Natchitoches: a
frontier diplomat who could establish an economic 
enterprise in a hostile environment.
By the time Cadillac "contracted" with St. Denis to 
undertake the expedition up the Red River, a French effort 
to sell merchandise in both Havana and Vera Cruz had 
failed.11 According to Penicaut, the Spanish governor, 
"would not even hear of any trade."12 The viceroy 
ordered the captain of the ship to "set sail immediately 
and go home," and the French were told to keep their goods 
out of Mexico. Bienville, now serving as commandant under 
the new governor, wrote in October 1713 that he did not 
think it "possible to carry on commerce in Louisiana large 
enough for a company." Trade with the Spaniards, he went 
on to say "is very uncertain both by way of the Red River 
and by St. Bernard's Bay." He did not think that St. Denis 
would "succeed in his journey by the Red River because 
there are four hundred leagues to travel through several
11MPA:FD 3:177; Chipman, Spanish Texas. 103.
12Penicaut, Fleurs de Lvs. 144.
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Indian nations [that are] always at war with each other." 
Moreover, a long distance lay between these Indians and the 
Spanish settlements, and St. Denis was likely to find only 
"half-breeds who have nothing but livestock and little 
money.1,13
Like Robert Cavelier de La Salle and Iberville, St. 
Denis would do the job now for Antoine Crozat, the new 
proprietor (indirectly for the crown) at a minimum 
cost —  always a primary consideration. St. Denis needed 
only a few soldiers because he recruited the Natchitoches 
Indians who had been forced to leave their ancestral home 
when floods destroyed their crops in 1705. At that time 
the Natchitoches had asked St. Denis for a place to settle, 
and he had sent them to live among the Colapissas.14 
St. Denis must have used the words and rituals of the 
ancien capitaine to resettle the refugees and earn their 
trust because according to Penicaut, they now followed him 
willingly.15
In 1713 St. Denis returned with the Natchitoches to 
their ancestral lands where traders, missionaries, and
13Abstract of a letter from Bienville to Crozat, 
October 1713, MPA:FD 3:178.
14Penicaut, Fleur de Lvs. 100-105.
15Ibid.. 145.
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soldiers would interact with the native Americans to create 
a fictive kinship network called the Natchitoches Post. 
When the War of the Spanish Succession disrupted supplies 
from France, it was a simple matter for St. Denis to send 
Penicaut, who had lived among the Natchitoches and the 
Colapissas "to the Colapissa village to get the 
Nassitoches [sic] and bring them with their families to 
Biloxi, so that he could take them along with him to their 
old home on the Red River."16 The process of creating a 
"people" began when St. Denis instructed the Indians 
concerning their duties and obligations. His tedious and 
difficult task of opening avenues for intercolonial trade 
would strengthen his position with the Indians, while 
producing the happy side effect of a marriage alliance with 
the family of Diego Ramon, the Spanish commandant of the 
presidio protecting what would become the northern border 
of Mexico. Long before St. Denis married his Spanish 
bride, however, he used the techniques of the ancien 
capitaine to become the "father" of many "children."
16Ibid. Penicaut indicated that St. Denis brought the 
Natchitoches back to their ancestral lands during the year 
1712. It is possible that the migration took place in 
stages, but the written passport issued to St. Denis is 
dated September 12, 1713. Chipman, Spanish Texas. 104.
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Penicaut describes St. Denis's meeting with the
Natchitoches and the Doustinony, who joined their brothers
as clients of their French patron. The Doustiony had never
left their ancestral lands. "When M. de St. Denis got
there, writes Penicaut,
he assembled the chiefs of the Doustiony and the 
Nassitoches and told them, in the presence of 
the Chief of the Tonicas, that they must sow 
seed in their fields, and that he was going to 
have grains distributed among them, which he had 
brought along for that very purpose; for 
henceforth there would always be Frenchmen 
living among them.17
St. Denis presented himself to the Indians as a pere de
famille responsible for the cultivation of the patriarchal
domain. But he also established himself as master of the
household and the Indians as the servants of their French
master. In "the future theirs would be the responsibility
of feeding the Frenchmen who stayed there" Penicaut
reports that he told them, and
therefore, he exhorted them to work at the task 
unceasingly and informed them that they would 
have nothing to fear from other savages as long 
as they all stood closely united.
Penicaut went on to describe how St. Denis gave the Indians
iron tools and instructed them to clear the forest and
build a warehouse and living guarters for the French. The
17Penicaut, Fleurs de Lvs. 148-149.
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two huts of the primitive trading station were built 
before St. Denis made his long trek into Mexico in search 
of Father Hidalgo. Fort St. Jean Baptiste was built later, 
possibly in 1716, after St. Denis helped the Spanish 
Franciscans to return to their abandoned missions.18 
Between 1714 and 1716 St. Denis proceeded with his very 
difficult task of establishing commercial relations with 
the Spaniards. First he made contact with the Assinais who 
promised to lead him to the Spaniards after he gave them 
presents. St. Denis persuaded the Assinais to give him 
four guides who then led him to the Spanish village 
identified as the Presidio del Norte.19 Here St. Denis 
made contact with the Spanish family responsible for 
protecting the border of the Spanish Empire and maintaining 
its restrictive trade regulations.
After waiting six weeks for the Spanish captain at the 
presidio to contact his superior about the possibility of 
trading with the French, St. Denis was escorted to the 
Spanish governor in Coahuila. St. Denis sent orders back 
to his men at Presidio de Norte to return to Natchitoches
18Ibid., 149; Fray Juan Agustin Morfi, History of 
Texas. 1673-1779. 2 vols. (Albuguergue: Quivira Society, 
1935), 1:169-170; Chipman, Spanish Texas. 104; Giraud, A
History of French Louisiana. 2:187.
19Penicaut, Fleurs de Lvs. 150-51.
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because the governor had decided to send him to the viceroy 
of Mexico. St. Denis stayed in Coahuila almost a year 
before undertaking the journey to see the viceroy. It was 
during this time that he established his connections with 
the family of Captain Diego Ramon whose granddaughter he 
would later marry and then leave with her family, promising 
to return later to bring her to Mobile.20
St. Denis's relationship with the Ramon family, 
however, remained tenuous until after his journey to Mexico 
City. It was the duty of every official to enforce the 
trade laws which strictly prohibited importing French 
merchandise. St. Denis was imprisoned in Mexico City, and 
after his release, it became apparent that open trade was 
impossible. Before St. Denis began his journey back to 
Coahuila, the viceroy offered him a company of calvary in 
order to persuade him to serve the King of Spain. 
According to Penicaut, the Louisiana cavalier "told him 
that he had taken an oath of fidelity to his King, whose 
service he would quit only at death."21
Ross Phares' account of St. Denis's adventures, based 
on an extensive study of Spanish documents, clearly reveals
20Ibid., 153, 193.
21Ibid., 183-84, 193.
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that St. Denis did not have an easy time pursuing his goals 
in Texas and Mexico. He marched into hostile Spanish 
territory with a small force of twenty-four French 
Canadians. He returned twenty-one of them from the 
Assinais to Mobile. Then, finding himself a prisoner of 
the Spaniards, he "boasted that his imprisonment at the Rio 
Grande had been voluntary and enjoyable.1,22 Ultimately, 
St. Denis succeeded in captivating his captors.
Legal proceedings in Mexico City produced documents 
which demonstrate that the experienced Canadian captain was 
"a master at the art of choosing his topics and phrases" 
and "a past master at the art of omission."23 St. Denis 
was obviously guilty of bringing merchandise across a 
frontier that was closed to foreign trade.24 Hostile 
Spaniards had accused him of lying and cheating and would 
continue to do so. The old captain cleverly omitted any 
reference to the merchandise he brought with him or the 
storehouses he had built on the Red River. He concentrated 
on Father Hidalgo's invitation and the service he was 
rendering to God and king. He recommended the
22Phares, Cavalier. 66-69.
23Ibid., 70.
24Ibid., 51.
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reestablishment of the Spanish missions in Texas, which of 
course implied the reoccupation of Texas by Spain.25 He 
may or may not have boldly proclaimed his perpetual 
allegiance to the French king as Penicaut reported, but he 
did sidestep the question of becoming a Spanish subject.
After his release from prison in Mexico, St. Denis 
accepted a position as guide for a Spanish expedition to 
reoccupy the Texas missions. He would receive the same 
salary as the Spanish commanding officer.26 As an 
independent operator, St. Denis bargained for the best 
deal.
Upon his return to the presidio of San Juan Bautista, 
St. Denis took advantage of an opportunity to gain favor 
with his fiancees's grandfather who, up to that point had 
envisioned another marriage alliance for his granddaughter. 
The Indians had deserted the presidio, and failure to 
control frontier Indians threatened a loss of revenue and 
prestige for the Ramon family.27 The task of restoring 
the loyalty and services of the Indians opened the way for 
St. Denis to demonstrate his expertise and prepare the
25Ibid., 70, 76-77.
26Ibid.. 79.
27Ibid., 85. See also Penicaut, Fleurs de Lys. 190-92.
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ground for establishing trading activities with the 
Spaniards.
St. Denis caught up with the Indians who were
traveling slowly. They gathered around him in a circle,
and he addressed them in Spanish. He acknowledged their
longstanding grievances, reminded them that the governor-
had "always been kind and upright" and was not personally
guilty of having "wronged any one of you." He went on to
say that "the old chief has been too weak with his own
people— that is all you can say against him." St. Denis
then explained that the governor
pledges his faith that no Spaniard shall be 
allowed to set his foot in your village without 
your express consent, and that every sort of 
protection which you may claim shall be extended 
over your tribe.
He then suggested the futility of leaving the land of their
ancestors without knowing where they would go or what
hostile tribes they would have to fight. St. Denis ended
his speech with the observation that they could always
undertake their "desperate enterprise of emigration" if the
governor failed to abide by his promises.28
The Indians were persuaded to return to their homes,
the Spaniards were greatly impressed, and the Spanish
28Quoted by Phares, Cavalier. 86-88.
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empire in Texas received a new lease on life. Soon after 
his return to San Juan Battista, St. Denis's marriage to 
the granddaughter of Captain Ramon took place, no doubt as 
a result of the young captain's success. By April 17, 1716 
the expedition had begun the long march back into Texas.
The occupation force that left San Juan Bautista in 
April consisted of Captain Domingo Ramon, Fathers Hidalgo 
and Espinosa, six other priests, two lay brothers, twenty- 
five soldiers including two Diego Ramons (Domingo's son and 
the father-in-law of St. Denis both named Diego), three 
Frenchmen, a mixed group of Spanish civilians with their 
families, one black slave, and two Indian guides —  a total 
of some 75 or 80 persons.29
St. Denis and the young Diego crossed the Brazos to 
assemble the Tejas Indians and prepare them to receive the 
Spaniards. The ceremonies included a procession, 
distribution of gifts, smoking the peace pipe, and firing 
salutes. Playing his part in this civic ritual on the 
Texas frontier, Captain Ramon, carrying a banner, marched 
in the center alongside the clergy. At one point in the 
ceremony, St. Denis fell on his knees before the standard 
"on which were painted the images of Christ Crucified and
29Ibid., 94-96.
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Our Lady of Guadalupe."30 He then embraced the Commander
and all the religious. St. Denis was "followed by all the
captains and the other people."31
Father Espinosa's diary relates that there was more
than one occasion when the Indians assembled to celebrate
the return of the Spanish friars. The ceremony described
in detail by Espinosa took place on Sunday, June 28. On
the previous Saturday he had recorded that 34 Indians,
including five leaders, had arrived. On this occasion the
soldiers lined up in double file with the captain and the
religious in the center. "There was a general salute on
our part, and in the meantime we went to the place prepared
for the reception, which was a hut of boughs of trees,
carpeted with blankets; the pack-saddles serving as
stools."32 The Saturday assembly ended
with a very serious discourse by an Indian 
chief, in which he gave us to understand the 
pleasure with which all desired to receive us in 
their midst, as Don Luis de San Dionisio ... who 
understands and speaks much of their language, 
made known to us.33
30Gabriel Tous, ed. , "Ramon Expedition: Espinosa's
Diary of 1716," Preliminary Studies of the Texas Catholic 
Historical Society 1 (April, 1930): 21.
31Quoted from Ramon's diary by Phares, Cavalier. 108.
32T o u s , "Espinosa's Diary," 20.
33Ibid.
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The larger Sunday assembly attended by 96 Indians took 
place after the caravan had traveled nine leagues to the 
northeast.
In the process of reestablishing the Spanish missions 
in East Texas St. Denis served as translator and spokesman 
for the Indians. He also conveyed to the Indians the 
message of Captain Ramon that the "Spaniards had come to 
look after the welfare of their souls and to bring them to 
a recognition of the authority of King Philip V."34
The viceroy of Mexico had ordered the establishment of 
the missions and the presidio for the express purpose of 
preventing the commercial and military incursion of the 
French into territory claimed by Spain.35 While St. Denis 
helped the Spanish king to achieve his immediate goal, he 
undermined its purpose. He saw himself as an intermediary 
between Indians and Europeans and as an independent 
entrepreneur who to achieve his own ends presented himself 
as the servant of a sovereign king.
Derbanne, the Second Expedition, and Fort St. Jean Baptiste
After the Spaniards had been found and brought back to 
Texas, St. Denis returned to Mobile in the company of his
34Phares, Cavalier. 109.
35Ibid.. 72.
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father-in-law, Diego Ramon, whom he introduced to 
prospective business associates as a horse trader.36 One 
of these traders was Frangois Dion Deprez Derbanne, a 
Canadian who served as storekeeper in charge of the 
warehouse on Dauphin Island in Mobile Bay as early as 
1710.37 In January, 1716, a month before the departure of 
the Ramon expedition, Derbanne and Ensign Claude-Charles du 
Tisne departed from Dauphin Island to prepare supplies for 
Bienville's Natchez expedition.38 By October, Derbanne 
had returned to Mobile where he became a partner in a 
commercial company which included St. Denis, Graveline, 
Joseph Chauvin de Lery, Nicolas Chauvin de La Freniere, and 
the Beaulieu brothers. St. Denis and his partners arrived 
at Natchitoches on November 25.39
Fort St. Jean Baptiste no doubt enhanced St. Denis's 
clandestine trading network. The existence of the fort 
provided a cover for the commercial activities of the Ramon 
family as the clan continued the pretense of enforcing
36Phares, Cavalier. 111.
37Katherine Bridges and Winston De Ville, eds. and 
trans., "Natchitoches and the Trail to the Rio Grande: Two
Early Eighteenth-Century Accounts by the Sieur Derbanne," 
Louisiana History 8 (Summer, 1967): 240-41.
38Ibid., 241. Giraud, Histoire. 2:77.
39Phares, Cavalier. 113.
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Spanish trade regulations while profiting from the 
Louisiana trade. Apparently St. Denis had little to do 
with the actual establishment of the fort which, according 
to Giraud, grew out of Bienville's resolve to prevent the 
Spanish from advancing into the Red River Valley.40
In 1716 Spanish missions did not present a military 
threat to the French. On the contrary, when St. Denis 
returned to Natchitoches, prepared to bring the merchandise 
purchased with capital supplied by Derbanne and his other 
partners, the Spanish missions needed his help to survive 
a crisis caused by a severe winter, flooding rain, malaria, 
desertion, shortage of supplies, and hostile Indians. 
Going to their aid, St. Denis not only pacified the Indians 
but put them to work building two additional missions. He 
made three trips back to Natchitoches to purchase maize for 
the Spanish missionaries.41
While St. Denis promoted Spanish missionary activity 
and created a market for French merchandise, Cadillac and 
Bienville decided to send a detachment of French soldiers 
to Natchitoches. According to Giraud, a sergeant and six 
soldiers were dispatched during the summer of 1716, but du
40Giraud, History. 2:187.
41Ibid.. 113-114.
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Tisne did not arrive in Natchitoches until later.
Penicaut relates that Cadillac sent "twenty-five soldiers
off with one sergeant and three boats loaded with
merchandise, munitions, and food supplies, with a letter to
M. de Bienville who was at the Natchez." The letter
instructed Bienville to
send M. de Tissenet— [an experienced] Canadian
officer, who understood the savage languages
very well — at the head of this detachment that 
was to go up the Riviere Rouge to build a fort 
at the Nassitoches.42
In his "Memoir on Louisiana" dated 1725-26, Bienville
states that "it was in 1716 when I was still at the Natchez
to punish them for their first revolt that I sent a
detachment to take possession of the Red River and
establish the Natchitoches.1,43 He goes on to say that he
"had received information that the Governor of Mexico was
42Penicaut, Fleurs de Lvs, 193. Du Tisne had come to 
Louisiana from Canada where he had developed a reputation 
for being an amazingly active officer who had the knowledge 
and experience of governing the Indians. His rank in the 
French navy was that of an ensign, but his background and 
experience certainly indicate that he was an experienced 
Canadian officer. Dictionary of Canadian Biography. 2:215. 
A good summary of du Tisne's exploits in Illinois and west 
of the Mississippi can be found in Gilbert C. Din and 
Abraham P. Nasatir, The Imperial Osages: Spanish-Indian
Diplomacy in the Mississippi Valley (Norman: University of 
Oklahoma Press, 1983), 35-37.
43"Memoir on Louisiana, the Indians and the Commerce 
that Can Be Carried On with Them," MPA:FD. 3:515.
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having a large convoy march there" and that the Spanish did 
indeed establish themselves at Los Adaes when they 
discovered that the Red River had been occupied ten days 
before they arrived. Exactly when and by whom the fort was 
built cannot be determined from the available 
documents,44 but St. Denis did leave some of his goods at 
the little trading post when he headed for Mexico in March 
1717.45
During the years that preceded the death of Louis XIV, 
the financial crisis precipitated by the War of the Spanish 
Succession had opened the door for St. Denis to make his 
contract with Cadillac. The experienced captain took 
advantage of the opportunity to create a market for his 
goods and services that was large enough to support himself 
and his extended family but not capable of sustaining 
Crozat's monopoly. Crozat's decision to give up his 
proprietorship came at a time when the Duke of Orleans, now 
regent for the young Louis XV, had put royal finances in 
the hands of the Scottish banker and adventurer, John Law. 
Cadillac was recalled and Law's Mississippi Company
44See Giraud, Histoire 2:181-182, n. 3.
45Phares, Cavalier. 114.
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produced a capital transfusion which temporarily 
resuscitated the nascent colony.46
Discord continued at the highest levels of colonial 
administration after Crozat surrendered his monopoly on 
August 23. Jean Michiele Lepinay briefly replaced Cadillac 
until Law's Company of the West gave command of the colony 
to Bienville.47 By the time St. Denis returned from his 
second expedition to Mexico, Philippe Blondel had been 
placed in command of Fort St. Jean Baptiste, but the real 
Spanish threat to French Louisiana occurred when the 
Spanish recaptured Pensacola which had been taken by 
Bienville shortly after he received word of the outbreak of 
the dynastic conflict between French and Spanish Bourbons 
in April, 1719.
Defense of Mobile and the Siege of Pensacola
From the very beginning of French penetration into the 
Mississippi Valley, the ability of the Canadian captains to 
carry on commerce and provide for the subsistence of their 
companies depended on control of the Indians. Iberville,
46John G. Clark, New Orleans. 1718-1812: An Economic
History (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press,
1970), 8-19.
47Mathe Allain, "Antoine de Lamothe, Sieur de
Cadillac;" Brian E. Coutts, "Jean-Michiele Lepinay," 
Louisiana Governors. 16, 19.
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Le Sueur, and Tonti had worked diligently to establish 
peace among the Indian tribes so that the rivers under 
French control could become avenues of trade. St. Denis 
proposed to use the Indians to counter any attempt to 
extend Spain's influence in the Louisiana territory. 
Bienville later expressed the doubts he had felt about St. 
Denis' ability to defend the western boundary and later 
boasted about sending French soldiers to Fort St. Jean 
Baptiste to counter the Spanish threat.48
The events of the Franco-Spanish War gave St. Denis 
the opportunity to demonstrate the effectiveness of the 
ancien capitaine's alliance with the reliance on the 
Indians for defense.
In 1719 before St. Denis had returned from his second 
expedition to Mexico, Bienville convoked a council of war 
and a decision was made to expel the Spanish from 
Pensacola.49 The easy capture of Pensacola by the French 
was only the prelude to a more difficult war. The Spanish 
recaptured the the Pensacola fortress with a force of 1,200 
men before Bienville's brother, Joseph Le Moyne de Serigny,
48Bienville to the Navy Council, December, 1721, 
MPA;FD 3:314-315; "Memoir on Louisiana, the Indians and the
Commerce that Can Be Carried On with Them (1725-26)," 
MPA:FD. 3:515.
49Phares, Cavalier. 152.
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and his nephew, could muster reinforcements. Another of 
Bienville's brothers, was captured and taken to Havana. 
Contemplating a Spanish attack on Mobile, the French 
colonists began to fear for the very survival of French 
Louisiana.50
With only sixty French soldiers, Bienville and his 
brothers had to depend on approximately 400 Indian allies. 
St. Denis was released from prison in Mexico in time to 
summon additional Indian allies to the defense of Mobile, 
but the minutes of the Louisiana Council of Commerce 
discuss what happened after the Spanish recaptured 
Pensacola and launched an attack on Mobile without even 
mentioning St. Denis.51 Phares, however, credits St. 
Denis with the victory. He maintains that the danger of an 
imminent attack on Mobile and the arrival of St. Denis with 
a contingent of Indians from Biloxi motivated French 
settlers to stream in from the concessions.
The Spanish assault on Mobile was delayed by a single 
French ship positioned to defend the fort. By the time the 
Spaniards launched a frontal assault on land, St. Denis had 
arrived with a small force. The battle was engaged, and
50Giraud, Histoire. 3:301.
51MPA:FD 3:242-290.
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the Spaniards fought their way into a wooded area where the 
timely arrival of more Indian allies gave the French 
advantage in numbers and the cover of the forest. The 
decimated Spanish force retreated to their ships and sailed 
away. At that point the arrival of a French fleet of five 
ships commanded by Desnos de Champmeslin opened the way for 
a land and sea assault to retake Pensacola. The second 
siege of Pensacola by the French was much more difficult 
than the easy takover that had marked the beginning of 
hostilities, but more Indians responded to the call of the 
Great White Chief and they were compensated with the booty 
of the campaign.52
Though Bienville failed to give St. Denis any special 
credit for the recapture of Pensacola by the French, 
Penicaut described his role in the celebration that 
followed.
M. de St. Denis arranged to entertain M. de 
Chamelin and the captains and naval officers 
with a dance of the savages, who sang a calumet 
of peace to him. Next, in the name of M. de 
Chamelin, M. de St. Denis made them an oration 
in their own language, exhorting them to be 
friends of the French forever.53
After the festivities, Champmeslin distributed presents.
52Phares, Cavalier. 155-59.
53Penicaut, Fleur de Lvs. 232-34.
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Bienville did not acknowledge the diplomatic and 
military skill of St. Denis. Penicaut, on the other hand, 
may have idealized his deeds, but the old captain's success 
was based on his ability to mobilize France's Indian 
confederates. St. Denis no doubt had the advantage of 
arriving at just the right time, and his legendary 
invincibility enhanced the message of his ritualized 
communication with the Indian tribes. Whatever St. Denis's 
actual role was in the defense of Mobile and the recapture 
of Pensacola by the French, he made sure that his Indian 
allies believed that he was the man who had, with their 
assistance, saved the day.
Whereas Bienville downplayed St. Denis's role at 
Pensacola, he exaggerated the Spanish threat to 
Natchitoches. Disinformation may have been disseminated to 
convince the Company to repair the fort and send gifts and 
supplies to the French frontier post. When the Council was 
informed in October, 1719 "that the Spaniards were sending 
three hundred men to Texas," an order was issued to 
Derbanne and Blondel, to build a new fort and "give one 
hundred livres worth of presents to the Natchitoches 
nation, the same sum to the Dulchionis, sixty livres to the 
Adais, three hundred livres to the Cenis" In a letter 
dated June, 1720 Bienville informed the Navy Council that
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"the viceroy of Mexico was sending by land one thousand 
men" to "attack the French on the Red River and the 
Mississippi.54 Yet when Philippe Blondel and his troops 
attacked San Miguel de los Adaes in the only engagement in 
the Western theater of the war, he sacked the fort and 
captured a lay brother, one ragged soldier and a flock of 
chickens.55 It seems clear that Bienville not only 
exaggerated the threat but refused to acknowledge St. 
Denis's ability to control any Spanish attempt to launch an 
attack on the Red River post.
St. Denis and the Natchitoches Post
The administrative record suggests that St. Denis took 
a giant step forward in his military career when he 
received his appointment as captain and commandant of the 
Natchitoches Post during the winter of 1721-1722. He had 
re-entered the King's service as a lieutenant on March 23, 
1720. His appointment as Commandant of the Upper Cane 
River on July 1 of that year has been interpreted by 
Portre-Bobinski as a step in a series of rapid promotions 
which culminated in his appointment as commandant of the
54Minutes of the Council of Commerce, MPA:FD 3:267; 
Bienville to the Navy Council, Ibid., 295.
55Phares, Cavalier. 160-61. According to Marcel
Giraud, the Red River frontier remained peaceful during the 
entire war. Histoire. 3:304.
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Natchitoches Post.56 Yet what really mattered on the 
frontier was control over the Indians and the ability to 
mediate between the French and the Spanish.57
By 1722 Natchitoches was beginning to realize its 
potential as a trading post capable of supplying New 
Orleans with horses, corn, and bear grease.58 There was 
hope that it would provide a market for goods imported from 
France. The 1722 census listed fourteen men including the 
commandant and Derbanne, St. Denis's business partner who 
now served as warehouse keeper. There were ten women, ten 
children, twenty black slaves and eight Indian slaves. 
Twelve horned cattle and 74 horses are also listed. By 
1726 the Europeans numbered 94, and there were 35 slaves, 
38 horned cattle and 72 horses.59 Evidently these
figures do not include the military garrison which was
56Portre-Bobinski and Smith, Natchitoches. 44-48.
57Phares, Cavalier. 143.
58Giraud, History. 5:265-266, 385; Histoire. 3:367.
John G. Clark, New Orleans. 28. Surrey, Commerce of 
Louisiana. 262.
59Elizabeth S. Mills, comp., Natchitoches Colonials: 
Censuses. Military Rolls. and Tax Lists. 1722-1803 
(Chicago: Adams Press, 1981), 3-7.
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reduced from 29 men to 20 in 1727 as a result of the 
company's effort to reduce expenditures.60
Although his debt to the company increased from 12,2 05 
livres in 1723 to over 18,000 by 1742, St. Denis was able 
to build a house and accumulate a large herd of cattle. 
The inventory made after his death on June 11, 1744
included 24 black slaves and 100 cattle.61 Neither 
Natchitoches nor Louisiana as a whole thrived economically 
under the French regime, but Natchitoches was more self- 
sufficient than most other areas. Enough wealth could be 
derived from trade with the Indians and the Spanish to 
support St. Denis comfortably.
After 1722 St. Denis performed his duties in the 
service of the Company of the Indies which was under 
contract to the king. St. Denis now held a patent of 
nobility along with his commission as a royal officer. He 
was also a private individual with a contract to sell 
company merchandise for a commission of 5 per cent. His
60Giraud, History. 5:385.
61Germaine Portre-Bobinski, trans., Natchitoches: 
Translations of Old French and Spanish Documents (Rutland,
111.: Privately printed, 1928), n.p.
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relationship with the company was based on mutual interest 
and reciprocal obligations.62
St. Denis's authority in Natchitoches and the 
surrounding area was now unassailable. Charles Gayarre 
writes that Indians over a hundred miles away "submitted to 
his sway . . . and . . . acknowledged him as their great 
chief." His decisions in tribal disputes were readily 
accepted, and anywhere from five to six thousand warriors 
stood ready to fight at his command. And although Gayarre 
goes on to say that the "Natchez feared him more than 
anything else,"63 in 1731 St. Denis's reputation for 
invincibility was challenged by an attack on Natchitoches 
by the Natchez.
Two years had passed since the "entire white male 
population of Fort Rosalie"64 had been massacred. For two 
years the Natchez Indians and their allies had threatened 
the very existence of the French colony in Louisiana. When 
Saint Denis received word that the Natchez were headed 
toward Natchitoches, he immediately sent runners in all
62Phares, Cavalier. 182-183.
63Charles Gayarre, History of Louisiana. (New Orleans: 
Armand Hawkins, 1885; repr., New York: AMS Press, 1972),
1:418.
64Phares, Cavalier. 201.
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directions. Relief troops from New Orleans never arrived. 
The Spanish commandant at Los Adais sent only sixteen men, 
but hundreds of loyal Indians responded immediately to St. 
Denis's call to arms. There were not enough weapons 
available and St. Denis had to supply the Indians with guns 
that belonged to him. The attack began on October 5, 1731 
and the battle raged for two weeks. St. Denis used
defensive tactics until the attackers burned a French woman 
in full view of the defenders. At the right moment, St. 
Denis led his army of Frenchmen, Spaniards, and Indians in 
an offensive charge. Stiff resistence was followed by a 
truce and then three or four more days of fighting before 
the Natchez broke and ran. With no help from the Governor, 
St. Denis had mobilized the "people" of his post to repel 
the Natchez invasion.65
In his letter of November 2, 1731 addressed to the
commissaire-ordonnateur, Edme Gatien de Salmon, St. Denis 
simply stated that the Natchez had fled, that the company 
had failed to meet its obligations, and explained how he 
had to use his personal resources to sustain all the 
volunteers who responded to his call. He criticized the 
company for failing to maintain an adeguate defense force.
65Ibid., 203-211.
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If the company had performed its duties, he wrote, war 
could have been avoided. The old captain had done his duty 
to uphold the invincibility of the French king. The fault 
lay with the Company.66
Before the end of November St. Denis wrote a memoir in 
which he clearly stated the defense needs of the colony. 
He recommended a garrison of 500 troops at New Orleans, 4 00 
at Mobile, and 250 for the Alabama Post. He also made it 
clear that a frontier post required more than a military 
garrison.
The company had failed in its task of promoting the 
settlement and economic development of the colony. "I will 
say that it is necessary to have honest family folk and not 
at all those useless people and vagabonds that are nearly 
always brought in by the company."67 The old captain 
knew how to manage the Indians and govern settlers, and he 
did not hesitate to inform the king that the company was 
responsible for the Indian uprising.
The successful defence of Natchitoches became a source 
of inspiration and encouragement for Commandant-General
66Extract of the letter from St. Denis to Salmon, 
November 2, 1731, AC C13, 13:162-164. Phares, Cavalier.
211.
fi 7 • • •Memoir of St. Denis, Commandant of Natchitoches, 
November, 1731, AC C13, 13:169.
fitienne de Perier and Commissary Salmon. Perier described 
St. Denis as a "brave man: le plus ancien des officiers de 
la colonie." Salmon informed the minister of marine that 
many had confidence only in him.68 The city planted by 
Louis Juchereau de Saint Denis on the border between two 
empires had become the nucleus of a viable frontier 
community. The failure of the Company created new 
opportunities for those who were ready to learn and apply 
the techniques of the ancien capitaine.
68Etat des Officiers entretenus a la Louisiane avec 
apostelles, 1733, AC C13, 13:169; Salmon to Maurepas, May 
12, 1732. AC, C13, 15:100.
CHAPTER 6 
Company, Captains, and Crown
From 1717 to 1731, the reorganized Company of the 
Indies administered Louisiana for the crown. The Company 
streamlined its operations in Louisiana, cut its expenses, 
and reduced the military garrison. The crown was unwilling 
to subsidize a colony which had originally been established 
for the strategic purpose of preventing the British from 
controlling the mouth of the Mississippi, and the Company 
ventured to promote economic development and produce a 
profit for its investors.1 In keeping with this policy, 
the Company instituted stricter financial controls over the 
ancien capitaines who ran the frontier posts. The attempt 
of the Company to turn a profit on its investment in 
Louisiana stirred up the tension between the purse and the 
sword which was inherent in the system of centralized 
control installed by Colbert. In the end, however, 
commercial failure and the Natchez uprising ultimately
1Clark, New Orleans. 10.
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forced the crown to revert to reliance on the old captains 
when the company surrendered its monopoly in 1731. At that 
point the legendary adventures of St. Denis provided an 
example and a model of how to control a vast territory with 
minimal expense to the crown.
St. Denis's contract with the Company of the Indies
did not sever his ties with the French crown or change the
status of his oath of loyalty to the king. The king
recognized the Company as a "moral person" to whom he as
head of the body politic gave "regalian rights." As an arm
of the state, the Company was subject directly to the king.
The king was the seigneur of the Company which held
Louisiana (and other territories) as a fief. In exchange
for "fealty, counsel, and aid," the king owed the Company
protection and supervision.2 The old captain who served
the Company under contract would continue to serve the
crown after the Company relinquished the colony.
Military Officers, Commissaries, and the Poverty of the 
People
Controlling supplies and expenditures was the 
persistent problem that fueled the conflict between 
commissioners and commandants throughout the period of 
French dominion in Louisiana. From the time of Iberville
2Roland Mousnier, The Institutions of France. 474.
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the governors and captains could usually depend upon the 
support of the Jesuits, while first Pere Henri Roulleaux de 
La Vente, the seminary priest appointed pastor of Mobile by 
the Bishop of Quebec, and then Pere Raphael de Luxembourg, 
the Capuchin superior, sided with the commissioners.
The appointment of Crasse as scrivener in 1700 to keep 
track of the king's accounts and the distribution of 
supplies marked the institution of an administrative 
apparatus designed to insure financial accountability. 
Nicolas La Salle replaced Crasse two years later. It was 
La Salle, acting as naval commissioner, who accused 
Iberville of fraudently manipulating the accounts and 
misappropriating the king's funds while outfitting ships 
for naval combat in 1705. At the beginning of what became 
a perennial conflict between the Louisiana governor and the 
commissaire-ordonnateur, Iberville and his Canadian 
officers were charged with serving their own personal 
interests at the expense of the king and his people. After 
a long inquest, Pontchartrain remained convinced that 
Iberville had been guilty of diverting funds and placing 
his personal interest above that of the king when he 
exercised his prerogative as commander to draw supplies
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from the storehouse.3 The accounts indicated that 
merchandise worth more than 47,000 livres was taken out 
between 1702 and 1706. Iberville and his brothers were 
accused of selling the goods (sometimes at a profit as high 
as 600 percent) without any return to the royal treasury.4
The issue of financial accountability centered on 
whether the governor distributed gifts and allocated 
supplies in the interest of the king and his people or 
whether he and his captains exploited the king and the 
colony by using the crown's resources for personal 
advantage that adversely affected the colony and disturbed 
the peace and tranquillity of the people. Bienville 
followed Iberville in his determination to control the 
consumption and distribution of supplies. La Salle 
continued to complain about Bienville's failure to follow 
strict accounting procedures. Bienville justified his 
actions by the need to "ease the public poverty."5 La 
Salle had the support of Pere La Vente who was only too 
glad to blame the poor condition of the colony on Bienville 
and his officers, whom they accused of profiting from the
3Jay Higginbotham, Old Mobile. 59; Giraud, Histoire, 
1:35, n. 1, 115-118.
4Surrey, Commerce of Louisiana. 155.
5Giraud, History. 1:226-227.
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sale of the king's merchandise at the expense of the poor 
inhabitants who were forced to pay exorbitant prices. The 
implication was that the officers pilfered the warehouses 
and then sold the goods to the inhabitants. The conflict 
between Bienville and his officers on the one hand, and La 
Salle and La Vente on the other, divided the population 
because any discontented inhabitant was prone to side with 
the commissary.6
The response of Pere La Vente, who arrived at Mobile 
on August 1, 1704, to the adverse conditions in the colony 
set the stage for the later criticism of Canadian officers 
by Pere Raphael functioning in the dual capacity of 
Capuchin superior and cure with jurisdiction over a 
territory which stretched from the Gulf Coast to the Ohio 
River. While arranging marriages for the young ladies 
placed in his care during the voyage of the Pelican. Pere 
La Vente expressed suspicion about the moral character of 
Commandant Bienville, an eligible batchelor in his twenties 
who kept a female housekeeper while apparently showing no 
interest in marriage. The commandant reluctantly expended 
scarce resources to provide a house and church for an order 
of priests who lacked the determination, the endurance, and
6Ibid., 1:229.
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the manpower to serve as pastors and evangelists in a vast 
frontier territory. La Vente received gifts of money and 
property from those who died during the yellow fever 
epidemic which raged for two years after the arrival of the 
Pelican and profited from his personal trading activity 
while constantly complaining about the state of the colony 
and the poverty of the people. The young commandant who 
matured with the colony itself promoted the activities of 
the Jesuits who cleverly adapted themselves to the austere 
lifestyle of the frontier in Canada and the Illinois 
country. The mature Bienville would later carry for the 
Company of the Indies the burden of protecting and 
defending the colony established by his older brother 
increased by the weight of Pere Raphael's criticism and a 
replay of the charges against the military officers leveled 
by Pere La Vente.7
The special commission appointed to investigate 
complaints against Iberville and his brothers before the 
governor died in 1706 had produced evidence implicating 
Iberville and several others associated with the Le Moyne 
clan. Consequently, Ponchartrain bypassed Bienville and 
placed Daneau de Muy in command of the colony. Jean-
7Higginbotham, Old Mobile. 176, 246-257, 292-298, 410- 
421; Giraud, History 5:29, 61, 187-188.
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Baptiste-Martin Dartaguiette d'Iron, a young marine 
commissary accompanied de Muy across the Atlantic, but when 
de Muy died on January 25, 1708 enroute from Havana to
Mobile, the full responsibility for investigating the Le 
Moyne brothers fell on the commissary.8
Martin Dartaguiette developed a respectful regard for 
Bienville as an officer well-qualified to command the 
colony, and his investigation helped to exonerate 
Bienville. The younger Le Moyne was ultimately able to 
convince Dartaguiette that he had never exploited his 
office for personal benefit and justified what he had to do 
by the necessity of receiving Indians on a less than 
adequate salary that he did not even receive for seven 
years.9 Bienville was thus able to continue in command of 
the colony from the death of Sauvolle in August 17 01 until 
Antoine Lamothe Cadillac arrived in 1712.
During Cadillac's administration, Bienville allied 
himself with the commissary against the governor, but the 
conflict between the purse and the sword reignited when 
Jacques de La Chaise arrived in 1723. La Chaise had been 
commissioned by the Company as a special investigator, and
8Higginbotham, Old Mobile. 314-323.
9Giraud, History. 1:226-227; 5:26-27. Bienville to 
Pontchartrain, October 27, 1711, MPA:FD. 3:169.
he began the process of determining why there was a gap 
between the value of merchandise distributed and the amount 
of notes received in exchange for it.10 As La Chaise 
searched for evidence of embezzlement by the Le Moyne 
family, Pere Raphael accused the military officers of 
exploiting the people by dividing scarce goods among
themselves and selling them to the inhabitants after
quadrupling the original price. La Chaise and Raphael 
revived the old accusations of immorality and profiteering 
advanced by La Salle and La Vente while ignoring the 
problem of delayed salaries and the niggardly reimbursement 
for expenses which characterized royal administration in 
the early years of the colony.11 La Salle had accused 
Bienville of ignoring the correct accounting procedures, 
and though D'Artaguiette concluded that Bienville's 
distribution of royal supplies had been justified by 
extenuating circumstances, Pontchartrain remained 
suspicious of him, and now the directors of the Company 
were prepared to back La Chaise as he began to accuse the 
commandant and his officers of profiteering from the
distribution of supplies from the king's warehouse.
10Giraud, History 5:20.
1 ■’■Raphael to Raguet, May 15, 1725, MPA: FD 2:478, 483; 
Giraud, History 5:38-41, 269-270.
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The reorganized Company of the Indies sent Jean- 
Frangois Choplet Du Sauvoy to Louisiana along with La 
Chaise as its commissioners in addition to several newly 
appointed members of the Superior Council. When the 
commissioners and councillors arrived at Ship Island in 
1723, they were met by Henry de Louboey, the commandant of 
the Biloxi post. Like most military officers in colonial 
Louisiana, Louboey supplemented his meager and often unpaid 
salary by engaging in commerce, a forbidden practice that 
had been tolerated by the crown during the crisis of the 
War of the Spanish Succession. Unaware that La Chaise had 
been appointed to investigate and eliminate such practices, 
Louboey rowed out to their ship, inquired about its cargo, 
and informed the Captain that he had Spanish piastres for 
commerce de pacotilles (private trading). When the ship's 
captain reported this conversation to La Chaise, he was 
ordered to inform Louboey that all of the ship's cargo must 
be unloaded at New Orleans.12
Later, Louboey returned with orders from Bienville to 
ignore La Chaise's instructions and unload the cargo
12De La Chaise to the Directors of the Company of the 
Indies, N.O., September 6, 1723 in MPA;FD. 2:295-296;
Giraud, History 5:17.
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because Biloxi and Mobile were badly in need of 
supplies.13 Bienville had shown that he was still in 
command of the colony, but La Chaise, supported by 
Bienville's discontented opponents, would work to establish 
the dominance of the purse over the sword. From the time of 
his initial conflict with Bienville over unloading cargoes, 
La Chaise was determined to establish strict procedures for 
the distribution of the king's merchandise in order to 
prevent the military officers from profiteering by buying 
the goods on credit at low prices and reselling them for 
profit.
Meanwhile, La Chaise presented his warrant and letters 
to Bienville, who was surprised to learn that Sieur 
Delorme, a director of the Company, had been recalled. La 
Chaise asked Bienville if seals could be placed on all 
Delorme's property "because his Royal Highness was 
convinced that he had accumulated many piastres."14 The 
commissioners then accompanied Bienville to Delorme's house 
where they informed him of his recall. They then proceeded 
to place seals "on all the warehouses and the chest in 
which we found only ninety-one piastres almost all in small
13MPA:FD 2:297.
14La Chaise to the Directors, September 6, 1723,
MPA:FD. 2:299.
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copper coins." La Chaise concluded that Delorme had been 
forewarned.15
In his reports to the directors of the Company of the 
Indies, La Chaise (with the support of the Capuchin 
superior) accused the captains of serving their own 
interests. The officers not only neglected the interests of 
the king, but, in effect, they exploited the king's people 
by profiting from the sale of merchandise from the king's 
warehouse.16
In his first report, La Chaise vividly described the 
poor condition of the warehouses and outlined numerous 
problems that needed to be addressed by the company. He 
blamed Bienville and concluded that the commandant should 
be replaced. Good workmen could not obtain the things they 
needed from the warehouse because Bienville gave the 
soldiers, sailors, and the Canadians preference in the 
distribution of supplies. The patients in the hospital 
were neglected by the surgeon, a "protege of Mr. De 
Bienville." Bienville and Delorme failed to provide 
poultry-yards. Rations were given to women "who do nothing 
but cause disorder." The adjutant general rendered little
15Ibid., 2:300.
16La Chaise to the Directors, September 6 and October 
18, 1723, MPA:FD 2:294-357, 358-391.
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service to the colony. He "resides throughout the year on
his farm which is on the other side of the river."
Bienville had raised him up the ranks from a simple
sergeant, and he was Bienville's "favorite and the
confidant of his most secret business." This officer who
bore arms against the King in the Cevennes, owes 
the Company nearly eight thousand livres by the 
private account that I have drawn up, without 
speaking of what he will possibly owe by two 
other accounts with which he is charged."1'
La Chaise insisted that Bienville and his relatives
should be recalled and another commandant or governor
appointed. He also expressed the need for an intendant with
the authority to "restrain everybody." Pointing out that
the "sword must not in any manner meddle with commerce,"
the commissioner warned the directors that "As long as the
commandants meddle with the warehouses they will always be
badly managed."18
La Chaise accused Bienville of "seeking only to cause
the downfall of the colony in order that the King might
take control of it and that he might be able to do what he
wished."19 He was clearly telling the directors that the
17Ibid., 2:308-17.
18Ibid.. 2:323.
19Ibid.. 2:306.
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colony would never develop economically and the inhabitants 
would never be treated fairly until the stranglehold of 
Bienville and the Canadian officers on the resources of the 
colony was broken. Bienville had to go because the people 
were being mistreated. "There is not one who does not 
complain."20
After discoursing at length on the complaints about 
Bienville, the commissioner concentrated on the need for 
reliable bookkeepers who could maintain proper records and 
audit the warehouse accounts. In his effort to stop those 
who would take advantage of the Company and to insure the 
appointment of reliable officials, La Chaise returned again 
and again to the problems of appraising property, setting 
prices, and examining accounts.21 In his effort to 
institute financial controls, La Chaise attacked the very 
foundation of the Canadian kinship system by which a 
Canadian governor controlled the colony. The old captains 
and the linkage they maintained between their "companies" 
and the governor would be replaced by officials who would 
protect the "people" by insuring that the king's 
merchandise was fairly distributed.
20Ibid.
21Ibid.. 2:326-30.
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La Chaise soon discovered Frangois Duval a deputy 
bookkeeper who impressed him while serving as assistant to 
the New Orleans storekeeper as a man "acquainted with the 
affairs of the colony," capable of managing the audit of 
accounts. Noting that Duval "has the misfortune of not 
being liked" by Bienville, La Chaise suggested to the 
directors that he deserved a "place in the Council with so 
much the more right because he would immediately be in a 
position to render an account of everything that might 
arise.1,23
When complaints were made about Duval's price-setting 
policies, La Chaise ran into serious difficulties from the 
councillors who were unwilling to support the position of 
La Chaise and Duval against that of Bienville and his 
officers.24 The councillors also refused to accept La 
Chaise's appointment of Louis-Auguste de La Loire Flaucourt 
to replace Louis-Alexandre Durand as storekeeper in 
Mobile.25
The commissioners had secret orders to stop abuses, 
audit accounts, and make full reports, but the question of
23Ibid., 2:331. See also Giraud, History 5:21-23.
O A • #^*La Chaise to the Directors of the Company of the 
Indies, N.O., October 18, 1723, MPA:FD 2:361-62.
25Ibid., 2:366.
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whether they had the authority to appoint officials to 
replace those they removed created a wedge between La 
Chaise and the councillors. When Du Sauvoy died in August, 
1723 some councillors began to go over to Bienville's camp, 
and the council as a whole asserted its sovereign authority 
to resist a commissioner who refused to provide them with 
a copy of his secret orders.26 In his report of October 
18, La Chaise made it very clear that someone with the 
authority of an intendant was necessary to restrain the 
commandant and the councillors. Otherwise, the warehouses 
would revert back to their former condition.27 With the 
strong recommendation of Pere Raphael, La Chaise secured 
the support of the Company's directors.28
Even though his intention was to reorganize the 
administration of the colony and leave it in capable hands, 
by the time La Chaise died in 1729, he was being accused by 
Commandant Perier of placing his private interest above
26Ibid., 2:365-67, 379-80; Giraud, History 5:17, 28.
27La Chaise to the Directors, October 18, 1723, MPA:FD 
2:379; see also 323.
28The council called into question the extent of La 
Chaise's authority, and it was not until the appointment of 
Salmon in 1731 that the crown resolved the question by 
according to "Salmon the same honors as were due to an 
intendant. since the ordonnateur took the place of an 
intendant in Louisiana, the function of the intendant being 
confined to Canada." Giraud, History 5:313.
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that of the colony. The Council could and did claim that 
its powers derived "from the King and not the Company,"29 
but the real issue was whether the inhabitants were being 
cared for by those engaged in royal service.
Pere Raphael added fuel to the fire of the complaints 
that caused La Chaise to demand constraints on the Canadian 
captains. His letters written to Abbe Gilles-Bernard Raguet 
a Sulpicien priest who had been named to the reorganized 
Company's board of directors in 1724, helped to convince 
the directors to recall first Bienville, then 
Boisbriant.30 Raphael managed to persuade the board to 
back the efforts of La Chaise to "restrain everybody."31 
After the recall of Bienville, Raphael reported to Raguet 
that Boisbriant had an "extreme weakness for the officers 
and .. . lets himself be completely governed by them, and is 
unwilling to hear anything that condemns them." The 
soldiers, he asserted, walked away with anything they 
wanted, and then sold the goods for three or four times the 
original price. The Council was not "in a position to 
oppose anything because it has everything to fear from an
29Giraud, History. 5:46.
30Giraud, Histoire, 4:32.
31MPA:FD 2:323.
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undisciplined soldiery and from a discontented populace." 
Raphael made it clear to Raguet that the weakness of the 
government had to be remedied by a "chief of a totally 
different character." Boisbriant could not handle the 
task. He was a "good Canadian accustomed to the free life 
of the Indians, an enemy of affairs and so slack that he 
would never use his authority if he were not in some way 
forced to it by others."32 Raphael's charges against the 
Bienvillists confirmed earlier accusations made against 
Bienville and his brothers. The memoir of Charles Le Gac, 
a company official in Louisiana from 1718 to 1721, referred 
to decisions being made and measures "undertaken by Serigny 
and Bienville without the participation of a single [local] 
director."33
The correspondence of La Chaise and Pere Raphael 
reveals that the issue of controlling supplies and 
expenditures was the most visible part of the broader 
question of how to govern the colony. La Chaise and Pere
32Pere Raphael to the Abbe Raguet, New Orleans, 
September 15, 1725, MPA:FD. 2:512. See also Pierre Hamer, 
Raphael de Luxembourg; une contribution Luxembourqeoise a 
la colonisation de la Louisiane (Luxembourg: Section
Historique de l'Institut Grand-Ducal, 1966), 87-89.
33Glenn R. Conrad, ed., Immigration and War. 
Louisiana: 1718-1721 from the Memoir of Charles Le Gac
(Lafayette, La. : University of Southwestern Louisiana,
1970), 31.
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Raphael recommended the appointment of a strong personality 
who would rule the council and the colony according to the 
public interest. Pere Raphael advised Abbe Raguet that La 
Chaise was a man of proven integrity who knew how to deal 
with "les murmures du peuple."34 He suggested that if La 
Chaise had been willing to exploit the people by profiting 
from the sale of merchandise he would not have as many 
enemies on the Council.35 La Chaise and Raphael advanced 
the argument that Bienville, Boisbriant and the officers 
had violated the public trust and used the colony to 
advance their private interests. By backing La Chaise 
against the Council, the Company directors gave him control 
over expenditures that rendered the commissioner more 
powerful than the commandant-general. The murmuring of the 
people increased, La Chaise's exercise of authority made 
him more and more unpopular, and in 1729 the same charge of 
promoting his private interest at the expense of the people 
was leveled against him by Perier.36
The Company's effort to restrain and restrict the 
activities of the Canadian captains by attacking the
34Quoted in Hamer, Raphael de Luxembourg. 98.
35Ibid.
35Giraud, History. 5:45, 107.
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Canadian kinship system languished with its failure to 
expand and develop the economy of the colony. The real 
question at issue in the struggle between commandant and 
commissary was whether the French inhabitants and the 
native American population of the colony were being cared 
for by those engaged in royal service. La Salle, La Vente, 
La Chaise, and Raphael criticized the Canadians and their 
Jesuit supporters for exploiting the people. Their 
challenge to the governor's authority to control the 
distribrution of goods from the king's warehouse backfired 
because the old captains maintained their position in the 
frontier posts and villages by providing supplies and 
protection for their followers.
The retrocession of the colony to the crown and the 
return of Bienville revived the Canadian kinship system as 
a means of reducing expenditures, but the proclivity of the 
Chicasaws and Choctaws to take advantage of economic 
rivalry between the French and the English to demand more 
French goods at competitive prices made it difficult for 
Bienville and his successors to control royal expenditures.
CHAPTER 7
Needs and Service: Captains and Storekeepers
The governor of Louisiana commanded the officer corps 
which served the king of France by protecting his people and 
supplying them with the things they needed. The determina­
tion of the crown to curtail expenditures in a colony where 
commerce was threatened by the English and the Indians 
forced the governors to rely on post commandants who 
exercised patriarchal authority and used the techniques of 
the ancien capitaine. The attempt to introduce financial 
controls created a dilemma. The duty of the commissary- 
general and his storekeepers to serve the king by implement­
ing measures designed to stem the flow of a financial 
hemorrhage clashed with the duty of the governor and his 
commandants to supply the needs of the colony.
After the Company surrendered its responsibilty for the 
colony, the royal governors stressed the threat of English 
encroachment on Indian trade, the need to supply merchandise 
to Indian allies at a competitive price, and the difficulty 
of governing a vast territory with only a handful of French
203
204
soldiers. The conflict between commandants and commissaries 
in the Louisiana posts resulted when the Company of the 
Indies and later the crown attempted to dilute the authority 
of the commandant by giving the commissary general 
responsibility for financial, judicial, and police matters. 
As troubleshooter for the Company before the recall of 
Bienville, Jacques de La Chaise had advised the Directors in 
France to prevent the commandants from controlling the 
storekeepers and warehouses.1
The death of La Chaise and the Natchez Massacre opened the 
way for restoring the commandants' control over storekeepers 
and warehouses, but the crown and the Ministry of Marine 
were not willing to abandon the effort to control the 
military officers by using commissaries and storekeepers to 
manipulate the purse strings of the colony.
Immediately after the Natchez disaster, Commandant- 
General Etienne de Perier, who followed Bienville and 
Boisbriand and performed the functions of governor in the 
service of the Company from 1726 to 1733, reported to the 
minister of marine that he did not have "sixty . . . soldiers 
in condition to march from about four hundred men who are 
scattered about the posts of this colony." Moreover, there
1De La Chaise to the Directors of the Company of the 
Indies, March 8, 1724 in MPA:FD 2:323.
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were few officers who would be reliable "in an affair
calling for vigorous action."2 It was clear by then that
Perier had to count more on the Choctaw nation than his own
forces to preserve the colony, but the Bienvillists were
able to cast enough doubt on his skill in Indian relations
to convince the ministry of Marine to give the governorship
to Bienville.3
Before that decision was made, Comptroller-General
Philip Ory chided Perier for not reporting complaints about
the administration of affairs which reached France "from all
sides." Colonists bombarded Ory with their grievances.
There are complaints about the enormous usury 
that prevails in the colony, about the prices of 
the goods that are sold exorbitantly dearly when 
they come from the warehouses as well as at the 
shop, and in this latter place even more dearly 
under the pretext that these goods come from 
private stocks that have been sold very dearly; 
that this shop is in the hands of the Councilors 
and principal employees of the Company or of 
people protected by you such as the Abbe 
Berthelen or by them, who abuse the authority 
that their protector gives them; and that finally 
speculation has continued more than ever in 
copper money and notes in spite of the precise 
orders that the Company has given; all these 
facts are serious, and you do not say one word to 
me about them.4
2Perier to Maurepas, December 5, 1729, MPA:FD. 1:55.
3See Gayarre, Louisiana. 1:450-52.
4Ory to Perier, November 1?, 173 0, MPA:FD 4:50.
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Thirteen months later Perier and the commissary-general,
Edme Gatien de Salmon, recommended two ways of conducting
trade to prevent abuses and drive off the English traders.
First by means of the merchandise that the King 
might send here and that would be delivered from 
the warehouse in small lots to inhabitants who 
would bring the skins for which they had traded 
to the warehouse in payment; the second to grant 
a firm of merchants permission to carry on trade 
in deerskins and to give them without charge both 
the freight of the merchandise on his Majesty's 
vessels and the return freight for their skins, 
in which case these merchants would be obliged to 
sell their merchandise to the Indians on the 
basis of the tariff that would be drawn up for 
this purpose, and recommendations would be given 
to the officers established in the different 
posts to act to prevent the traders from doing 
injustices to the Indians.5
Perier and Salmon intended to establish harmony among the
officers, but the question of the commandant's authority
over the storekeeper had to be resolved again and again.
Governors and commandants demanded the right to issue
orders during military emergencies, but the attempt to
divide military and financial responsibility and establish
guidelines fills page after page of correspondence between
the crown and the colony and between the governor and the
post commandants. The king had instructed Jean-Baptiste du
Bois du Clos, the commissary who served with Cadillac, that
5Perier and Salmon to Maurepas, December 5, 1731, Ibid.. 
89-90.
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the "administration of the King's funds ... commerce and 
everything that may relate to it concern him exclusively." 
Exclusive responsibility for everthing relating to the
"dignity of command and the military" belonged to the
governor.6 The triumph of the purse over the sword by La 
Chaise was followed by a relatively peaceful relationship 
between Bienville and Salmon until a big flare up occurred 
when Sebastien Frangois-Ange Lenormant de Mezy interfered 
with the Governor Vaudreuil's orders to send supplies to 
Mobile and Tombecbe in 1745. Vaudreuil requested specific 
instructions for Lenormant's replacement because of the 
"extreme importance that the commissaries general keep
themselves within the boundaries of their power." When 
Lenormant departed Louisiana in 1748, the minister of marine 
issued a detailed set of instructions delineating the 
separate jurisdiction of governor and commissary giving
special attention to those areas where it overlapped.7
6Royal Instructions for Duclos, Louisiana Historical 
Quarterly. 15 (October, 1932), 603-604.
7Vaudreuil to Louboey, commandant at Mobile, April 22, 
1744, Huntington Manuscript Collection, HM LO 9, The 
Letterbooks. vol. Ill, 77; Vaudreuil to Maurepas, October 30, 
1745 and November 20, 1746, MPA:FD 4:251-252, 302; Memoire du 
roi pour servir d'instruction aux Srs. Vaudreuil gouverneur et 
Michel commissaire general de la marine, ordonnateur a la 
Louisiane, (December 23, 1748), trans. Donald Lemieux, in
Lemieux, "The Office of Commissaire Ordonnateur in French 
Louisiana, 1731-1763: A Study in French Colonial
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The La Fontaine affair provides important insights into 
the relationship between commissaries and commandants. In 
the letter quoted above, Perier and Salmon had also 
discussed Sieur Fontaine who would later flee to Mexico to 
escape punishment for mismanaging the storehouse at 
Natchitoches. Possibly before Fontaine had assumed 
responsiblity as storekeeper and certainly before Perier and 
Salmon had been informed of his involvement in trading 
abuses, Fontaine met a detachment of forty men commanded by 
Louboey on their way to relieve the siege of Natchitoches. 
Fontaine's mission was to deliver to Perier St. Denis's 
letter of November 2 describing the defense of 
Natchitoches.8 On April 1, 1734 Bienville and Salmon
informed Maurepas that La Fontaine, the sergeant "who was 
performing the functions of keeper of the warehouse at the 
post of Natchitoches," had withdrawn to the Spaniards at the 
border post known as the Adais and from there to Mexico. 
They assumed that La Fontaine had disposed of the king's 
merchandise and property before he left French territory.9
Administration"(Ph.D. diss., Louisiana State University, 
1972), 103-106.
8Perier and Salmon to Maurepas, December 5, 1731, MPA:FD 
88-89.
9Bienville and Salmon to Maurepas, April 1, 1734 in
ibid., 3:640.
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The correspondence relating to the La Fontaine case 
indicates that the storehouse at Natchitoches was in 
terrible condition. The accounts were in such a state of 
confusion that Duplessis, who replaced La Fontaine, asked to 
be relieved.10
Who was responsible for the mess is not clear, but 
Salmon had only good things to say about St. Denis. Perier 
and Salmon had not explained how they had learned about the 
problem at the warehouse, but they did credit St. Denis with 
notifying the governor and the commissary-general that La 
Fontaine had gone from the Adais to Mexico. Salmon reported 
to Maurepas that everyone in the colony considered St. Denis 
an excellent officer and that many had confidence only in 
him.11 In addition, Derbanne, St. Denis's old business 
associate was installed as subdelegate responsible to 
Salmon. Apparently, the company and not La Fontaine was 
blamed for the disorder. An amnesty was requested for the 
old storekeeper and a year later, Salmon requested a pardon 
for him.12
10Duplessis to Salmon, April 14. 1732. Archives
Nationales (Paris), Archives des Colonies, series C13, vol. 
15, folio 91.
•^Salmon to Maurepas, May 12, 1732. AC, C13, 15:100.
12Salmon to Maurepas, May 8, 1733. AC, C13 17:100.
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One might conjecture that the St. Denis who was himself 
engaged in clandestine trade with Mexico could ignore the 
administrative practices at the local level. The fact that 
Salmon made a point of praising St. Denis suggests his 
desire to develop a good working relationship with the old, 
experienced officers of the colony both to further the 
interests of the crown and colonial interests of his own.
Guy Fregault has described Salmon as a conscientious 
administrator who always promoted the interests of the 
colony and the colonists. When the disaster of the Chicasaw 
Wars precipitated the fiscal crisis of 1740, Salmon became 
the scapegoat.13 When the crown ordered Bienville to 
destroy the Chicasaws, the pressure was put on the 
commissary-general. Michael J. Foret tells us that 
Bienville was instructed to "practice all economy possible 
in planning the campaign." At the same time, however, he was 
encouraged to "make any expenditures necessary to ensure 
success.1,14
When the military failure and the financial crisis 
suggested that neither the king's business nor the colony's
13Guy Fregault, Le Grand Marquis. Pierre de Riaaud de 
Vaudreuil. et la Louisiane (Montreal: Fides, 1952), 182-83.
14Michael J. Foret, "War or Peace? Louisiana, the 
Choctaws, and the Chickasaws, 1733-1735," Louisiana History 31 
(Summer 1990): 288.
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interests were being looked after, the crown sent another 
bureaucrat to investigate. Upon arrival in Louisiana, 
Lenormant de Mezy immediately began looking for evidence of 
embezzlement. Salmon was accused of negligence in all 
affairs of the colony. He was charged with selling 
merchandise from the king's stores to the Spanish at a 
profit to himself and of profiteering by letters of 
exchange.15
Extending his investigation into the activities of the 
post commandants, Lenormant was able to uncover evidence of 
embezzlement by Taillefer, the commandant at Tombecbe, and 
Maurepas was inclined to place restraints on the 
commandants' control over the distribution of goods from the 
storehouses.16 The Tombecbe Post had been established 
during Bienville's first campaign against the Chickasaws, 
and the Taillefer case reached a critical point just as 
Governor Vaudreuil found it necessary to increase the flow
15Vaudreuil to Maurepas, January 6, 1745, HM LO 9, I, 53.
16Maurepas to Vaudreuil and Lenormant, April 13, 1746, HM 
LO 58.
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of trade goods and presents to contain the rebellion of the 
Choctaw faction led by Red Shoe in 1746.17
During Vaudreuil's administration, 1743-1753, Lenormant 
and Michel de la Rouvilliere his successor as commissary 
general, supported the storekeepers in the posts against the 
commandants. At one point, Vaudreuil asked Maurepas how the 
governor was to deal with the commissary general on 
occasions when these gentlemen interfered with his decision 
to "put a sufficient quantity of merchandise in this 
[Choctaw] nation so that there might be no reason for them 
to feel any needs, which was the only device that [Red Shoe] 
had for causing the commerce with the English to be desired 
there."18 The need to provide sustenance for Indian 
allies was an essential element in the military strategy of 
the ancien caoitaine. For this reason, Vaudreuil insisted 
that the commissary-general give no orders in the posts when 
they related to the service without communicating them to
17Vaudreuil to Maurepas, April 1, 1746, MPA;FD 4:264; 
Vaudreuil to Louboey, August 23, 1746, HM LO 9, III, 204;
Vaudreuil to Maurepas, November 20, 1746, MPA:FD 4:298, 302; 
Vaudreuil to Rouille, January 28, 1752, MPA:FD 5:110-111; See 
also Patricia Galloway, "Choctaw Factionalism and Civil War, 
1746-1750," The Journal of Mississippi History 44 (November, 
1982), 289-327.
18Vaudreuil to Maurepas, November 20, 1746 in MPA:FD 
4:302.
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the governor, and he declared to Maurepas that it was his 
responsibility to see that no abuses were committed.19 
Warfare and Sustenance: Needs of the Colony
The Natchez Massacre and the subsequent Chickasaw Wars 
made it apparent that the security of the colony depended 
upon the military force of France's Indian allies.20 
There simply were not enough French soldiers to maintain the 
tranquillity of the colony. French officers and Indian 
allies stood on a "middle ground" where the king depended on 
the old captain to exercise his sovereign will. Warfare and 
the sustenance of the colony hinged on the ability and 
willingness of the king to provide for the needs of the 
colony.
The Chickasaw Wars and the Choctaw rebellion that 
followed in their wake tested the resolve of the crown and 
the king's ability to supply the needs of his Indian allies.
19Vaudreuil to Maurepas, October 30, 1745, ibid.. 251-52.
20The Natchez revolt and the Chickasaw Wars have been 
discussed within the context of the Indian alliance network by 
Daniel H. Usner, Jr. , Indians. Settlers. & Slaves in a 
Frontier Exchange Economy: The Lower Mississippi Valiev
Before 1783 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press,
1992), 65-104. See also Foret, "War or Peace?", 273-292 and 
Charles J. Balesi, The Times of the French in the Heart of 
North America (Chicago: Alliance Frangaise, 1992), 174-187.
Patrica Galloway has done an extensive analysis of Choctaw 
villages and their chiefs in "Choctaw Factionalism and Civil 
War, 1746-1750," 289-327.
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When Bienville returned to Louisiana in 1733, there was 
tremendous excitement and expectation among the Canadians 
and the Indians. He now had the backing of the king.21 
In a 1732 memoir to Bienville and Commissary General Salmon 
from Louis XV and his minister, Maurepas, the new
administration was informed that "His Majesty is making use
of everything in order to induce the merchants to send
vessels with merchandise and wares suitable for the
colony."22 The memoir of 1732 reflects Maurepas's 
sophisticated knowledge of Indian relations in Louisiana. 
The king and his minister acknowledged that Bienville was 
aware of the English efforts to take over the Choctaw trade 
and that the preservation of the colony depended on 
preventing them from doing so. They instructed Bienville to 
"adopt the most fitting measures to frustrate [the English] 
and prevent their trade among the nations of Louisiana."23 
Even so between 1732 and 1734 when Bienville took the helm, 
the colony was faced with a critical shortage of trade
21Patricia Dillon Woods, French Indian Relations on the 
Southern Frontier. 1699-1762 (Ann Arbor, Mich.: UMI Research
Press, 1980), 115; Louis XV to Bienville, February 2, 1732,
MPA:FD. 3:541.
22Louis XV to Bienville and Salmon, February 2, 1732,
MPA:FD 3:571.
23Louis XV to Bienville, February 2, 1732, ibid., 3:553.
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supplies. Maurepas made every effort to keep the colony 
well-supplied, yet ships were lost at sea, goods were 
damaged because of collapsing storage facilities in Mobile, 
and disruptions were caused by natural disasters as well as 
wars between France and England.24
As commandant-general of Louisiana, Bienville's duty 
consisted in upholding the honor of the king and the 
interests of the colony. His tactics were those of an 
ancien capitaine. The economic progress of Louisiana and 
the tranquillity of the people required peace. Within the 
framework of the French frontier mentalite and prevailing 
Indian mores, Indians who killed Frenchmen broke the peace, 
and the insult to royal authority had to be remedied. The 
Natchez had massacred Frenchmen, and the Chickasaws had 
given them refuge. The Choctaw Indians had been fighting 
the Chickasaw for generations before the arrival of the 
French. They were more than willing to attack the 
Chickasaws to force them to surrender the Natchez refugees. 
Yet with the passage of time it became evident that the 
English masters of the Chickasaws were more successful than 
the French in supplying their Indian allies with the powder,
24Woods, Indian Relations. 116-17.
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bullets, clothing, and iron pots necessary to protect and 
provide for their families.
Governor Perier had tackled the task of repairing the 
insult immediately after the Natchez massacre, but then it 
became a question of either negotiating an honorable peace 
or eliminating the Chickasaws who succored the Natchez and 
traded with the English. Peace could be granted only if the 
Chickasaws would surrender the Natchez remnant to the French 
and promise not to trade with the English. Bienville and 
Maurepas decided to organize a French force to fight with 
the Choctaws against the Chickasaws.
In July 1733 Bienville postponed any type of military 
action that might compromise the honor of French arms 
because of a critical shortage of supplies.25 Bienville, 
and Vaudreuil after him, continued to ask for more and more 
supplies. Maurepas did his best to meet their requirements, 
but there were always unexpected circumstances which 
prevented the arrival of supplies at a crucial moment.
The least expensive method of punishing the Chickasaws 
would be "to put the Indians alone into action," but it 
would take too long and would not work if hostilities broke
25Bienville to Maurepas, July 26, 1733, MPA:FD. 1:212.
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out between France and England.26 Maurepas and Bienville 
had corresponded about all of these possibilities in the 
spring of 1735.
The French attempt to repair the damage done to French 
honor by the Natchez massacre had extended over a period of 
seven years. Now it would be necessary to undertake a more 
costly campaign, a campaign that would ultimately convince 
Bienville to retire from the king's service and return to 
France. He feared a second failure,27 but after a few 
additional troops arrived from France in the spring of 173 6, 
Bienville obeyed the crown's orders to undertake the 
expedition against the Chickasaw.28
Bienville's effort to coordinate his attack in the 
first Chickasaw War with the Canadian troops of Pierre 
D'Artaguette failed miserably. D'Artaguette was killed and 
the Chickasaws, aided by the English, intercepted 
Bienville's battle plan. The Chickasaws caught the French 
in a cross-fire as they approached the village of Ackia on
26Bienville to Maurepas, April 23, 1735, ibid., 1:261.
27Gayarre, Louisiana. 1:460.
28Ibid., 470.
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May 26, 173 6. The French lost over a hundred soldiers.29
The ability of Bienville and the king to protect their 
"children” was called into question, and ultimately French 
control of the lower Mississippi Valley was placed in 
jeopardy.
The crown accepted responsibility for the disaster, and 
Bienville had gained and continued to hold Maurepas's 
confidence. Maurepas now offered to provide more men and 
bigger cannon, and anything else that Bienville might need. 
Bienville was apparently unable to shift gears. He knew how 
to make the best possible use of limited resources, but what 
would he do with an army that might succumb to disease 
before he was ready to use it?30 How could he transport 
big cannons in a wilderness where the roads were old Indian 
trails?31
In Europe, colonial conflict had to take a back seat to 
balance of power considerations on the continent.32 As
29"Narrative of the War against the Chickasaws attacked 
by the army of New Orleans commanded by Mr. de Bienville, 
governor of this province," April 1, 1736, MPA:FD 1:316-319; 
Woods, Indian Relations. 126.
30Woods, Indian Relations. 132.
31Ibid.. 142-43.
32Walter L. Dorn, Competition for Empire. 1740-1763. (New 
York: Harper Torchbooks, 1963), 165.
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soon as Bienville was ready for men and supplies, Maurepas 
had to apologize for delays in sending them. In the 
meantime, France was losing ground in the commercial 
competition with England, and the Choctaw Indians, who 
needed merchandise more than French protection, began to 
visit Carolina and invite the English traders into their 
villages.
As early as 1734, Gilles Augustin Payen de Chavoy de 
Noyan, a nephew of Bienville, had reported to Maurepas from 
New Orleans that a Choctaw chief named Red Shoe had 
undertaken a journey to Carolina to discuss the trading 
propositions of some English traders. Pere Baudouin, a 
Jesuit missionary resident in the Choctaw villages, had 
informed Noyan that Red Shoe "was very badly received on his 
return by the chiefs of his nation."33 Bienville had 
taken the precaution of sending extra merchandise to insure 
the loyalty of the Choctaws, but after the disaster at 
Ackia, Red Shoe secured a truce with the Chickasaw and made 
another trip to Charleston seeking English supplies. 
Fortunately for the French, Red Shoe came back from 
Charleston empty handed, his Choctaw followers began to 
defect, and he himself returned to the French camp in time
33Noyan to Maurepas, November 8, 1734 in MPA:FD 4:139.
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to support Bienville's second Chickasaw campaign in 
1740.34
Once again Bienville failed in his effort to eliminate 
the Chickasaws, but he did succeed in forcing them to sue 
for peace. The English, afraid that the French might attack 
Carolina, put brakes on their trading activity, and the 
Chickasaws offered to deliver the Natchez refugees to the 
French. Bienville insisted that the Chickasaws oust all the 
English traders from their lands and delayed the negotiation 
until it became clear that the French could no longer 
prevail upon the Choctaws to continue the campaign.35
The peace with the Chickasaws would not last, and the 
failure of the French to supply their Choctaw allies with 
merchandise at a competitive price soon provoked a Choctaw 
rebellion in which Frenchmen were killed.36 Governor 
Vaudreuil who replaced Bienville in 1743 put a price on Red 
Shoe's head, but by the time the rebel Choctaw chief was 
assassinated in June 1747, a civil war had broken out among
34Woods, Indian Relations. 135-38.
35Ibid., 144-46; "Canelle's Journal of Campaign against 
the Chickasaws," August 1742 in MPA:FD 4:199-201.
36Vaudreuil to Beauchamps, August 28, 1746 and Speech to 
the Choctaw Tribe Concerning the Assassination of Three 
Frenchmen by Red Shoe on August 14, HM LO 9, III, 213-215; 
Galloway, "Choctaw Factionalism and Civil War," 310.
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the Choctaw tribes between the Eastern villages loyal to the 
French and the Western villages which continued to welcome 
English traders.37 Vaudreuil and his old captains worked 
to achieve the reunification of the Choctaw nation and the 
exclusion of English traders,38 but the costs of providing 
increased presents for the Choctaw chiefs and of subsidizing 
the trade in deerskins proved more than the king was willing 
to bear.
The objectives of restoring the honor of French arms 
and establishing Louisiana as a productive colony provided 
the justification for increasing royal expenditures. The 
crown had accepted financial responsibility for the colony, 
but Maurepas insisted on strict accountability for every 
dime expended.39 Bienville, Vaudreuil, and the Jesuit 
missionaries insisted that they could accomplish the task at 
the least possible cost by securing the friendship and
37Vaudreuil to Maurepas, March 15 and May 10, 1747 and 
Louboey to Maurepas, February 16, 1748, MPA;FD 4:305, 310,
312; Vaudreuil to Maurepas, November 5, 1748, HM LO 147
contains a detailed review of Red Shoe's actions prior to his 
assassination and described the conflict between loyal 
Choctaws and the rebel villages; See also Galloway, "Choctaw 
Factionalism and Civil War," 310-23.
38Vaudreuil to Rouille, June 24, 1750 MPA:FD 5:47.
39Louis XV to Bienville, February 2, 173 2, MPA:FD 3:541, 
546, 549-556; Louis XV to Bienville and Salmon, February 2, 
1732, MPA:FD 3:558-576; Fregault, Grand Marquis. 184-187.
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cooperation of allied Indian tribes. The disgrace of 
Maurepas in 1749 led to his successor's attempt to rely more 
on increased troops and less on Indian allies, but the 
financial drain on the king's treasury ultimately created 
the gigantic gap between the king's interest and the welfare 
of the colony that would eventually separate the king from 
his people.40 While continuing to insist that the gap did 
not exist, the governors and their old captains resorted to 
using any means necessary for the survival of the colony. 
They tried valiantly to bridge the gap, but the local 
autonomy of the frontier posts proved to be more durable in 
the long run than the patience of the French crown.
When Vaudreuil arrived in Louisiana to replace 
Bienville as governor, he was greeted warmly even by the 
Chickasaw chiefs who described the new governor's father, 
Philippe de Rigaud —  governor of Canada, 1703-1725 —  as 
the great chief of the northern Indians. That title, the 
chiefs maintained, belonged to the new Canadian governor of
40Beaudouin to Salmon, November 23, 1732, MPA:FD 1:155- 
163; Vaudreuil to Beaudouin, December 19, 1745, HM LO 9, III, 
185-189; Rouille to Vaudreuil, September 30, 1750, HM LO 234; 
"Memoir for the King," MPA:FD 5:58-59; James Pritchard, Louis
XV's Navy. 1748-1762:___ A Study of Organization and
Administration (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 
1987), 3-9.
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Louisiana.41 Vaudreuil made plans to use the 
distribution of merchandise and presents to undermine the 
authority of Red Shoe among the Choctaws. The key to 
controlling France's Indian allies lay in the proper 
distribution of merchandise, and the new governor faced a 
tremendous problem when Lenormant de Mezy arrived to begin 
his investigation of the financial practices of Salmon.
The man Maurepas chose to conduct the investigation had 
established his reputation in Canada as a "gargon de merit." 
He was ambitious and he had connections with the French 
court as a relative of the husband of the future marquise de 
Pompadour, the king's mistress.42 Lenormant arrived in 
Louisiana on October 15, 1744, and on January 6, Vaudreuil 
reported to Maurepas that no one could be found who was more 
qualified to establish order in the colony's finances. Even 
so, the governor cautioned that Lenormant needed knowledge 
and experience of colonial affairs that would take at least 
two or three years to develop.43 Guy Fregault believes 
that Lenormant had only one objective: to economize and
41Vaudreuil to Maurepas, February 12, 1744, HM LO 9, I,
17.
42Fregault, Grand Marquis. 190.
43Ibid.. 191-92; Vaudreuil to Maurepas, January 6, 1745, 
HMLO 9, I, 53-56.
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replenish the royal funds.44 To check the negative cash 
flow of royal funds he would raise prices and eliminate 
profiteering.
Lenormant's determination to achieve these objectives
without concern for the effect that this policy would have
on France's Indian allies brought him into direct and
immediate conflict with the governor, who relied on his old
captains to control and manage the tribes surrounding the
French posts which had been strategically located for that
purpose. Over and over, Vaudreuil and his old captains
insisted that the security of the colony depended on the
Indian nations. There were not enough French troops to
maintain tranquillity, and adequate supplies and merchandise
would be required to insure the loyalty of the Indian allies
and encourage them to campaign actively against the English
and their Indian allies. The crucial connection between
supplies and the fidelity of Indian allies was graphically
expressed by Vaudreuil in a letter to Maurepas on April 1,
1746 in which the governor described the effect of
Lenormant's "mistaken economies."
As the security of this colony depends upon the 
[Indian] nations, I am omitting nothing to
conciliate them with us, but also I must be
supported by means of the merchandise that the
44Fregault, Grand Marquis. 197.
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King sends for this purpose, rather than for it 
to be at the disposition of the commissaries 
general to favor with it whomsoever they see fit, 
claiming that they have a right to do so as M. 
Lenormant has done this year .... 45
Louboey, in command at Mobile, had already expressed his
exasperation with Lenormant in a letter to Maurepas the
previous fall. He reported the short speeches made by
several different Choctaw chiefs to acquaint the minister
with the grievances of Choctaw warriors and the efforts of
France's enemies
to penetrate their country, a purpose that they 
do not lose sight of and the execution of which 
they will finally be able to accomplish if we 
allow the colony to lack the goods necessary to 
prevent them from doing so, since the Indians are 
not people to feed forever on promises, self- 
interest being the only motive that makes them 
act ....
Louboey's message was clear. For France to occupy the vast 
territory of Louisiana with "a handful of men," a steady 
supply of goods was needed to preserve the loyalty of the 
Choctaw nation.46
45MPA:FD 4:268.
46Louboey to Maurepas, October 6, 1745 in ibid.. 4:237. 
For an analysis of the connection between generosity and 
loyalty in Choctaw culture see Richard White, The Roots of 
Dependency: Subsistence. Environment, and Social Change Among
the Choctaws. Pawnees, and Navaios (Lincoln: University of
Nebraska Press, 1983), 41-43.
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Vaudreuil had already explained to Maurepas how 
presents could be used effectively by distributing them to 
loyal chiefs to shore up their authority and by reducing 
and, ultimately, withholding them from a rebel chief such as 
Red Shoe. In February 1744, the governor assured Maurepas 
that peace was possible if a supply of merchandise would be 
made available at the same price charged by the English. He 
specified that the amount needed was 100,000 livres in 
excess of the normal supply.47 Two years later he 
reiterated his conviction that the Choctaws would keep their 
promises provided they did not lack merchandise.48 Before 
the arrival of Lenormant, Vaudreuil had complained to 
Maurepas that the Indians believed the French were poor and 
unable to produce as well as the English. In June 1744 the 
warehouses were empty; by October the lack of merchandise 
was an embarrassment.49 Repeated shortage of trade goods 
provoked statements such as the following by disaffected 
Choctaw chiefs reported by a French trader to Louboey and 
passed on to Maurepas.
47Vaudreuil to Maurepas, February 12, 1744, MPA;FD 4:221-
223.
48Vaudreuil to Maurepas, April 1, 1746, MPA:FD 4:265.
49HM LO 9, I, 17, 25, 37.
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But for the English we would all be dead ....
Those are our genuine Frenchmen. Neither the 
length of the road nor the difficulty in bringing 
us the things we need ever rebuffs them. They do 
not let us lack anything .... The red men . . . 
who are [French] allies and at their door go 
without breeches, the women and the children have 
no blankets to protect themselves against the 
cold; how would they manage to give us 
merchandise, are we not far distant from them?50
When supply ships finally began to arrive, Lenormant not
only doubled the price of goods but refused to release the
presents and merchandise that Vaudreuil, Louboey, and the
commandants of Tombecbe and Toulouse so badly needed.
The King's Interest and the Welfare of the Service
While Vaudreuil was complaining about Lenormant's
action increasing the cost of merchandise to the posts,
Maurepas received new evidence against Commandant Taillefer
proving embezzlement at Tombecbe in 1743. On April 13,
1746, Maurepas addressed a letter to Vaudreuil and Lenormant
instructing the commissary to cooperate with Vaudreuil
because discontent among the Indians had to be prevented.
The minister stressed, however, that post commanders served
their own interests and were in the habit of justifying
their actions as necessary for controlling the Indians.
Taillefer had violated his authority by imprisoning the
50Louboey to Maurepas, November 6, 1745 in MPA:FD 4:254-
55.
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storekeeper and taking over his functions. According to 
Maurepas, this affair was neither reported nor punished.51 
The king's interest required precautions against embezzle­
ment, and Maurepas warned Vaudreuil that he had doubts about 
the governor's ability to control expenses and stop abuses.
Nevertheless, Vaudreuil continued to rely on the old 
captains. On January 2, 1744, he had given specific
instructions to Pierre Annibal de Velle, who had replaced 
Taillefer at Tombecbe in 1743. In accordance with the 
king's intention, the storekeeper was ordered to make no 
advances and allow no trade in the post. He was required to 
record and report the source of peltries and act on behalf 
of the king as the sole trader in them. Both the commandant 
and the storekeeper were instructed to send detailed written 
reports directly to Vaudreuil and Louboey.52 In February 
the governor cautioned de Velle against private trading. He 
explained that the instructions for carrying on trade with 
the Indians were "good for the service" and that it was not 
his intention for de Velle to "lose any gratification due
51Maurepas to Vaudreuil and Lenormant, April 13, 1746, HM
LO 58.
52Vaudreuil to De Velle, January 2, 1744, HM LO 9, III,
31-33
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him."53 But de Velle pleaded continually to be relieved 
from his duties at a hardship post, and in 1744 he was 
replaced by Pierre Henri d'Erneville, who was allowed 
certain trading privileges for taking over as commandant. 
By November of that year, however, d'Erneville was ordered 
to transfer "all instructions" to Frangois Marie Joseph 
Hazeur although the terms of Hazeur's "monopoly" were not 
spelled out.54 The problems at the post were such that 
Vaudreuil later insisted that Hazeur be compensated for his 
trading losses incurred for the welfare of the service.55 
On July 30, 1747, Vaudreuil instructed Louboey not to
restrain Hazeur from trading. He authorized de Velle to 
direct the trading operation and "to name the destination of 
the agreed merchandise in keeping with the good of the 
service."56
53Vaudreuil to de Velle, February 29, 1744 in ibid., Ill,
63.
54Vaudreuil to de Velle, June 25, 1744; July 30, 1744, HM 
LO 9, III, 94, 101. Vaudreuil to D'Erneville, November 11,
1744 and November 29, 1745, HM LO 9, III, 144-45, 184.
Vaudreuil to Pere Baudouin, December 19, 1745, HM LO 9, III, 
185-88.
55Vaudreuil to Maurepas, March 20, 1748, HM LO 116.
56Vaudreuil to Louboey, July 30, 1747, HM LO 9, III, 271-
277.
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Vaudreuil continued to promote the services of his old 
captains. Indeed, he defined and used the term ancien to 
describe the special qualifications of a post commandant. 
The term had been used by Penicaut to describe a Canadian 
officer. Perier too had used the term after the Natchez 
massacre to describe St. Denis. In 1744, Vaudreuil 
described Sieur de Blanc as an "old captain" when he 
informed Maurepas that he had approved his request to 
replace St. Denis as commandant at Natchitoches.57 
Vaudreuil's letter of April 28, 1751 to Antoine Louis
Rouille, Maurepas's successor as minister of marine, 
described the special qualifications for a commandant of the 
Alabama Post (Fort Toulouse). Aware of the need to protect 
the southeastern frontier against the incursions of the 
English, the governor based his job description for the 
prospective commandant on his objectives for the Alabama 
Post. The post required an officer experienced in Indian 
relations with the ability to oversee the settlement of the 
territory.
According to Vaudreuil, governing the Indians required 
"consumate experience and special study." An effective post 
commander had to have "knowledge of the Indian nations" as
57Vaudreuil to Maurepas, December 29, 1744, HM LO 9, I,
49.
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well as "talents ... for organizing settlements." For 
example, Vaudreuil recommended one Chevalier d'Orgon for the 
job of Alabama Post commandant because he was "an old 
captain" with the knowledge and experience of governing the 
Indians. D'Orgon had the knowledge and experience to be an 
effective post commandant, and Vaudreuil expected that "like 
a good pere de famille." he would have the ability to govern 
the "people who have settled there and who will settle 
there." Vaudreuil held up de Blanc, St. Denis's successor 
at Natchitoches, as a model: "As this post deserves special
attention, I think also that it would be advisable for his 
Majesty to appoint a commanding officer there as at the 
Natchitoches" capable of controlling both Indians and 
settlers.58
Vaudreuil's reliance on old captains to command the 
frontier posts was threatened first by Lenormant's refusal 
to release supplies from the king's storehouse and later by 
the determination of Rouille to close the Tombecbe Post. 
When Lenormant was replaced by Michel de la Rouvilliere, the 
governor exercised his right to order the distribution of 
supplies, but expenses incurred during the Choctaw rebellion 
ultimately led Rouille to resort to increasing the number of
58Vaudreuil to Rouille, April 28, 1751, MPA:FD 5:69-72.
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regular troops to eliminate the expense of supplying gifts 
and trade goods to France's Choctaw allies.
Peace with the Chickasaws was at hand in January 1744, 
but more presents and trade goods were necessary to supply 
both the Choctaws and the Chickasaws. Vaudreuil cautioned 
Louboey that it was unwise to give presents to the English 
partisans, but he was confident that an ample supply of
merchandise would insure French success. The governor
instructed the commandant at Mobile that the presents 
expected with the arrival of the ship should be used only 
for negotiations and that they would be supplied by the 
storekeeper "on specific orders." Only loyal chiefs should 
receive presents. Louboey must refuse "with discretion, 
those who favor the English."59 Vaudreuil could not give 
Louboey any news about the arrival of the king's ship. In 
June he wrote to de Velle that "no word had been received of
the king's ship" and observed that it would be "very
embarrassing if something happened to it." Not until 
October 20 did Vaudreuil inform Louboey that the ship had 
arrived. Louboey had already reported complaints of Indian 
chiefs who expressed doubts about the ability of the French 
to produce goods as well as the English. Now Vaudreuil
59Vaudreuil to Louboey, April 22, 1744, HM LO 9, III, 77-
78.
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proclaimed that the new shipment "should create a great 
change in the attitude of French allies who ought to be 
reproached for having shown such little confidence in the 
promises made to them."60
It was at this critical juncture that Lenormant arrived 
with a mandate to cut costs and increase revenues. To 
achieve these ends, he doubled the price of trade goods, 
delayed deliveries to the outlying posts, and retroactively 
reduced the value c-f the money with which the wages of 
soldiers and artisans were paid.61 In short, the 
commissary placed every conceivable obstacle in the way of 
Vaudreuil's policy of maintaining peace by enriching post 
commandants and their Indian allies.
Lenormant's measures gradually strangled the colonial 
economy. The complaints began in October 1745, a year after 
Lenormant's arrival, reached a shrill level in December 1745 
and climaxed in 1746.
Louboey had filed his first formal complaint with 
Maurepas in October 1745. Lenormant's changes would not 
improve the colony, and they "might easily cause some
60Vaudreuil to de Velle, June 25, 1744, HM LO 9, III, 95.
Vaudreuil to Louboey, October 20, 1744, 141.
61Fregault, Grand Marquis. 198-201.
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dangerous events if he continued to insist upon his 
system."62 Vaudreuil expressed his utter frustration to 
the minister on October 30. The governor stated that his 
only intention was to meet the expectations expressed by 
entrusting him with "the reins of this government." For 
this reason, it was imperative to render an account of the 
"economies that M. Lenormant has thought it advisable to 
make in the different posts of this colony without 
consulting me." Only the prudence of the post commandants 
prevented "deplorable results" that could lead to
disaster.63
Vaudreuil politely described Lenormant as a "zealous 
servant of the King and a man capable of performing the 
duties of his office well, without considering anything but 
his Majesty's interests." However, his decision "to impose 
[a profit of] 100 percent on the merchandise intended for 
the subsistence of the posts" caused "dissatisfaction on the 
part of the Indians and of the garrisons, which have 
attempted to rise in revolt" or go over to the English or 
the Spaniards. Only the prompt action of the Tombecbe
62Louboey to Maurepas, October 6, 1745, MPA;FD 4:240.
63Vaudreuil to Maurepas, October 30, 1745, MPA:FD 4:249-
251.
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commandant prevented a mutiny "by sending to me the soldiers 
who were suspected of being the most seditious.1,64
The soldiers had always been able to purchase 
merchandise for a cost of fifty percent above the price 
prevailing in France. Trade with the Choctaws had been 
conducted without adding the surcharge to cover the 
additional costs of doing business in the colony. 
Lenormant's attempt to stop the financial drain on the royal 
treasury by raising prices to cover heavy transportation and 
other costs ignored the threat of English competitors and 
the bargaining power of the Indians. "This system," 
Vaudreuil protested to the minister, "disgusts them, and I 
do not see any posts where it is possible to introduce it 
without running the risk of incurring the hostility of all 
the nations of these places."65
Vaudreuil carefully explained that the commissary 
general had ordered the storekeepers to "refuse to issue 
from the King's warehouses the merchandise that the 
commandants of these posts are often obliged to give the 
Indians in cases in which the welfare of the service is
64Ibid.. 4:249.
65Ibid.
236
involved." The governor clearly described the disastrous
effects of Lenormant's "good intentions."
I am not at all surprised, my lord, that M. 
Lenormant has not felt the difficulties that 
existed in changing the practices established in 
these different posts. He has never been near 
understanding the ways of the Indians and the 
manner in which one must conduct oneself with 
them, and in the time that he has been staying 
here he has been too much occupied with 
fulfilling his mission, which he is capable of 
performing well, to have been able to acquire a 
sufficiently perfect idea of the management of 
these nations, so I have no ill feeling against 
him for the savings that he has wished to make 
and I think that that is the only motive that has 
caused him to act in this way, so I do him this 
justice, but because people sometimes wish to 
conserve the interests of the King overmuch they 
often incur greater expense, as would be the 
result if the new practices continued longer.66
On November 29, 1745 Vaudreuil informed Beauchamps that
supplies would be sent without delay to Alabama and
Tombecbe. The trade concession for the Choctaws had been
given to Hazeur and the prospects for peace in 1746 would be
good "if the necessary quantity and quality" of merchandise
was available.67 On December 19, Vaudreuil wrote to Pere
Baudouin that deliveries of larger quantities of trade goods
would give France the advantage in the competition with
England, "unless the obstacles Lenormant placed in the way
66Ibid.. 251.
67Vaudreuil to Beauchamps, November 29, 1745, HM LO 9,
III, 184-85.
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cannot be removed."68 The next day Vaudreuil notified 
Louboey that supplies en route to Mobile for Tombecbe and 
Alabama had been delayed "due to the intransigence of 
Lenormant." Vaudreuil fumed that the delay was the cause of 
a new Choctaw revolt and grumbled that Lenormant was "an 
unmanageable man with whom I have little affinity 
today."69
By January 6, the governor was insisting that Lenormant 
must be replaced. "Without his removal there can be no 
success in governing the colony." He, Vaudreuil, must be 
given "the authority to control the merchandise from the 
stores for the requirements of the Indians and the 
posts.70 On January 28, Vaudreuil reported to the 
minister that Lenormant continued the "annoying and 
troublesome" practice of contacting the posts without 
consulting the governor. Lenormant was seeking Maurepas's 
approval by cutting expenses and saving the king money, but 
his actions were clearly "prejudicial to the good of the
68Vaudreuil to Baudouin, December 19, 1745, HM LO 9, III, 
185-86.
69Vaudreuil to Louboey, December 20, 1745, HM LO 9, III,
188.
70Vaudreuil to Maurepas, January 6, 1746, HM LO 9, I, 73.
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service and peace of the colony."71 By February 6, 
Vaudreuil intimated that the commissary had expended for 
personal advantage supplies badly needed for trade to 
maintain the loyalty of the Choctaw nation.72
According to Vaudreuil, Lenormant ignored "increased 
demands for more supplies and merchandise." The commandants 
probably suggested using force, but the governor informed 
Maurepas that force would not be used "to obtain powder from 
the stores for the posts" because of the "poor impression" 
violence would make on "the public."73 Vaudreuil motivated 
and secured the loyalty of his post commandants by allowing 
them to engage in closely supervised trading activities,74 
but his ability to control the old captains was being 
questioned at the very moment when the governor depended on 
them to quell the Choctaw rebellion.
The year passed as Maurepas temporized and reminded 
Vaudreuil about past abuses in Canada as well as the 
Taillefer affair. The minister did advise Lenormant to
71January 28, 1746, HM LO 9, I, 74.
72February 6, 1746, ibid., 76.
73March 9, 1746, ibid., 78.
74Vaudreuil to de Velle, February 29, 1744, HM LO 9, III, 
63; Vaudreuil to d'Erneville, November 11, 1744, HM LO 9, III, 
144-45.
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cooperate with the governor to prevent discontent among the 
Indians, but he also declared that "post commanders serve 
their own interests," use the need for Indian control to 
justify their actions, while they are actually motivated by 
the desire to "control distribution in the stores." 
Maurepas stressed that an example should be made of 
Taillefer to discourage other officers from abusing their 
authority over the storekeepers.75 He reminded Vaudreuil 
that Lenormant had uncovered evidence of embezzlement by 
Taillefer at Tombecbe in 1743, and that it was clear that 
the post commandant should not have been allowed to imprison 
the storekeeper and take over his functions.76
The conflict between the two servants of the king was 
clear. Lenormant aimed to prevent the old captains in 
command at Tombecbe from making a profit in the Indian trade 
at the expense of the king. The governor and his military 
officers, however, justified their right to order the 
distribution of merchandise as a means of preserving the 
colony by insuring the loyalty of France's Indian allies.
In November 1746, Vaudreuil pleaded with Maurepas to 
send him instructions for dealing with the commissaries.
75Maurepas to Vaudreuil and Lenormant, April 13, 1746, HM 
LO 58.
76Ibid.
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After calling Maurepas' attention, once again, to the fact
that Lenormant had been responsible for Red Shoe's success
in organizing the Choctaw revolt, the governor wrote:
I cannot conceal from you in this matter what I 
think of it because of the pain that I feel over 
it, or refrain from [requesting you] to send me 
orders about the manner in which I must behave 
with the commissaries general on such occasions. 
Otherwise this colony will always be in a 
position to suffer from [these quarrelings] 
because of the small amount of progress that it 
will be possible to make there. Those gentlemen 
have no other intentions than to show you a 
spirit of economy and an order of finance to 
accomplish their ends, without troubling 
themselves about the administration of the 
government, with which they are not charged.77
Despite the fact that Maurepas had ignored his demand that
Lenormant be replaced, the governor used every possible
method to convince the minister that his own policy and
methods promoted and advanced the colonial welfare and the
king's interests.
In New Orleans on the night of March 14, 1747,
Lenormant was assaulted by a man he and several other
witnesses identified as "Sieur Taillefer." The commissary
sent his manservant for help, then drew his sword and began
to defend himself.78 It is possible that the young cadet
77November 20, 1746, MPA:FD 4:302.
78Henry P. Dart, "A Duel in the Dark in New Orleans on 
March 14, 1747," Louisiana Historical Quarterly 13 (April
1930): 200-203.
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officer was the younger brother of Lieutenant Taillefer who 
had been charged with embezzlement at Tombecbe. It is also 
possible that Vaudreuil was behind the assault. The absence 
of subsequent references to the case in the records of the 
Superior Council suggests that someone may have ransacked 
the files.79 Fregault maintains, however, that the cadet
• o nsimply attacked Lenormant to avenge his brother. 
Whatever the reasons behind the attack, Lenormant took it as 
evidence that he needed to be removed from his post. Even 
before the attack he had been pleading with Maurepas to take 
him out of a country he did not love, but Maurepas insisted 
that he stay until a suitable replacement could be found. In 
March 1748 Lenormant finally received orders to go first to 
St. Domingue and then to return to France. At the same time 
the minister informed Vaudreuil that Vincent-Guillaume
• ft 1Senechal D'Auberville would serve as ordonnateur. °~L 
Michel de la Rouvilliere was appointed commissary general.
While struggling to retain the fidelity of the France's 
Indian allies and coping with the fetters of Lenormant's new 
system, the governor had requested instructions from the
79Ibid., 201.
80Fregault, Grand Marquis. 212.
81March 25, 1748, HM LO 123; Fregault, Grand Marauis.
212 .
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crown for occasions when the commissary-general interfered
with his actions to govern the colony.82 In a memoir dated
December 23, 1748 and addressed to the governor and Michel
de la Rouvilliere, Maurepas provided clear and detailed
guidelines. Maurepas was determined to reaffirm Vaudreuil's
authority to govern the colony, but he also insisted on
strict financial accountability and the elimination of
abuses by post commandants who might use Indian policy to
control the distribution of merchandise. The pressure of a
tight budget weighed heavily upon the minister.
The royal instructions of 1748 clearly gave the
governor the authority to override the commissary and his
storekeepers when necessary for the security of the colony.
Difference of opinion must not cause any dispute 
between them. When they will not agree on a matter, 
His Majesty wants a report of their respective 
reasons. However, if the disputed matter is 
urgent and cannot wait for His Majesty's orders, 
the governor's will shall prevail.83
The king's memoir went on to delineate the different
responsibilities of the two "chiefs of the colony." The
governor had exclusive authority over the military and
anything regarding the dignity of command.
82Vaudreuil to Maurepas, November 20, 1746, MPA;FD 4:302.
83"Memoire du roi," in Lemieux, "Office of Comissaire 
Ordonnateur", 103-106.
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The governor will order the troops and militia 
and see to their discipline and readiness when 
called upon to serve. For this effect, he must 
be kept informed by the officers of the condition 
of their troops and even enter into details with 
them over their responsibility in maintaining 
strict discipline. Furthermore, he must see to 
it that the officers commit no injustice, such as 
withholding flour and pay, against their 
soldiers; and if an officer is found guilty of 
such, the governor must punish that offender 
independently of the restitution ordered by the 
'ordonnateur'.84
Governing the Indians and building fortifications were
the responsibility of the governor, but once construction
was approved by His Majesty, "the execution will be the
common endeavor of the governor and 'ordonnateur'."85
The ordonnateur was responsible for everything having
to do with supplies, but provision for the governor to order
extraordinary expenditures during times of emergency was
also included in Michel's instructions.
The administration of capital, supplies, 
ammunition, and generally all which pertains to 
the warehouses and treasury of the colony are the 
sole concern of the 'commissaire ordonnateur'.
No payment, sale, nor consumption will be made 
without the consent of the ordonnateur. If, 
however, Vaudreuil decides on an extraordinary 
expense for the service of the colony, His 
Majesty commands Michel to order it; but he 
commands Vaudreuil to make such expense only in
84Ibid.. 103-104.
85Ibid.. 104.
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case of absolute necessity and to report on his 
motives.86
The administration of justice was also the responsibility of 
the ordonnateur. and Vaudreuil was warned not to interfere, 
except to enforce the judgments rendered. The governor and 
ordonnateur were jointly responsible for increasing the 
population of the colony, developing agriculture and 
promoting commerce.87
By the time Michel de la Rouvilliere arrived in 
Louisiana in the summer of 1749,88 Louis XV had dismissed 
Maurepas and replaced him with Rouille. Rouille relied 
heavily on the advice of experienced naval intendants, 
reestablished administrative control, and began the process 
of rebuilding the navy.89 Rouille was more able and
willing than Maurepas to avoid excessive dependence on 
commandant traders and Indian allies by providing additional 
troops, but the expense ultimately proved more than the 
crown was willing to bear.
86Ibid.. 105.
87 Ibid.
88MPA:FD 5:28, n. 3.
89Pritchard, Louis XV's Navv. 7-9.
The Defense of Tombecbe
The Tombecbe Post was 
established by Bienville in 
173 6 during the Chickasaw 
Wars. It was not as far 
from New Orleans as Fort 
Toulouse, but goods could 
be transported in large 
boats only during certain 
times of the year, (see map 
p. 245) When ships arrived 
late or unexpected delays 
rendered it necessary to 
transport goods at other 
times, costs escalated.
Tombecbe had to be 
maintained because it was 
strategically located near 
the western Choctaw 
villages. English traders 
had easy access to the area 
from the north, and they 
would no doubt establish a post nearby whenever the French 
pulled out. The reunification of the Choctaw nation after 
Red Shoe's death in 1747 and the destruction of the
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remaining rebel villages could be accomplished only by 
rewarding the Choctaw chiefs who had been unwavering in 
their loyalty to the French. In 1749, Vaudreuil reminded 
Rouille that he and Louboey had committed the French to 
supply the Choctaw nation, and the reunited nation would 
require even more goods and presents.90
Vaudreuil persistently argued that posts such as 
Tombecbe could be maintained at little or no cost to the 
king by granting trading monopolies. The problem was to 
keep an adequate supply of goods so that there would be no 
need for the Choctaws to resort to the English. To prevent 
those holding the monopolies from abusing these privileges, 
Vaudreuil had insisted to Maurepas that he would closely 
supervise their trading activities. In 1744 the governor 
had demonstrated his willingness to grant trading privileges 
to an old captain when necessary. When de Velle, Taillefer's 
replacement at Tombecbe, asked to be relieved of his 
"hardship post," in 1744, Vaudreuil sent d'Erneville to 
Tombecbe and permitted him to trade in peltries. Vaudreuil 
informed d'Erneville that sufficient merchandise would be 
sent to Tombecbe for the peltry trade he carried on with the
90Vaudreuil to Rouille, March 3, 1749, MPA;FD 5:19-21.
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Choctaws.91 Vaudreuil expected Hazeur, who relieved 
d'Erneville in December, 1745, to use his trading monopoly 
to support the garrison at Tombecbe and reward loyal Choctaw 
chiefs.
Hazeur had been sent to Tombecbe to engage in trade and 
provide an advantage for those chiefs who remained loyal to 
the French during Red Shoe's rebellion. Vaudreuil notified 
Pere Baudouin that Hazeur intended to serve traders 
recommended by the priest and others whom he would choose. 
Hazeur's plan called for enlisting the cooperation of two 
gentlemen-cadets, Ensign Chambly de Rouville and Sieur 
Canelle, with everyone working together for the good of the 
service.92
The need to promote rather than discourage trading 
activity at Tombecbe was stressed Vaudreuil in 1745 when he
91Vaudreuil to de Velle, June 25, 1744, HM LO 9, III, 95; 
Vaudreuil to D'Erneville, November 11, 1744, HM LO. Ill, 144.
92Vaudreuil to Baudoin, December 19, 1745, HM LO 9, III, 
185. On Canelle see "Canelle's Journal of Campaign Against the 
Chickasaws," MPA:FD 4:199-201. Villiers du Terrage defined 
gentlemen-cadets as "young volunteers serving without pay, 
without being enlisted, carrying the insignia of the company 
and always remaining free to resign from the service. They 
carried out the duties of soldiers except for fatigue duties 
and passed through all the ranks of subalterns." MPA:FD 4:201, 
n. 2.
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explained why Lenormant's system could not be implemented.
Tombecbe was
a post among the Choctaws to which we send 
nothing but flour for the subsistence of the 
garrison and which most frequently is in the 
situation of lacking it so that this garrison 
must necessarily trade in order to get a living, 
and it is likewise important that it be in that 
situation in order that the Indians may find a 
market for their products. We cannot carry on 
trade there on [Lenormant's] basis without 
running the risk of disgusting this nation with 
the French, and it would ask for nothing better 
than to have such pretexts in order to resort to 
the English, as it has wished to do this year for 
the same reason.93
The arguments for and against abandoning Tombecbe in 
1749 must be examined within the context of the mutual 
determination of the Rouille and Vaudreuil to curtail 
expenditures and eliminate abuses. While serving as interim 
commandant at Tombecbe in 1747, de Velle had promised "a 
great quantity of merchandise to those who would rid us of 
that monster (Red Shoe), who was the cause of the troubles 
that have disturbed that nation.1’94 After the death of Red 
Shoe, Alibamon Mingo, the most loyal and constant ally of 
the French, petitioned Vaudreuil to restore the presents of 
villages whose loyalty had been in question. The Choctaw 
chiefs, their spokesman said, lacked sufficient authority
93Vaudreuil to Maurepas, October 30, 1745, MPA:FD 4:250.
94Louboey to Maurepas, February 16, 1748, MPA:FD 4:312.
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over their warriors to prevent the insubordination of those 
who unwisely resorted to the English. Vaudreuil had 
indicated that a prompt response to his demand for justice 
after the death of the three Frenchmen would have prevented 
the carnage of a civil war within the Choctaw nation. The 
governor informed Rouille that he was moved by their 
sincerity and determination to enforce commitment to the 
French.
Since I was satisfied with the attitude in which 
I saw the Choctaws I decided to give presents to 
the twenty-five villages that came to see me, and 
as they gave us a most complete restitution, far 
beyond what could be expected of an anarchic 
nation whose rebels were supported by the 
English, in addition to the ordinary present I 
gave gratuities to those who brought me scalps, 
those who were wounded, and those whom I 
recognized as being the most distinguished by the 
good conduct that they have observed and the 
means that they have employed to cause us to 
succeed in this affair.95
The Choctaw chiefs were permitted to meet the governor at
Mobile only rarely and at the governor's convenience, but
they did not have to travel far to bring their wives and
children to Tombecbe. The commandant of the fort was
obliged to entertain them and provide presents.96
95Vaudreuil to Rouille, March 3, 1749, ibid.. 5:19-20.
96Ibid.. 23.
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The governor admitted that closing the post would cut 
expenses,97 but the unity and commitment of the Choctaw 
nation were his top priorities. The promises of presents 
and merchandise by de Velle and Louboey had to be honored, 
and to vacate Tombecbe at the wrong time would be like 
pulling the rug out from under those Choctaw chiefs who had 
demonstrated their loyalty to the French by punishing those 
who had rebelled.
The guestion of abandoning Tombecbe reached a critical 
point after the arrival of Michel during the summer of 1749. 
A twenty-three page, joint report on the state of the colony 
dated August 1, 1749 reveals that there was a brief
honeymoon period during which the governor and the new 
commissary professed "cooperation for the good of the 
service."98 The establishment of a firm basis for 
communication set the stage for a good interchange of ideas 
on matters relating to provisions, warehouses, and justice. 
The commissary recognized Vaudreuil's "wisdom and experience 
of the country," which prompted him to defer to the governor 
"concerning extraordinary expense."
97Ibid.. 22.
98Michel and Vaudreuil to Louis XV, August 1, 1749, HM LO
177.
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By January 1750, however, Michel requested specific
orders recognizing his authority over civil police matters.
He reminded Rouille that protecting the residents from
oppressive military officers was his official duty. In the
same letter, he complained that he had not been summoned to
several councils held at the governor's house when Antoine
Chauvin Des Islets, a trader under Hazeur's monopoly at
Tombecbe, arrived with fourteen Choctaw Indians from the
western villages." On July 2, Michel suggested that the
governor may have issued orders to the post commandants
instructing them not to discuss Indian affairs with the
commissary.100
Vaudreuil and his old captains clearly were
sidestepping any potential interference by the commissary.
Michel asked Rouille to intervene; otherwise, the governor
and military officers would keep him uninformed even about
matters pertaining to commercial activities
because of the facility that the governor has of 
disposing of all the posts, in which the 
commandants, who are all devoted to him, render
account to him alone of all that they learn and
discover.101
"Michel to Rouille, January 17, 1750, MPA:FD 5:38
100Michel to Rouille, July 2, 1750, Ibid.. 52-53.
101Ibid.. 53.
Michel's complaints escalated along with the financial 
expenditures of the colony, but Vaudreuil was in charge. 
The governor managed to keep Tombecbe afloat past Michel's 
death in 1752 and for the remainder of Rouille's 
administration. Vaudreuil admitted that the isolated post 
created a heavy financial burden, but it could not be 
dismantled without undermining the alliance with the Choctaw 
nation. He expressed his willingness to comply with the 
crown's intentions "not to increase the number of posts." 
He would even eliminate unnecessary posts if it were 
possible, but the only practical solution in September 17 50 
was to reduce expenses by taking advantage of deep water and 
transporting supplies in large boats. It was not possible 
to abandon Tombecbe "until the Choctaw nation has entirely 
reunited and until the troubles, which have prevailed there 
for so long, have been quieted." The suppression of the 
last two rebel villages had to be postponed because of the 
lack of food supplies. Another obstacle to the fulfillment 
of Choctaw promises was the Chickasaws who, though few in 
number, did not "fail to provide the English with the means 
of going safely to the Choctaws."102
102Vaudreuil to Rouille, September 24, 1750, Ibid., 55.
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At the end of September, Rouille wrote Vaudreuil that 
he would prefer to enforce the rule excluding officers from 
trading to avoid the type of abuse that had been common in 
Canada. Nevertheless, though he agreed to allow the 
governor to make other arrangements to stop the abuse of 
trade by officers and commandants, he would hold him 
responsible and require him to report on the conduct of 
each.103 Four days later he wrote again, this time 
informing Vaudreuil that the king considered Tombecbe an 
expensive and unnecessary post. The expenses of Indian 
control were out of hand. It was imperative to prevent the 
attempts by officers to profit from their position in the 
posts. By increasing the number of troops in the colony, 
the crown was determined to "place the colony in a state of 
defense and security and procure more inhabitants for its 
development.1,104
A memoir written for the king in 1751 stressed the 
importance of increasing troops. The king was given an 
outline of the provisions of the treaty negotiated with the 
Choctaws and informed that Vaudreuil expected the colony to 
"enjoy a tranquillity as regards the Indian nations that it
103Rouille to Vaudreuil, September 26, 1750, HM LO 228.
104Rouille to Vaudreuil, September 30, 1750, HM LO 234.
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has not had the good fortune to savor since its
establishment." The Chickasaws were now so few in number
that their nation could be destroyed by the Choctaws.
As long as the Choctaws remain faithful to us 
they will overawe the other nations. They form 
forty-two villages, which occupy at least forty 
leagues of country and in which there are nearly 
four thousand men bearing arms. They have always 
been our allies. The efforts that the English 
have made at all times to corrupt this nation had 
always been in vain until these latter times when 
they had found the means of detaching from it the 
villages of which mention has been made, and, 
according to what M. de Vaudreuil writes, there 
is reason to hope that it will remain in the same 
attitude toward us. The increase that his 
Majesty has made in the troops of the colony will 
especially contribute to restraining it.105^
The governor welcomed the increase in troop strength, but he
needed to convince the minister and the king that the new
recruits must be led by experienced officers who knew how to
control the Indians.
It was in his letter of January 12, 1751, sent along
with the news and provisions of the treaty with the Choctaws
that Vaudreuil described how Sieur de Grandpre, a young
French officer in command at Tombecbe, actually learned and
applied the knowledge of governing the Indians. Grandpre
fought "at the head" of the Choctaw warriors in raids on
rebel villages to set the stage for the successful peace
105"Memoir for the King," 1751, MPA:FD 5:58-59.
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negotiations.106 Using the methods of the old Canadian 
captains, Grandpre had promised presents and a steady, 
dependable supply of trade goods. The loyal Choctaws who 
raided the rebel villages expected to be rewarded with 
merchandise distributed at the Tombecbe Post. Rouille, 
however, was determined to place more troops in fewer posts, 
thereby eliminating the need and expense of depending on 
Indian allies to defend the colony.107
Expecting to receive an order from the crown to close 
Tombecbe, Vaudreuil boldly explained why he intended to 
postpone the execution of the king's command. The loyal 
Choctaw chiefs had "acted with . . . firmness against their 
own blood only upon the assurances that were given them that 
we would support them against their enemies." The chiefs 
trusted Vaudreuil to "preserve for them the post of 
Tombecbe." A decision to close the post would be "contrary 
to the welfare of the service" and would place the colony in 
a worse predicament than the one from which it had just 
escaped. Vaudreuil begged Rouille to entreat the king "not 
to be offended that I should suspend the execution of his 
orders" when the order to withdraw from Tombecbe reached
106Vaudreuil to Rouille, Ibid., 60.
107Rouille to Vaudreuil, September 30, 1750, HM LO 234.
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Louisiana. The governor reiterated that there was no doubt
"that such an unexpected change will have the effect of
puzzling beyond all expression the Choctaws of the eastern
faction." They "would think themselves ... abandoned and
sacrificed to the resentment of those of the west." They
would immediately "call back the English to their country"
and become permanent enemies of the French.108
Vaudreuil ended his letter defending the continued
maintenance of Tombecbe by recommending Grandpre as the type
of officer who would keep expenses under control while
earnestly promoting the interests of the king.
In this command he incurs only the expenses that 
are absolutely necessary, keeps his garrison 
there in good order, and renders me the most 
exact account of what is happening among the 
different nations of this continent, with which 
he is perfectly acquainted and by which he is 
loved.109
Grandpre knew how to function as an essential link between 
the king and his people living in and around the frontier 
post. This young Canadian officer had acquired and 
demonstrated the knowledge and experience of governing the 
Indians.
He is assuredly an officer [who is] capable and 
very zealous for the service. The action that he
108Ibid.. 63-64.
109Vaudreuil to Rouille, January 12, 1751, MPA:FD 5:64.
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has just performed, of marching at the head of 
our allies against the rebels with so much 
prudence and firmness, proves this sufficiently. 
Moreover, I have had the satisfaction of hearing 
them say that it is to him that they are indebted 
for the peace that they have just received and 
for the advantages that they have won over their 
enemies.110
The governor recommended that Grandpre be granted the Cross 
of St. Louis. Although by age he was not "one of the oldest 
captains," the reward and recognition would give incentive 
to other officers seeking "opportunities to distinguish 
themselves. "11]-
Like La Salle, Iberville, Bienville, and Vaudreuil, 
Grandpre spoke to the Indian leaders in the language of the 
old Canadian captains. Their common objective was to 
increase the glory of the king by controlling a vast 
territory by enlisting Indian allies in the royal service. 
The king, for his part, contracted to provide presents for 
the Indian captains and trade goods for their people. The 
potential of sending a fleet of ships with soldiers and 
weapons was the trump card in the game of intertribal 
diplomacy played by the ancien capitaine. The very real 
conflict of interest between the king and his people in the 
New World reached a critical point when Rouille expressed
110Ibid.
111Ibid., 5:65.
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his determination to increase the number of regular French 
troops as a means of eliminating the crown's dependence on 
the old captains and their Indian allies. The governor 
needed the resources of the king to maintain the loyalty and 
service of the French and Indian frontier captains. He 
needed their loyalty and service to maintain control of the 
colony. Vaudreuil had to resist the crown to save the 
colony.
The complaints of Michel during the winter of 1750 no 
doubt reinforced Rouille's determination to bypass the old 
captains and implement strict financial controls, but the 
commissary was not permitted to impede the flow of trade 
goods. In January 1750, Michel tried to intervene when the 
military commandant of New Orleans, attempted to force 
civilians to patronize his canteen by arresting and 
imprisoning those who were drinking and amusing themselves 
in private homes. When Vaudreuil refused to do anything, 
Michel informed Rouille that the "public is vexed and 
complains with good reason."112 In June 1751, Michel 
protested that officers engaged in the Choctaw trade enjoyed 
excessive profits, causing the service to suffer.113 The
112Michel to Rouille, January 17, 1750, Ibid.. 37-38.
113Michel to Vaudreuil, June 9 and 10, 1751, HM LO 291
and 292.
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following month Vaudreuil reported that he was obliged to 
order Michel to release merchandise needed by the 
commandants for gifts and trade.114 This time the governor 
was determined not to allow the commissary to interfere with 
his efforts to maintain the alliance of the reunited Choctaw 
nation.
Increasing the number of troops could enhance the 
exercise of royal sovereignty, but such action required a 
greater financial expenditure than the crown was willing to 
bear. While Rouille pushed Vaudreuil to reduce expenses by 
closing a "useless" post, the governor continued to use the 
methods of the ancien capitaine for the good of the service. 
In his letter of February 1, 1750, Vaudreuil had recalled 
that during the Chickasaw Wars in 1736 and 1740, the French 
were obliged to depend on their Choctaw allies to "avenge us 
for the least insult." He suggested that these deplorable 
circumstances would persist "until it pleases you to 
persuade His Majesty to send to this colony sufficient 
forces to act with firmness.115 Still, the decision to 
increase troop strength for the purpose of curtailing 
expenditures required to maintain the Indian trade would
114Vaudreuil to Rouille, July 20, 1751, MPA:FD 5:96.
115Ibid.. 5:44.
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alienate the Choctaws, thereby requiring the military 
occupation of a vast territory.
In the long run, the most economical policy was to rely 
on the old captains who could insure the loyalty of the 
Choctaws by distributing merchandise supplied by the king. 
By September the governor responded to Rouilie's demands to 
stop trading abuses and reduce the enormous expenses of 
Tombecbe by admitting that it does "cost the king something" 
to use loyal Choctaws to avenge insults, but there was no 
practical alternative.116
Nothing could please the old captains more than an 
increase in troop strength, but Rouille's belief that it 
would eliminate the need for trading posts and reduce 
expenses was mere fantasy. Between the last year of 
Bienville's administration in 1743 and the last stages of 
the Choctaw rebellion in 1748, annual royal expenditures for 
the Louisiana colony had increased from 348,528 livres to 
539,265. For 1752, 1753, and 1754, the king's expenses
amounted to 930,767, 887,205, and 963,124 livres
respectively.117 By August 1753, Governor Louis
Billouart, Chevalier de Kerlerec was reiterating all of the
116Vaudreuil to Rouille, September 24, 1750, ibid.. 5:56.
117 - • . •1J-'Gayarre, History of Louisiana. 2:21, 47, 65, 73, 78.
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old arguments. Supplies and trade goods would insure the 
loyalty of the Choctaws. When there was a shortage of goods 
or the prices were too high, the English were there to stir 
up trouble. It was less expensive in the long run to 
provide supplies in order to prevent expensive warfare.118
The governor would not admit that there was any gap 
between the welfare of the service and that of the colony, 
but he defended his determination to resist the commissary's 
interference. Vaudreuil insisted that he was motivated by 
nothing but the good of the service.119 He had made every 
effort to keep expenses down, but timing the arrival of 
supplies from France so that provisions could be dispatched 
to Tombecbe in a single boat was the key to reducing 
expenses.120 High costs resulted when a shortage of 
supplies in the posts created the burden of feeding and 
entertaining Indians who descended on Mobile. Michel erred
118Kerlerec to Rouille, August 20, 1753, MPA:FD 5:129-
130.
1 1Q » •For example, when he petitioned the crown to approve 
his selection of Chevalier d'Orgon as commandant for the 
Alabama Post, Vaudreuil insisted that he was not "susceptible 
to partiality or to any influence that can be prejudicial to 
[the service]. Vaudreuil to Rouille, April 28, 1751, MPA:FD 
5:72.
120Vaudreuil to Rouille, January 12, 1751, MPA:FD 5:64.
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in ascribing the increased expenses to officers who meddled 
with the warehouses.121
In July 1751, the commissary unleashed his verbal 
tirade against Vaudreuil and his "Canadian creatures and 
kinsmen," but as late as May of that year, he supported the 
governor's opinion that any withdrawal from Tombecbe must be 
gradual and carefully planned. The arrival of
reinforcements would strengthen the hand of Vaudreuil in 
matters of alliance and defense, but the "Indians do not 
lose sight of the presents that we are accustomed to give 
them, which they regard as a charge that we have contracted 
with them."122 On the basis of this observation, one 
might have predicted that increasing the number of regular 
troops would not reduce royal expenditures.
On the same day in July that the commissary drafted his 
verbal attack against Vaudreuil and his kinsmen, the 
governor requested positive orders that would ensure the 
delivery of the merchandise needed for France's Indian 
allies.
Permit me, if you please, my lord to have the 
honor of remarking to you in this connection that
121Michel to Rouille, June 27, 1750; Michel to Rouille, 
July 2, 1750, MPA:FD 5:51, 53.
122Vaudreuil and Michel to Rouille, May 21, 1751, ibid..
5:88.
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a door must either be open or shut, that is to 
say that if we have no interest in keeping this 
nation it is advisable to abandon it to the 
English, who thirst only to get possession of it, 
and that on the contrary if we must show it 
consideration, for the reasons that I have had 
the honor of reporting to you in my letter of the 
twentieth of last April, to retain it in our 
interests we have only ... the single method of 
furnishing it its needs in order not to put it in 
the position of obtaining them from other 
sources, which is the surest [way] to alienate it 
from us.123
Vaudreuil suggested that Michel himself recognized the need 
to cultivate the good will of the Choctaw nation, but the 
commissary was so blinded by egotism that he asserted his 
authority "without considering the welfare of the 
service.1,124
As a provincial governor Vaudreuil commanded the 
colonial officer corps. He understood the connection 
between loyalty and generosity, the importance of managing 
needs and interests, and the determination of the crown to 
reduce colonial expenses. He refused to permit Michel to 
manipulate the royal purse strings to undermine his ability 
to control the colony. Michel's complaints were testimony 
to the fact that Vaudreuil relied on the old captains to 
control miltary and financial activities in the posts.
123Vaudreuil to Rouille, July 20, 1751, Ibid.. 96.
124Ibid.
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Bienville and Vaudreuil relied heavily on the "old 
captains" to control the frontier posts and repeatedly tried 
to convince the king that his interest and that of the 
colony were the same. The governors and their captains 
continued to coax the crown to finance the colonial 
enterprise in the tradition of Iberville and La Salle. The 
Canadian governors of Louisiana resisted the crown's attempt 
to stem the financial hemorrhage by permitting the 
commissary general to manipulate the royal purse strings.
My analysis of the correspondence relating to Lenormant 
and Michel shows that Vaudreuil managed to prevent Michel 
from interfering with his policy of providing gifts and 
merchandise for France's Indian allies. The fact that 
Lenormant's interference had led to the Choctaw revolt gave 
the governor leverage with the minister, and Michel's 
complaints can more accurately be interpreted as indicating 
the commissary's frustration than as evidence of effective 
interference with the governor's activities.125
Royal control of the colonial kinship network depended 
on a steady flow of provisions and supplies. The efforts of
125For the opposing view see Michael J. Foret, 
"Irresolution and Uncertainty: French Colonial Indian Policy,
1699-1763," M. A. Thesis, University of Southwestern 
Louisiana, 1982, 107.
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the crown to stem the financial hemorrhage exposed an 
unbrigeable gap between the king and his people.
CHAPTER 8
The Commercial Kinship Network and the 
Conciliar Bridge to the People
The royal commissaries insisted on strict financial 
controls, but Lenormant and Michel were not the harbingers 
of a modern financial system. The transfer of Lenormant and 
the death of Michel actually opened the way for their 
successors to engage in factional family politics in 
Louisiana, when the obsolete naval bureaucracy struggled 
through the crisis precipitated by the poor performance of 
the French navy in the Seven Years7 War and the territorial 
losses of European colonial warfare.1 The Canadian family 
network expanded to include the descendants of La Chaise, 
and several men sent from France to serve on the Superior 
Council married into Canadian families. The Louisiana 
kinship system included heirs of councillors and financiers 
as well as young military cadets who married into the old 
Canadian family network.2
1See Pritchard, Louis XV7s Navy. 55-70, 206-211.
2Giraud, History 5:8, 181, 282-285; Carl A. Brasseaux, 
Denis-Nicolas Foucault and the New Orleans Rebellion of 1768 
(Ruston, La.: McGinty Publications, 1987), 60-61.
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Michel began asserting his authority against the 
military officers when he accused the commandant of New 
Orleans of harassing citizens who declined to patronize his 
canteen. Between January and July 1750, he struggled 
against the governor's restrictions on his efforts to 
communicate with post commandants and investigate their 
trading activities. For a long time, he had first-hand 
information only about what was happening in New Orleans. 
It was his duty to keep track of the merchandise distributed 
to the different posts, and Vaudreuil continually ordered 
him to send more supplies than he thought was necessary. He 
had, of course, agreed to defer to Vaudreuil on 
extraordinary expenses pertaining to Indian affairs as he 
had been instructed to do.3
By July 20, 1751, Michel was able to provide Rouille 
with detailed reports about the supplies requested for 
Tombecbe, but what really precipitated his vehement verbal 
attack against Vaudreuil and the old captains was the 
D'Erneville affair. In July 1750, Michel had reported to
3,lMemoire du roi," December 23, 1748 in Lemieux,
"Office of Commissaire Ordonnateur," 105; Michel and
Vaudreuil to Louis XV, August 1, 1749, HM LO 177; Michel to 
Rouille, January 17 and June 2, 1750, MPA:FD 5:37-38, 53; 
Rouille to Vaudreuil, September 26, 1750, HM LO 243;
Vaudreuil to Michel, June 8, 1751, HM LO 290; Michel to
Vaudreuil, June 10, 1751, HM LO 292; Michel to Rouille, July 
20, 1751, MPA:FD 5:98, 101-02.
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Rouille that the governor had neglected to inform him about 
a certain trading expedition to Santa Fe. Vaudreuil not 
only denied the charge, but rejoined that Michel had 
acknowledged the advantages of the enterprise. The governor 
was already irritated that Rouille would question his good 
intentions when Michel took the side of the storekeeper in 
a quarrel with Duplessy, his newly appointed commandant at 
English Turn. Then, one night when Membrede (the New 
Orleans Commandant) D'Erneville, and other colonial 
officials were gathered at the governor's house, D'Erneville 
insulted the commissary.4
A native of Basse-Normany, D'Erneville, came as a 
gentleman-cadet to the colony where he married the daughter 
of Frangois Fleuriau, the attorney-general on the Superior 
Council. The elder Fleuriau had connections in the ministry 
of the marine and the king's council as a kinsman of 
Fleuriau de Morville, a relative of the keeper of the seals, 
and de Morville's son, Fleuriau d'Armenonville, who served 
briefly as marine minister. Frangois and Antoine Brusle, 
another member of the Superior Council, married into closely 
related families. Fleuriau had been the leader of the
4Fregault, Grand Marquis. 294-299.
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faction that developed in opposition to La Chaise.5 By 
marrying Pelagie Fleuriau, D'Erneville tapped into a kinship 
network with deep colonial roots.
On June 17 D'Erneville responded to Michel's charges 
concerning the incident at the governor's house.6 The next 
day Michel described the incident in detail in his own 
letter to Vaudreuil. D'Erneville, he said, had called him 
a "zero" in the presence of all the colonial officials. 
Michel demanded that the governor intervene and render him 
justice. The governor replied rather bluntly that he "never 
interferes in affairs between officers."7
A month after the climax of the D'Erneville affair, 
Michel exploded his powder keg. His letter of July 2 0 
accused the governor of placing his private interest above 
the interest of the king. Moreover, Vaudreuil promoted and 
protected the financial and trading interests of his friends 
and kinsmen to the detriment of the colony. Michel's 
invective against Vaudreuil and his Canadian "creatures" 
began with the Choctaw question. With the old captains 
enjoying the protection of Vaudreuil, "a single Choctaw
50'Neill, Church and State. 181; Giraud, History
5:274-75, 291; Fregault, Grand Marquis. 298.
6D'Erneville to Vaudreuil, June 17, 1751, HM LO 294.
7Michel to Vaudreuil, June 18, 1751, Ibid.. 295;
Fregault, Grand Marquis. 300-301.
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Indian in the colony will always be a cause of considerable 
expense for the King." The "devious devices" used to keep 
the Choctaw nation in balance make it "necessary for us to 
treat it with consideration." Grandpre and Des Islets 
arrived in New Orleans after the peace treaty went into 
effect. They made excuses about surplus merchandise which 
they left in the hands of "the most imprudent and most 
reckless of all the officers of the colony, and several 
traders [who are] vagabonds and jailbirds." Not only did 
they leave this officer in command at Tombecbe, but they 
requested an advance of 25,000 livres in merchandise that 
they would be able to sell at a profit of 150 percent. To 
illustrate the devious devices, Michel enclosed letters to 
indicate that the governor sometimes doubled the amount of 
merchandise requested by the post commandant.8
Michel went on to explain that he simply had not been 
able to oppose the insatiable demands of the military 
officers. Mere remarks about the prodigal allocation of the 
king's resources brought "cabals and vexation" down on the 
commissary. Yet there was no doubt that the governor gained 
a profit of 30 percent of the merchandise distributed at 
Tombecbe and all the other posts as well. "M. Lenormant 
must have proved it to you by his memoirs and M. de
8Michel to Rouille, July 20, 1751, MPA;FD 5:97-98.
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Vaudreuil's sponsorship of the preceding commandants and 
holders of monopolies.” All the posts are occupied by "his 
Canadian creatures and his kinsmen and allies of himself or 
of his wife."9
Michel's most serious charge was that eight soldiers 
had deserted the Tombecbe Post because the flour sent to 
Tombecbe was traded to the Indians, forcing the garrison to 
eat corn. The soldiers had taken advantage of Grandpre's 
absence to desert. The situation at Tombecbe was 
considerably more complicated than Michel led Rouille to 
believe, however. The commissary did say that the deserters 
had been apprehended by the Choctaws and that the Choctaw 
demand for their pardon created a diplomatic incident, but 
he did not explain why Imataha Mingo, Alibamon Mingo, and 
about fifty other Indians petitioned the governor to spare 
the lives of the deserters. Michel would have Rouille 
believe that the soldiers escaped from a garrison where they 
had been forced to eat corn by the commandant and those who 
held the trading monopoly. In a speech reported by a trader 
stationed at Tombecbe, Alibamon Mingo admitted that these 
soldiers "had lost their senses."10 Speeches made in
9Ibid., 98-99.
10Dupumeux to [?Beauchamp], June 18, 1751, MPA:FD 5:89-
91.
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defense of the Frenchmen ignored the fact that the soldiers 
had stolen the king's merchandise, stressing rather that 
they had provided things needed by the Indians.
The soldiers deserved punishment for leaving their 
posts, Alibamon Mingo was reported as saying, but Vaudreuil 
should overlook the wrong that had been done out of 
consideration for his Choctaw "children." "He can easily 
imagine the infinite pain that it would give the Choctaws to 
see the blood of people who every day bring them the things 
they need, and that with great difficulty." Because these 
Frenchmen dwelt in the "same cabin" with their Indian 
brothers, the "great chief of the French" should not "refuse 
his children the favor they ask of him." The chief of the 
Chichatalayas sent a gift of deer skins to the great chief 
of the French along with the message that he had risked his 
life "often enough for the service of the French to deserve 
this pardon."11
In his explanation of the Tombecbe dessertions, 
Vaudreuil explained to Rouille that the soldiers at Tombecbe 
had to trade for a living.12 What created the diplomatic
1:LIbid. . 5:90-91.
12Vaudreuil to Rouille, July 20, 1751, MPA:FD 5:94;
Vaudreuil's letters to Commandant de Blanc and the trader de 
la Ronde at Natchitoches clearly indicated that the governor 
routinely regulated and protected the trading privileges of 
certain individuals. The governor's correspondence also
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incident was that their status as soldiers subjected them to
the death penalty for desertion. Only the governor could
grant them a pardon. According to the Indian "captains" he
ought to do so for the sake of his "children." Michel, of
course, did not see it this way. He would not concede that
the military officers he criticized should be permitted to
maintain their position as frontier post commandants by
practicing techniques handed down as a legacy of the old
Canadian Indian captains.13
Vaudreuil had recommended that Hazeur be protected in
his losses for the good of the service.14 Michel now
suggested that the governor was willing to let the king bear
the expense for the poor judgment of commandants who chose
to leave their posts in charge of subordinates who might not
resist the efforts of the garrison to empty the storehouse.
All these gentlemen imagine that it is the King 
who must bear the expense of their bad moves, and 
in fact he does bear them, since they put it all 
down in their accounts, which it is not possible 
to correct in opposition to M. de Vaudreuil, who
demonstrates that the governor and his post commandants made 
a conscious effort as officers of the crown to reward loyal 
leaders and penalize rebels. Vaudreuil to de blanc, November 
22, 1752, HM LO 4 06; Vaudreuil to de la Ronde, November 22, 
1752, LO 408.
13Michel to Rouille, July 20, 1751, MPA:FD 5:99.
14Vaudreuil to Maurepas, March 20, 174 8, HM LO 116.
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serves them all as advocate to the detriment of 
the King's interests.15
Michel went on to comment about the lack of discipline in
the colony in terms reminiscent of Pere Raphael's complaints
about the Bienvillists twenty-five years before. No one
knows discipline, wrote Michel, "neither officer nor
soldier. Every thing is permitted to the soldier, provided
that he drinks up his money at the canteen."16
Michel's invective against the governor and his
officers offers a glimpse at a protected economic enterprise
operating in the camouflaged, colonial kinship network.
Everyone in New Orleans knew that the soldiers violated
police regulations by obtaining wine and rum from the
canteen and reselling it to the blacks and Indians, but the
governor refused to do anything about it. M. de Belisle
farmed the canteen, and Michel suspected that he paid off
the major of the New Orleans troops as well as the
governor's wife for the privilege. He charged that
Vaudreuil had advanced Belisle ten thousand livres to buy
wine for the canteen.17
15Michel to Rouille, July 20, 1751, MPA:FD 5:100.
16Ibid.
17Ibid., 101, 104, n.7.
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Michel further alleged that the governor's wife also
profited from trade in the capital city.
She has business with everybody here and she 
forces the merchants and individuals here to take 
charge of her merchandise to sell it at the price 
she fixes. She has a warehouse at her house of 
all sorts of stuff, which her butler sells, and 
when he is not there she takes up the measuring 
rods herself.
The commissary went on to say that Vaudreuil knew all about 
his wife's trading activities and that he derived revenue 
from them.18
Michel went on to report to the minister another 
example of how the governor and his old captains found 
support for their trading monopolies even in the Superior 
Council. Despite the fact that Michel held the position of 
First Judge on the Council and shared with the governor the 
responsibility for promoting commerce, he carried little 
weight when the two highest ranking military officers and 
the attorney-general were loyal supporters of Vaudreuil.
In the letter of July 20, Michel proposed to secure a 
steady, daily supply of fish for the poor people and troops 
of the city. He had found a "contractor who promised to do 
the fishing every day no matter what the weather and to sell 
the fish at half the price at which it was formerly sold." 
When word reached the New Orleans major about Michel's plan,
18Ibid.
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he immediately conspired with Councillor Jean Baptiste 
Raguet and Attorney-General Fleuriau to protect his 
monopoly. Raguet, whose father had arrived in Louisiana as 
a clerk for the Superior Council in 1717, had even deeper 
roots in the kinship network than did Fleuriau.19
Even before he presented his proposal, Michel reported, 
the councillors told him on behalf of the governor that the 
king's orders "forbade anyone whomsoever to take possession 
of or to appropriate to himself any fishing or land, and 
that everybody had the right to fish in this colony." The 
commissary upbraided the councillors for making 
"representations to the governor" about a project that had 
not yet been formally introduced. Surprised that they knew 
about the matter, he asked who had informed them and 
protested that they had no right to discuss it with the 
governor without speaking to him first. Michel sent the 
councillors away and went immediately to Vaudreuil to 
determine whether the governor had "authorized all these 
procedures." He pleaded with Vaudreuil to prohibit 
commercial fishing activities of the soldiers and protested 
that it was his duty as commissary to confiscate their 
fish.20 The governor and the councillors, however,
19Ibid., 102, 104, n. 8.
20Ibid., 102.
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completely ignored the commissary. Nothing changed despite
all he said and did.
The major still has his fish market for his
profit, which he is promoting to the detriment of
the other one by means of five or six soldiers
exempt from service throughout the year. What am 
I saying? They have since attempted to force the 
true fishmongers whom I have established there to 
go every day and make a declaration of their fish 
at the guardhouse, and they have declared
publicly that I was receiving a thousand piastres 
from the proceeds from the fish21
By the end of 1751, the crown had decided to inject
more funds into maritime administration, but the integrity
of the French navy still depended on the bond of personal
loyalty that bolstered the unity of the officer corps and
linked the king to his people. By the beginning of 1752,
Vaudreuil had weathered the crisis of the Choctaw rebellion.
He never lost the confidence of the king and his minister
even after resisting the intention of Rouille to close
Tombecbe. The old captains continued to rally their
companies at his command.
In a letter to Rouille in January 1752, Vaudreuil
expressed his bewilderment about the refusal of the
commissaries to cooperate by releasing the merchandise
needed to promote good relations with the Indian tribes.
I have never clearly understood what could be the 
reasons of the commissaries general in this
21Ibid.
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country for having raised so many objections up 
to the present about the delivery of this
merchandise unless they prefer to sell it among
the people, while the King's intention is that 
this merchandise be used for the trade with the 
Indians and that this is only an advance that he
is obliged to make for six months or a year,
which is, moreover, indispensable, since it is 
true that the traders can provide themselves with 
stocks only from the King's warehouses, where 
alone the merchandise can be found and the only 
place by way of which we could arrive at
satisfying the Choctaw nation and thereby retain 
it for ourselves if it is true that it is
important for this colony, as we shall find it as 
soon as we wish to fathom the reasons for it and 
to consider its advantages.22
The murder of Frenchmen by Red Shoe had been avenged.
The Choctaw nation had demonstrated that it would meet its
obligations to the French. Vaudreuil commanded the support 
and loyalty of the king's people. The real question was 
whether the king and his commissaries were willing and able 
to "satisfy [the Choctaw nation] in the matter of its 
needs.1,23
Kerlerec, the Council, and the People
The divergent interest of crown and colony may well 
have been at the root of Vaudreuil's troubles as governor of 
Canada.24 They only became apparent, however, during the
22Vaudreuil to Rouille, January 28, 1752, Ibid., 5:110-
111.
23Ibid., 113.
24Eccles, France in America. 188-89.
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administration of Vaudreuil's successor, Louis Billouart de 
Kerlerec, from 1753 to 1763. Vaudreuil had mastered the 
rhetoric of the old Canadian captains, but the determination 
of the crown to eliminate the "corruption" of private 
interest interfered with his ability to rally Indians and 
Canadians to the service of the king. The idea that 
increasing funds for regular troops might eliminate 
dependance on Indians and old captains certainly wreaked 
havoc in Louisiana under Kerlerec.
The new Louisiana governor lacked colonial roots, but 
he began to use Canadian rhetoric because as a naval 
captain, he knew how important it was to maintain the 
confidence of his crew. He began his term as governor with 
a plea for popular support. The neglect and indifference of 
the crown made it all the more necessary for the governor to 
do all he could to meet the needs of the people. Under 
Kerlerec, the good of the public began to overshadow the 
service of the king.
By the time Kerlerec arrived, Michel was dead, and 
D'Auberville, who had served as interim ordonnateur in 1748, 
once again took charge of the financial administration as 
ordonnateur from 1752 to 1757.25 In March 1753, the new
25Marc de Villiers du Terrage, The Last Years of French 
Louisiana, eds. Carl A. Brasseaux and Glenn R. Conrad, 
trans. Hosea Philips (Lafayette, La.: Center for Louisiana
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governor reported to Rouille that he had "spent an entire 
day" with new settlers at English Bend "hearing 
representations of every sort." The settlers complained 
about their flooded land and expressed doubts about their 
ability to cultivate it. They told him that Michel had 
refused to give them the assistance that had been promised 
to them. Kerlerec decided to give the settlers "some 
gratuities in provisions proportional to their urgent 
needs."26
In his effort to do something for the merchants of New 
Orleans, Kerlerec also informed the minister of their 
grievances.
I also cannot refrain from adding to you on this 
subject that the late M. Michel, because of the 
little attention that he gave to this matter, is 
the sole cause of the bad faith that may prevail 
here among the merchants. Great partiality has 
always been the basis of his own judgment and 
very often that of the entire Council, which his 
haughty disposition had subjugated and which has 
almost always been browbeaten. At last his death 
postponed the decision to leave this country 
which a small number of good merchants had 
made.27
The new governor worked hard to establish his position 
at the head of the colony by seeking conciliar support for
Studies, 1982), 49.
26Kerlerec to Rouille, March 8, 1753, MPA:FD 5:121-22.
27Ibid.. 123.
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his decisions and consulting with the old officers.28 Not 
until September 1754 did he report that he was forced to use 
the term "order" for the first time in his relations with 
the commissary.29 Kerlerec's serious problems with the 
commissary began only in 1758 with the appointment of 
Vincent de Rochemore to replace D'Auberville as ordonnateur. 
Although the neglect of the colony by the crown would be 
Kerlerec's biggest problem, Rochemore's alliance with Simard 
de Bellisle and D'Erneville was the greatest threat to the 
governor's authority in the colony.
By the time Rochemore arrived, Kerlerec had won the 
respect of the Indian chiefs by providing them with gifts 
and supplies in the tradition of the ancien capitaine. 
Kerlerec claimed to hear the voice of his people expressed 
by the "chiefs and honored men" who represented the diverse 
clans and companies of the lower Mississippi valley in 
general assemblies: gatherings of village chiefs or
"principal men of the nation."30 He thus used the "just 
rage of the public of all classes" to justify his 
intervention against Rochemore and his associates when, in
28Kerlerec to Jean Baptiste de Machault d'Arnouville, 
September 15, 1754, Ibid., 147-49.
29Ibid., 148.
30See "Memoir on Indians by Kerlerec" December 12, 
1758, MPA:FD: 5:218.
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1759, petitions signed by "the most notable inhabitants and 
all the merchants" of New Orleans and Mobile asked him to
use his authority" to ensure "a free sale" of merchandise
confiscated by Rochemore and Bellisle.31
The association of Rochemore with "rascals" who
promoted their private interests made it necessary for the 
governor to intervene on behalf of the public and dismiss 
with the king's approval those responsible for refusing to 
follow his orders. One of the "rascals" was Jean Baptiste 
Destrehan, a land speculator who had accumulated property 
worth 600,000 livres in a twelve-year period.32 Another 
was d'Erneville, the officer who had insulted Michel, While 
the governor was making his annual visit to distribute
Indian presents at Mobile in the March 1759, Bellisle 
disobeyed Kerlerec's orders to receive any vessel carrying 
food for the colony. The refusal of the captain of a Dutch 
ship to sell the cargo at the low price insisted upon by 
Rochemore caused Bellisle to invoke a 1727 ordinance against 
trading with cartel ships. A similar incident occurred three
31Kerlerec to Nicolas Rene Berryer, April 24, 17 59; to 
Simards de Bellisle, April 9, 1759; "Report to Louis XV on 
the Texel Affair; in Abraham Nasatir and James R. Mills, 
eds. , Commerce and Contraband in New Orleans During the 
French and Indian War (Cincinnati: American Jewish
Archives, 1968), 59, 39-40, 162.
32Villiers du Terrage, Last Years. 100.
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months later with the arrival of the Three Brothers. It was 
during the Three Brothers/s affair that Kerlerec sparked a 
popular demonstration and supported his decision to release 
the ship by calling a convocation of the people.33 In the 
spring of 1760, the crown responded by giving Kerlerec 
"broad powers" which "placed the ordonnateur completely 
under his control."34
Kerlerec's principal difficulty was therefore not with 
establishing his authority over the commissary in the eyes 
of the crown.35 Rather, it was the governor's inability 
to dominate the Superior Council and the powerful colonial 
faction led by d'Erneville that proved to be his biggest 
obstacle. With the support of prominent military officers 
engaged in the commercial kinship network, Rochemore was 
able to defy Kerlerec not by virtue of his authority as 
ordonnateur. but through an alliance with "captains" who 
profited more by private trading carried on in opposition to 
a governor who had no royal patronage or goods to 
distribute. In March 1769, d'Erneville wrote to marine 
minister Nicolas Rene Berryer accusing the governor and his
33Ibid., 103-104; Nasatir and Mills, Commerce and 
Contraband. 20, 34.
34Villiers du Terrage, Last Years. 145.
35See, e.g., Berryer to Kerlerec. October 1, 1759 in
Commerce and Contraband. 150.
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secretary, Titon de Silegue, of establishing partnerships 
with the post commandants and enjoying the profits of their 
economic enterprises. Michel had made similar accusations 
against Vaudreuil, but d'Erneville suggested that whereas 
Vaudreuil had been "fond of this military corps," Kerlerec 
was a despot.36 The commissary and the councillors 
charged the governor with violating royal ordinances 
prohibiting trade with cartel ships. However, when Berryer 
learned that the commissary had decided to enforce those 
regulations only after the captain refused to sell the 
merchandise at the price set by the commissary, he concluded 
that Kerlerec had indeed acted in the interest of the king 
and the colony by releasing the ship and permitting the 
cargo to be sold at a price that would encourage other ships 
to bring badly needed supplies into the colony.37 
The Forsaken Children of the King
Kerlerec convinced the crown to recall Rochemore, but 
the naval defeats of the Seven Year's War produced 
instability in the marine ministry which reflected the 
disarray at the royal court. Jean-Jacques-Blaise d'Abbadie 
was sent to settle the king's accounts and liquidate the
36D'Erneville to Berryer, March 15, 1760, MPA;FD 5:245.
37Berryer to Kerlerec, October 1, 1759, and Report to 
the King on the Texel Affair in Nasitir and Mills, eds. , 
Commerce and Contraband. 146-147, 152-54.
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French colonial enterprise in Louisiana. By the time his 
replacement arrived on June 29, 1763, Kerlerec had been
summoned to France to answer Rochemore's charges against 
him.38
Desiring to shed the financial burden of Louisiana, the 
crown decided to invest d'Abbadie with the authority of both 
governor and comissaire-ordonnateur.39 The provisions of 
the original, secret "Act of Cession" to Spain had been 
changed to exclude all of Louisiana east of the Mississippi 
except New Orleans. When d'Abbadie took command as 
"commissary general and ordonnateur" in October 24, 1763, he 
received news of Pontiac's rebellion and heard the 
complaints of various Indian tribes before he received 
clarification of his orders and an update on the original 
"Act of Cession."40
On April 21, 1764, the French king had expressed his 
hope that his Spanish cousin would provide "for the 
prosperity and tranquillity of the inhabitants of the colony 
of Louisiana" by giving "orders to his governor" to ensure 
that the clergy and missionaries would continue to perform 
their services for the colony. Louis XV also expressed his
38Villiers du Terrage, Last Years. 172, 182.
39Ibid.. 180.
40Ibid.. 191-192.
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hope and expectation "that the ordinary judges and the 
Superior Council will continue to serve justice, according 
to the laws, forms and customs of the colony." The king 
ordered d'Abbadie to "have this letter registered with the 
Superior Council of New Orleans, so that the different 
estates of the colony may be informed of its contents, and 
so that they may have recourse to it as needed"41
On September 30, the new governor acknowledged receipt 
of the king's letter and reported that his "departure from 
this colony cannot be as prompt as you assume." The English 
had been unable to take possession of the Illinois territory 
and French troops could not be withdrawn before the arrival 
of the Spanish governor. Dealing with French settlers on 
the banks of the Mississippi required "careful handling, 
because of the Indians." The transfer of territory from 
France to Spain would take at least three months. D'Abbadie 
went on to say that it would be "necessary for the Spanish 
to adopt French methods in governing the Indians" because 
the English "will use all manner of means to win over the 
Indian tribes."42
41Louis XV to d'Abbadie, April 21, 1764 in ibid., 225-
227.
42D'Abbadie to Choiseul, September 30, 1764 in Ibid.,
225.
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The sudden death of d'Abbadie on February 4, 1765
brought Charles-Philippe Aubry to the helm as head of the 
colony. Denis-Nicolas Foucault assumed the duties of 
ordonnateur.43 As first judge of the Superior Council,
Foucault was closely associated with Nicolas Chauvin de 
Lafreniere who in January 1765 convoked an assembly of 
"delegates of all the parishes of lower Louisiana" which 
sent Jean Milhet, a rich merchant and captain of the New 
Orleans militia, on an embassy to France to petition the 
king to "annul the act of cession of Louisiana."44 Milhet 
may have departed for France before d'Abbadie died, but he 
did not return until the end of 1767.45
In the meantime, Aubry and Foucault faced a massive 
financial and political crisis. Aubry did his best to 
please the French, the English, and the Indians.46 Aubry 
claimed to work "ceaselessly from morning till night." He 
complained that there was no money, no supplies, and no 
commerce. "Everything falls on me, and I bear all the
43Brasseaux, Foucault. 41-42; Villiers du Terrage, Last 
Years, 232.
44Villiers du Terrage, Last Years. 234-35.
45Ibid.. 234, 281.
46Ibid., 239.
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expenses."47 On February 25, 1765, he reported to
Choiseul that he would send "several small gifts" to Louis 
St. Ange de Bellerive for the tribes that were "harassing" 
the Illinois commandant "on all sides." He explained that 
he would like to "dispense with all expenditures."48 It 
was in this atmosphere of penury and uncertainty that Aubry 
had to deal with Indian rebels and French councillors and 
merchants who slowly came to realize that the French king 
had forsaken his children in Louisiana.
One of the many Indian chiefs who invaded New Orleans 
during this period expressed his disgust to Aubry at hearing 
"strange words" which he, at first, did not believe. Not 
only did the French give away the land where his people 
lived to the English, but French traders were no longer 
permitted to come into their villages. "We have learned also 
that you, Frenchman (sic) , whom we believed to be so 
powerful and so brave, have obeyed [the English] like women, 
letting us die from hunger and suffering." The chief asked 
Aubry for one thing only: that he "replace the guns, the
47Aubry to Choiseul, April 24, 1765, in Carl A.
Brasseaux, ed., Quest for the Promised Land: Official
Correspondence Relating to the First Acadian Migration to 
Louisiana. 1764-1769 (Lafayette: University of Southwestern 
Louisiana, 1989) 42. See also Villiers du Terrage, Last
Years. 264-265.
48Aubry to Choiseul, February 25, 17 65, in Promised
Land. 30.
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powder, the tomahawks, and the knives that we expended in 
fighting with you." He then expressed his rage at the 
Englishmen who heard his speech.49
Chariot Kaske, a Shawnee chief, returned to Illinois 
from New Orleans to form an alliance with French traders to 
continue to resist the English occupation of the Illinois 
country after Pontiac suffered military defeat and could no 
longer command the allegiance of the Indian confederation. 
Presenting himself to the French governor as "a 
representative of the Shawnee 'great chief,' seeking aid 
from his father," Chariot expressed surprise that the 
"emperor" yielded the territory. Angry at being rejected, 
he told Aubry: "we are masters of our bodies and our
lands."50 It was clear that the Indians were determined 
to resist the English with or without the support of their 
French "father." After being rejected by the French, who 
refused to provide protection or iron, Chariot returned to 
Illinois, where he continued the struggle against British 
occupation under the pretense that Aubry "had promised 
assistance and demanded attacks on the British."51 If 
there were no powerful European protector to be had, the old
49Quoted in Villiers du Terrage, Last Years. 239.
500uoted in Richard White, Middle Ground. 300-303.
51Ibid., 301.
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Indian captains would invent one so as to overcome their 
foes with powerful rhetoric which could sometimes be as 
effective as a powerful military force. They surely could 
not seek the protection of the British who now refused to 
provide them with the things they needed.
Conclusion
In spite of Aubry's efforts to dissuade them, the old
captains and their people had rebelled against the express
orders of the king. They tried to excuse their disobedience
by arguing that the Spanish did not respect any of the laws,
established customs, and usages. The Council sent two
representatives to France to plead the colony's cause, but
Choiseul received the deputies only as private citizens.
Their pleas were ignored.52
The October 1768 "Memoir of the farmers and merchants
of Louisiana" represented the position of the Superior
Council and overflows with the language of the ancien
capitaine. The Superior Council here pleaded with the king
on behalf of his people. The "magistrates . . . could no
longer refuse to reply to the plaintive cries of an
oppressed people." Collectively they
authorized a suffering people to bring their 
requests and their wishes to the king ... quite 
convinced that their respectful attention for
52Ibid., 305-11.
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their monarch would not be rejected by His
Majesty who is so benevolent, who is for his
people the earthly image of the savior ...
The Spanish governor Ulloa was a tyrant who had violated the 
"promises" contained in the letters of April 21.53
From the very beginning of French exploration in the 
Mississippi Valley, LaSalle and Iberville had cajoled the 
king into supporting the colony with the prospect of 
increasing his wealth, power, and glory. After the death of 
Louis XIV, France was in Glenn Conrad's words, a "reluctant 
imperialist."54 When the Company of the Indies withdrew, 
Maurepas took the colony under his wing, but he kept 
expenses down by promoting the frontier exchange economy 
while vigilantly taking precautions against profiteering by 
the governor and post commandants. France would not or 
could not pay the costs of Rouille's determination to 
increase the number of regular troops. After Vaudreuil, 
Kerlerec cultivated a broad base of popular support and 
steered a course guided by the interests of the colony.
A bizarre situation resulted when the crown decided it 
was no longer in the king's interest to support the colony.
53Ibid.. 315.
54Glenn Conrad,"Reluctant Imperialist: France in North
America" in Patricia K. Galloway, ed. , La Salle and His 
Legacy: Frenchmen and Indians in the Lower Mississippi
Valiev (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 1982),
93-105.
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Aubry became the reluctant head of a colony that no longer 
needed to compete with the English for Indian allies. He 
governed in the name and service of a king who had 
transferred the territory to the king of Spain, whose 
governor was perceived as a tyrant. The people rose up to 
proclaim their liberty under the protection of a French 
king, who had turned his back on his children.
Aubry, Ulloa, and Foucault were links of a chain that 
had been broken. The councillors who promised the people 
that they would restore the linkage with the French king had 
deep colonial roots as leaders of the many and varied 
companies that the king termed the "estates" of the colony. 
But the Indians and the French inhabitants would only 
recognize a sovereign who protected their lives and property 
and supplied the goods they needed. The Indians and the 
habitants were ready to obey the strong, wealthy chief who 
could ally with a "Frenchman" able and willing to supply 
their needs. The key to Spanish control would be to enlist 
French captains in the service of the Spanish king.
CHAPTER 9
Posts and People: French Captains in the Spanish Service
When the French crown transferred Louisiana to Spain in 
1763, the French governor and his captain-commandants 
continued to maintain the loyalty of the Indians. Spain 
hesitated to take formal possession of the orphan colony. 
After the short-lived rebellion of 1768, General Alexander 
O'Reilly spent less than eight months (from August 17, 1769 
to March, 1770) securing Spanish control of the province and 
installing Luis de Unzaga as the new governor.1 In New 
Orleans O'Reilly prosecuted and punished the rebel leaders 
and replaced the Superior Council with the Cabildo, but in 
the outlying posts very little was changed.
The general appointed former French officers as 
commandants of the various posts. Only the Illinois post 
was placed under a Spaniard, but even there Louis de St. 
Ange of Bellerive continued in Spanish service because of
1Lawrence Kinnaird, ed., "Introduction," Spain in the 
Mississippi Valiev. 1765-1794: Translations from the
Spanish Archives in the Bancroft Library (Washington, D.C.: 
American Historical Association, 1949), 2:xxi-xxiii. 
Hereafter cited as SMV.
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his knowledge and experience governing the Indians. In 173 6 
Bienville had described St. Ange as the "son of an ancien 
capitaine de milice ... vigorous in spirit and valor."2 
More than twenty years later Kerlerec endorsed him as an 
"excellent officer for the country and particularly for the 
savages that he leads and guides as he wishes."3 Ulloa had 
explained to Grimaldi that it was "necessary to keep him in 
the same command which he has held not only on account of 
his conduct but also because of the credit and reputation 
which he has among the Indians."4
O'Reilly established a hierarchy of officials in the 
frontier posts by placing two lieutenant governors in 
strategic posts in charge of the French captains performing 
their duties as commandants of the smaller posts. On the 
list of officials appointed by O'Reilly on February 4, 1770, 
Pedro Piernas was listed as Lieutenant Governor of the 
Ylinueses (Illinois) district with the rank of Captain of 
Infantry while de Mezieres, ranked as a captain of militia,
2Etat-major, La., 1736, AC D2c 50:45.
3Apostille, 1759, AC D2c 50:vo63.
4Ulloa to Grimaldi, August 4, 1768, SMV 2:59; Bernardo 
de Galvez reported to his uncle Jose on March 21, 1777 that 
he had selected "the retired captain of infantry, formerly 
of the French service, Don Pedro Francisco Volsay to replace 
St. Ange as an advisor on Indian affairs after the death of 
the old captain who "had a perfect knowledge of [the 
Indians]." SMV 2:236.
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received the title "Lieutenant Governor of Natchitoches." 
Simard de Bellisle, selected as commandant of the St. 
Charles half of the German coast, was also ranked as a 
captain of infantry.5
O'Reilly listed five post commandants as captains of 
militia, but two others held this position without any 
military rank. Marafret Laysarde, commissioned as the 
Rapides Post commandant, had been a merchant in New Orleans 
before he served as storekeeper of the Arkansas Post.6 
Fusilier de la Clair at Opelousas was a merchant and 
trader.7 Their appointment demonstrated that anciens 
caoitaines were not necessarily military men. They earned 
their posts because of their position at the head of 
prominent colonial families. The fact that they had not 
participated in any active way in the rebellion, their 
profession of loyalty to the Spanish crown, and their 
ability to govern the inhabitants and Indians in and around 
their posts were the most important factors in O'Reilly's
5SMV 2:157.
6Stanley Faye, "The Arkansas Post of Louisiana: French
Domination," Louisiana Historical Quarterly 26 (July 1943), 
716-19.
7Winston De Ville, Opelousas: The History of a French
and Spanish Military Post in America. 1716-1803 (Cottonport, 
La.: Polyanthos, 1973), 71-72.
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decision to appoint them.8 Each qualified as an ancien 
caoitaine and a good pere de famille. Athanase de Mezieres 
was noted for his ability to bring the Indian tribes of 
Louisiana and Texas into allegiance to the Spanish crown. 
The Rapides Post actually served as a dependency of 
Natchitoches. Several French officers did their
apprenticeship at Natchitoches before being placed in 
command at Arkansas, Pointe Coupee, or Opelousas. For 
example, Balthazar de Villiers moved from Balize to 
Natchitoches, then to Pointe Coupee. In 1772, he served as 
acting lieutenant governor while de Mezieres traveled to 
Europe. He later served as commandant of the Arkansas Post 
while Governor Galvez was aiding the Americans in their 
revolt against England.9
The Vaugine family provides another example of the 
special importance of the Natchitoches Post as a school for 
post commandants. Etienne Martin de Vaugine de Nuisement was 
the patriarch of a clan that was to dominate the Arkansas 
Post by the time the Louisiana Territory was sold to the 
United States in 1803. In 1753 he married Antoinette
80/Reilly to Arriaga, October 17 and December 10, 1769; 
O'Reilly to Grimaldi, December 10, 1769 in in SMV 2:99, 101- 
02, 127-29; See also Herbert Eugene Bolton, Athanase de
Mezieres and the Louisiana-Texas Frontier. 1768-1780 
(Cleveland: Arthur H. Clark, 1914), 1:79.
9Bolton, Mezieres. 1:100.
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Pelagie Petit de Livilliers, a descendant of Pierre Boucher 
who had arrived in Canada in 1634. Vaugine de Nuisement 
established an indigo plantation in the Attakapas district 
in 1764 and served in the Louisiana Infantry Regiment. From 
1780 to 1786, he served as commandant of the Natchitoches 
Post. His son, Frangois, represented the United States when 
the Arkansas Post came under American sovereignty.10
The primary purpose of the Spanish frontier posts was 
to protect the North American border of the Spanish empire. 
Natchitoches was the training ground for commandants whose 
most important gualification was the knowledge of how to 
control the Indians and settlers in the territory 
surrounding their posts. By 1776 the number of Natchitoches 
Indians living next to Fort St. Jean had dwindled to 10, but 
the census of Indian Tribes conducted that year counted 
1443 Indians living along the northwest radius extending 135 
leagues from the Natchitoches Post.11 French officials did 
their best to convince the Choctaws and the Alabamas who 
still numbered in the thousands to accept British dominion. 
The Osages west of the Mississippi would have to be
10,,The Vaugine Arkansas Connection," Grand Prairie 
Historical Society Bulletin 21, no. 1 (April 1978) : 6-10.
1;LElizabeth S. Mills, comp., Natchitoches Colonials: 
Censuses. Military Rolls, and Tax Lists. 1722-1803 (Chicago: 
Adams, 1981), 21.
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controlled, and numerous tribes requested to migrate to the 
west after the British took possession of the Ohio 
valley.12
The Indian population may well have declined sharply 
from what it had been in 1500, but their numbers were still 
immense compared to the number of Europeans living in the 
Mississippi Valley.13 Of course it was always in the 
interest of the post commandants to exaggerate the Indian 
threat, but the commercial and demographic advantages of the 
British rendered reliable Indian alliances essential to the 
process of controlling the Louisiana territory. The ability
12,,D/Abbadie Journal," in Brasseaux, Comparative View. 
113-124. See also Din and Nasatir, Imperial Osage. 54; 
Bolton, Mezieres. 1:73.
130'Reilly himself pointed out that Pointe Coupee, 
located fifty leagues upriver from New Orleans, was, except 
for the capital city, the "only well populated district in 
this Province." David K. Bjork, ed., "Documents Relating to 
Alexandro O'Reilly and the Expedition Sent Out by Him from 
New Orleans to Natchitoches, 1769-1770," Louisiana 
Historical Quarterly. 7 (1924), 21. A census dated September 
2, 1771 indicates that the city of New Orleans and both
river banks downstream numbered 2,2 32 white inhabitants. 
Pointe Coupee counted 548. The total of whites, free 
negroes, negro and Indian slaves in the whole province was 
only 11,344. The white population of Natchitoches and 
Rapides barely exceeded 500. See SMV 2:196. A census of the 
Arkansas Post reported by De Villiers on April 3, 1777
reveals that 509 Indians, 11 slaves, and 50 habitants were 
counted in the area surrounding the post. (Archivo General 
de Indias, Seville, Papeles Procedentes de la Isla de Cuba, 
legajo 190:111-113. Microfilm copies, Center for Louisiana 
Studies, University of Southwestern Louisiana at Lafayette. 
Hereafter cited as AGI, PC, leg.)
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of a commandant to distribute gifts wisely "to the various 
tribes . . . harassing him on all sides"14 was required to 
maintain the territorial integrity of Spanish Louisiana 
against the British threat. Aubry, the last French governor 
of Louisiana, did his best to warn his Spanish counterpart 
that most "of the tribes residing on this continent, both in 
English territory and in ours, are very populous and 
fierce."15 The "vast horde" of "powerful and warlike 
tribes"16 would present the greatest challenge to Spanish 
governors who would be responsible for occupying the vast 
Louisiana territory. The magnitude of the task of 
controlling the Indians clearly indicates the important role 
that post commandants and Indian captains would continue to 
play during the Spanish period.17
14Aubry to Choiseul, February 25, 1765, in Promised
Land. 30.
15Aubry to Choiseul, March [probably May] 28, 17 66,
ibid., 63.
16Bolton, Mezieres. 1:67,70.
17In his Memoria of 177 6, Francisco Bouligny observed 
that the innumerable "Indians who inhabit that immense 
country" deserve special attention. "Without their 
friendship and good relations, it will not be easy for us to 
ascend the [Mississippi] without employing superior forces 
and making heavy expenditures. On the contrary, assuring 
ourselves of their friendship, not only will we have free 
passage of the river, but they themselves will be the guards 
and defenders of our rights, impeding and containing any 
insult or invasion which we might fear from the English." 
Louisiana in 1776: A Memoria of Francisco Bouligny. ed.
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In October 1769, O'Reilly reported to Minister of the 
Indies Julian de Arriaga that he had taken possession of 
Louisiana in the name of the Spanish king and received a 
profession of loyalty from the inhabitants. Afterwards he 
"summoned all the Indians living within sixty leagues" of 
New Orleans. When the Indians arrived at his house they 
were received into his presence by "all the officers of the 
garrison and the principal persons of the city." The 
greeting ceremony included saluting the governor with his 
flag and smoking the peace pipe.18
Following this ceremony the Bayougoula chief spoke on 
behalf of the Indians, their chiefs and warriors. He 
addressed O'Reilly as the father of the Indians and the 
"chief whom the great King of Spain has sent to take 
possession of these lands." He had been careful to ask 
permission to speak and he prudently did not speak too long 
for fear of displeasing the "great chief of chiefs." He
Gilbert C. Din (New Orleans: Jack D.L Holmes, 1977), 65.
Bouligny was an officer in the Fixed Havana Regiment when 
O'Reilly developed disciplined militia units by using 
regular soldiers to train local soldiers. He came to 
Louisiana as O'Reilly's aide-de-camp and remained in 
Louisiana to serve successively as lieutenant governor of 
Louisiana, commandant of Natchez, commandant of the Fixed 
Louisiana Regiment, and acting governor. Gilbert C. Din, 
Francisco Bouligny: A Bourbon Soldier in Spanish Louisiana
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1993), 17-
18, 29, 55-102, 141-156, 178-205.
180'Reilly to Arriaga, October 17, 1769, SMV 2:101.
301
assured O'Reilly "that all these red men, warriors and 
chiefs of the tribes will be inviolably faithful to thee, 
both here and in all the posts where there are people at thy 
orders.1,19
O'Reilly then described to the Indians "the close bonds 
of blood and alliance between the kings of Spain and France, 
as a result of which this cession of the colony had been 
made." He made it clear that the friend of the French king 
was a friend of the Spanish king and the enemy of one was 
the enemy of the other. He even encouraged the Indians to 
treat the English well because they were friends of the 
Spanish king, although "they were not related by the same 
bonds as was the French nation." The Indians would be given 
their annual presents without delay and the king would 
demand of them no "other gratitude than their constant 
fidelity." Then O'Reilly placed medals on each chief and 
had them "kiss the royal effigy" before touching them on the 
shoulders with his sword.20 In performing this ceremony 
for the Indians surrounding his post of New Orleans O'Reilly 
acted as a type of surrogate king.
When O'Reilly made a trip to Pointe Coupee on December 
12, 1769, he performed the same ritual. He asked the
19Ibid., 101-102.
2QIbid.. 102.
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inhabitants to assemble in certain designated places so that 
he could "listen to all complaints which they may have," 
gather information about "the conditions of the country and 
the number of inhabitants," establish militia companies, and 
"issue regulations by which they may be rapidly united for
defense in case of Indian insults or in case this Governor
should need them for any other purpose."21 To outlying 
posts which he could not visit personally, O'Reilly sent 
emissaries as his representatives. On November 16, for
example, the General had sent two officers to Atakapas, 
Opelousas, Natchitoches, and Rapides "to administer the oath 
of allegiance to the inhabitants and to obtain all 
information which I may need."22 
The Discourse of de Mezieres
Athanase de Mezieres came to Louisiana as a young 
cadet. His mother was Marie Antoinette Clugny, and his
sisters had established matrimonial alliances with the 
D'Andelot and Montessons families. While serving in 
Louisiana as ensign, lieutenant, and captain, de Mezieres 
acquired the knowledge and experience needed to govern the 
Indians. He married Marie Petronille Feliciane, a daughter
21Bjork, "Documents Relating to Alexandro O'Reilly," 
21-2 2 .
22I b i d . , 22.
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of St. Denis. His first marriage ended when Marie died in 
1748, and sometime before the end of 1769 he established 
another alliance by his marriage to Pelagie Fazende, a 
descendant of Jacques Fazende who had begun his lengthy 
service on the Superior Council in 1722.23
Military rank and family connections spurred the career 
of de Mezieres, but his years of living among the Indians, 
his trading activities, and his linguistic ability earned 
him his appointment by O'Reilly as lieutenant governor of 
Natchitoches. Prior to his Louisiana assignment O'Reilly 
had organized a disciplined militia in Cuba as a means of 
defending the sprawling Spanish empire at the least possible 
cost.24 Similarly in Louisiana, he chose not to replace 
the local captains with professional administrators from 
Spain but rather to select those French captains whose 
loyalty to the Spanish crown could be ensured by royal 
favor.25
23Bolton, Athanase de Mezieres. 1:80-81.
24Allan J. Kuethe, Cuba. 1733-1815: Crown. Military,
and Society (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press,
1986), 25-49.
250'Reilly thus departed from standard Spanish colonial 
practice. See John Walton Caughey, Bernardo de Galvez in 
Louisiana. 1776-1783 (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1934; repr., Gretna, La.: Pelican, 1972), 33.
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In December 1769, O'Reilly noted that de Mezieres had 
"a good amount of capital of his own with which to answer 
for his conduct, [and] much experience, and knowledge of the 
Indians and the district of Natchitoches." By enlisting de 
Mezieres's two eldest sons as cadets, O'Reilly "caused great 
satisfaction to the father" and bound "him more firmly to 
the service."26 On his part, de Mezieres continued to 
profess loyalty to the Spanish crown. In a letter to 
Governor Luis de Unzaga written in June, 1770 after O'Reilly 
departed Louisiana, he made it clear that he was glad to 
"sacrifice my person and my goods" in the enterprise of 
inducing the Osage Indians to sue for peace.27
O'Reilly issued explicit instructions to be followed by 
the commandants of each post. Unzaga would occasionally 
reprimand de Mezieres for not abiding by the rules, but the 
overriding need for government economy and the policy of 
preserving the tranquillity and territorial integrity of the 
Spanish empire without expense to the royal treasury meant
260'Reilly to Grimaldi, December 10, 1769, SMV 2:129-
30.
27De Mezieres to Unzaga Y Amezaga, June 27, 177 0, in
Bolton, Mezieres. 1:203.
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that de Mezieres actually exercised a substantial degree of 
autonomy.28
De Mezieres's first concern as lieutenant governor of 
the Natchitoches Post was with the traders under his 
jurisdiction who set a bad example for the Indians among 
whom they lived by their lack of discipline.29 De 
Mezieres's "Instructions to the Traders" contains a clear 
statement of the rules they were to follow and reflects 
O'Reilly's policy of controlling the traders by placing them 
under the firm authority of the post commandants. They in 
turn would use the traders to control the Indians. The 
"Instructions to the Traders" reflects the traditional 
wisdom of the old Canadian captains and summarizes much of 
the discourse that constitutes the essential features of the 
Louisiana synthesis of Athanase de Mezieres.
De Mezieres began by informing the traders that his 
captain-general enjoined him to "choose persons known for 
their good habits and their zeal for the service of the 
king." Such persons were to be sent into the Indian 
villages "to encourage the savages more and more to work, 
and not to permit them to remain in an idleness dangerous
OR . . .  ■ .^°Moore, Revolt in Louisiana. 83; Din and Nasatir,
Imperial Osacres. 62, 83-86.
29Din and Nasatir, Imperial Osaqes. 28, 62; see also
Moore, Revolt in Louisiana. 92-102.
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not only to their own interests but to those of his Majesty
as well.” After listing Grappe, Dupin, and Fazende Moriere
as the traders to whom he extended trading privileges, de
Mezieres outlined ten rules for them to follow.
Rule one required that the traders furnish
satisfactory, customary merchandise at the "ordinary trade
price.” Rules two to five banned English merchandise,
identified the friendly nations which should receive
supplies, and required the traders to arrest French or
Spanish vagabonds and confiscate their goods. The sixth
rule, which required a pledge to send couriers to keep the
commandant informed of "any news of interest to the service
of his Majesty," indicates that the traders were to perform
a service for the post commandant that was similar to the
services performed by the commandants for the governor. The
seventh rule clearly indicates that a licensed trader was
expected to perform the functions of an old captain and a
pere de famille in his assigned village.
They are likewise pledged to maintain peace and 
entire harmony among the people allied with us; 
and if any quarrel should occur between the 
families or individuals of the villages where 
they reside, or even among the neighboring 
tribes, they are pledged to stifle it and to 
conciliate the parties.
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Rule eight required the traders to
explain daily to the Indians the inestimable 
advantage which they enjoy of being under the 
happy dominion of his Majesty; that all the 
French are charmed to live under the laws of so 
august a monarch.
In addition, the traders were to assure the Indians that
"this great king considers them as his dearest subjects."
The king expected them "to submit to his will, but with no
other purpose than their own happiness."30
The discourse of Athanase de Mezieres is a window on
the important role of the ancien capitaine as a link between
the king and his people. Licensed traders and loyal Indian
chiefs brought their families and tribes under the umbrella
of the king's authority. They motivated their people to
work and fight in the service of the king, established peace
and tranquillity in their villages, and defended their local
districts against hostile invaders. For his part, the king
was obligated to supply them with European merchandise and
to exercise the awesome power of his invincible arms on
their behalf. The sacred pact that bound a people or
"company of savages" to the king required each of his
subjects to sacrifice their persons and their property in
the service of the king. In return the governor and the
30"Instructions for the Traders of the Cadaux 
D'Acquioux and Hiatasses Nations, February 4, 1770 in
Bolton, Mezieres, 1:148-50.
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post commandant were required to place the welfare of the 
king's people above their own personal interests.31
De Mezieres served as a critical link in the new chain 
that connected the Spanish king to his people in what is now 
Louisiana, Texas, and Arkansas. That link was tested, 
however, when O'Reilly issued specific regulations requiring 
de Mezieres to defer certain decisions to the governor.32 
The conflict between de Mezieres's duty to abide by these 
regulations and the necessity of maintaining good relations 
with the Indians is illustrated by the case of Francisco 
Morvan.
Before the transfer of Louisiana to Spain, Morvan had 
killed a vagabond named Brindamur, then found asylum with 
the Cadodachos where he remained for seven years and became 
an adopted member of the tribe. When de Mezieres ordered 
the appearance of all traders and vagrants to appear before 
him in 1770, the Cadodacho cacique Tinhioiien escorted him to 
Natchitoches but asked that he be allowed to return to his
31De Mezieres to Unzaga Y Amezaga, October 23, 1770,
ibid., 1:188.
32Instructions to the lieutenant governor of the 
Natchitoches district, November 24, 1769, AGI, PC, leg. 187 
cited in David K. Bjork, ed., "Documents Relating to 
Alexandro O'Reilly and An Expedition Sent Out by Him From 
New Orleans to Natchitoches, 1769-1770," Louisiana 
Historical Quarterly. 7 (1924), 22, note 5.
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new "family."33 According to O'Reilly's regulations only 
the governor could then release Morvan from de Mezieres's 
custody. However, not wanting to jeopardize his
relationship with Tinhioiien, de Mezieres convoked an 
assembly of those men who represented the most important 
families in and around the community of the Natchitoches 
Post. They agreed with him that Morvan should be delivered 
over to Tinhioiien.34 De Mezieres tried to justify his 
action by deferring to the assembly, but Unzaga stiffly 
reprimanded him for ignoring explicit instructions and 
suggested that by exercising a pardon he was attempting to 
steal the glory that properly belonged to the governor. 
Unzaga complained that de Mezieres's action in convening the 
council was not only contrary to Spanish law, but appeared 
"in such a light that only your meritorious behaviour, good 
conduct, and honest intentions absolve you from 
criminality."35
De Mezieres had acted here more as a spokesman for his 
people than as a agent of the king. In a conflict between 
the king's regulations and tribal custom he convoked a
33De Mezieres to Unzaga Y Amezaga, May 15, 1770,
Bolton, Mezieres. 1:160-162; n. 211.
34Ibid.. 1:162.
35Unzaga Y Amezaga to De Mezieres, June 1, 1770, ibid., 
1:171-73.
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council of his own "tribe" to justify actions that would
insure the tranquillity of colonists and Indians alike. His
language was that of the ancien capitaine.
Six months earlier O'Reilly had expressed his approval
of the language used by de Mezieres to instruct an Indian
chief concerning the duties and privileges of his people as
subjects of the Spanish king.
The language which you used, Sir, with the Indian 
chief, is quite in conformity with my intentions 
and with everything which I have said to you on 
the subject. These are the sole expressions 
which the service of the king and which the 
public welfare can dictate to each post
commander. In this respect I am very well
satisfied with the way in which you conduct 
yourself and with the means which you have taken 
to make known the mildness of the government and 
the clemency of the king, and I hope that as a
result of your care you will experience the
happiest results.36
Nevertheless, it was O'Reilly's policy which placed 
tremendous emphasis on providing for the happiness of the 
king's subjects while "maintaining the people in the 
fidelity and submissiveness which are due to their sovereign 
that created the bind in which de Mezieres found 
himself."37
360'Reilly to De Mezieres, January 23, 1770, ibid..
1:134.
37Establishment of the New Orleans Cabildo, November 
25, 1769, SMV 2:108-10.
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Governor Unzaga and the viceroy of Mexico continued to 
make every effort to keep tabs on de Mezieres. Joseph de la 
Pena, a military officer serving as interim lieutenant 
governor while de Mezieres traveled among the Indian nations 
in 1772, reported to the governor that de Mezieres had a 
reputation of being a "man of two words."38 After 
accusing de Mezieres of "pure deceit," de la Pena charged 
that the "only thing that has proved true is that the posts 
and mails are being directed to the traders who are in the 
nations, announcing his coming and giving new instructions, 
retiring some from trade in which they are occupied and 
establishing others to the injury of the former."39 In 
1774 the viceroy instructed the governor of Texas not to 
correspond with the governor of Natchitoches.40 Near the 
end of the decade, however, Governor Galvez praised de 
Mezieres's special merits when he reported to de Mezieres 
that he had asked Theodoro de Croix the Commandant-General
*3 0
JODe La Pena to Unzaga Y Amezaga, September 14, 1772, 
in Bolton, Mezieres. 2:16.
39Ibid.. 2:15.
40Antonio Maria de Bucareli to the Baron de Ripperda, 
May 8, 1774, ibid., 2:51.
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of the Interior Provinces to afford him "the protection and 
confidence which you merit.41
De la Pena was not the only Spaniard who denounced de 
Mezieres. Fray Jose Abad informed the viceroy that the 
Natchitoches commandant was "one of the principal agents" 
encouraging a scandalous trade which was the "sole cause of 
the complete perdition of ... [the Indians'] souls and of 
the destruction of the province."42 The implication was 
that the traders promoted warfare and drunkenness among the 
Indians so that they could profit from the sale of liquor 
and weapons. De la Pena and Fray Abad maintained that de 
Mezieres abused his authority by protecting and encouraging 
traders who, together with their patron, profited by 
corrupting and exploiting the Indians at the expense of the 
public welfare and the tranquillity of the province.
Actually, de Mezieres, who was willing to risk 
everything in his service of the king, resorted to borrowing 
money on his own personal credit in order to supply the 
Indians with trade goods and gifts to maintain their 
loyalty. By the time he died, his accumulated capital was
41Bernardo de Galvez to de Mezieres, March 22, 1779,
ibid., 2:245.
42Fray Jose Abad to Bucareli, July 15, 1774, ibid.,
2:67.
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gone.43 Although he did have a vested interest in the 
Indian trade, and he was ready to resort to force when 
necessary, like St. Denis, he preferred a relationship with 
Indian allies who had such a profound respect for the 
captain and his king that they were willing to identify and 
destroy any enemy who would dare insult such a wise, 
powerful, and benevolent father.
De Mezieres's speech to the seven chiefs of the 
Tavaiazes, Tuacanas, Iscanis, and Quitseys, which he 
included in the report on his 1770 expedition to the 
Cadodacho tribes, epitomizes the effective discourse of the 
ancien capitaine. With it he effectively performed the 
duties of an old captain and a good pere de famille. by 
proclaiming to the errant Indians both the consequences of 
remaining outside the great household of the Spanish king 
and the rules and the advantages of joining it.
De Mezieres first sent word "by means of the friendly 
tribes" that he had come to see the unruly chiefs at the 
"command of the captain-general of Louisiana." The chief, 
father, and protector of the Indians wished to receive 
information about their willingness to make amends for the 
"great abuse" that caused the king to suspend their aid. De
43De Mezieres to Unzaga Y Amezaga, May 20, 1770, ibid.. 
1:200-201; Bolton, "Historical Introduction," ibid.. 1:83.
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Mezieres pointed to the Spanish flag and told them "that we 
had become naturalized as Spaniards, that our new and 
beloved monarch was the most powerful in the world, and 
emperor of the Indies." Although their misconduct had 
angered the king, his clemency and magnanimity equalled his 
immense power. If they changed their behavior and proved 
themselves deserving of his benevolence, the king would 
grant them the peace they sought. If, however, they failed 
to "desist from robberies and hostilities . . . they would 
bring upon themselves the imponderable weight of his 
invincible arms." De Mezieres reminded them of the "good 
example and inviolable fidelity of the friendly 
Cadodachos.44
De Mezieres next reminded the errant Indians that the
Osages to the north, the Comanches to the west, and the
Apaches to the south surrounded them, and that if they did
not make peace with the Spaniards to the east they would be
reduced to ashes by four horrible fires. De Mezieres took
special care to convince the Indians that they could not
turn to the French to aid them against their enemies and the
Spanish. He emphasized that
the very name of Frenchman had been erased and 
forgotten; that we were Spaniards, and, as such,
44"Report by de Mezieres of the Expedition to 
Cadodachos," October 29, 1770, ibid., 1:209-210.
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as sensitive to the outrages committed as we 
would be interested in avenging them as soon as 
they might be resumed.45
At the end of his speech, de Mezieres "cordially and
affectionately" took "the hand of each one of the
surrounding Spaniards," purposely demonstrating and making
"evident the close and sacred pact which binds us."46
The recalcitrant Indians made a number of excuses for
their refusal to comply with the conditions for making peace
with the Spanish king and his allies. Upon being invited to
accompany de Mezieres to Los Adaes so that "the Spaniards
there, by whom they would be lovingly received, might report
it to the great captain at San Antonio, who would be much
pleased by such authentic testimony," they balked. De
Mezieres suggested that they were afraid. He interpreted
their "irrational" behavior by explaining that they were
"savages." "Vengeance is not a defect, but a virtue" with
them he wrote, "and since in treachery they find the laurel
for their most heroic deeds, their material natures do not
imagine that there could be people endowed with more sublime
thoughts."47 In his "Instructions for the Traders of the
Cadaux D'Acquioux and Hiatasses Nations," issued the
45Ibid.
46Ibid.. 1:211.
47Ibid.. 1:213.
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previous February, de Mezieres had stressed that the Indians 
must be taught that the protection of the king is "assured 
to all natives who comport themselves as becomes men."48
To become true Frenchmen, the Indians were expected to 
abide by the rules. They would only acquire true honor in 
the service of the king. The old captain pleaded for the 
rational behavior which would permit him to direct the 
activities of the Indians in accordance with the king's 
will. The discourse of de Mezieres illustrates how the 
contrast between reasoning men and brute beasts opened the 
door for the old captain to present himself as both mediator 
and master to the Indian tribes.
After the transfer of Louisiana to Spain , the exercise 
of royal authority continued to depend on the old captain in 
the frontier posts and inside the Indian villages. Beneath 
the superstructure of military and administrative titles, 
lies the ancien caoitaine de milice. Carl Ekberg has shown 
that the tension that developed between local power and 
Spanish authority in colonial Ste. Genevieve was resolved 
when the local militia captain, Frangois Valle II, became 
town commandant and through his influence over the local
48Instructions for the Traders of the Cadaux D'Acquioux 
and Hiatasses Nations, February 4, 1770, ibid.. 1:149.
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community brought it into Spanish service.49 The 
tranquillity and stability of frontier settlements such as 
Ste. Genevieve depended to a great extent on the willingness 
of the militia captain to support the commandant of the 
post. In the case of Ste. Genevieve, the tension ended when 
the militia captain became the commandant.
Under the authority of the Valle militia captains, Ste. 
Genevieve remained stable as the Louisiana territory was 
transferred back to France and then to the United States in 
1803. In 1804, Jean-Baptiste Valle succeeded his brother 
Frangois as commandant. According to Ekberg, the younger 
brother "made the transition from Spanish officer to 
American commandant of Ste. Genevieve without so much as 
batting an eye." Jean-Baptiste's son, Louis, attended West 
Point, and "by returning to Ste. Genevieve he helped to 
fulfill Thomas Jefferson's plan of turning the residents of 
Upper Louisiana into Americans."50 Authority, stability, 
local autonomy, and the benevolent care of the local 
populace were the characteristic features of Ste. Genevieve 
under the patriarchal authority of the Valle family. The 
United States inherited the services of the Valle patriarchs
49Carl J. Ekberg, Colonial Ste. Genevieve:____An
Adventure on the Mississippi Frontier (Gerald, Missouri: 
Patrice Press, 1985), 348.
50Ibid., 83-85.
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who presided over the Americanization of a post noted for
intensely local loyalties.
Don Juan Filhiol
A young French militia captain who entered the service
of Spain during the American Revolutionary War used the
technique and tactics of the ancien caoitaine to establish
Fort Miro on the Ouachita river. He obtained a land grant
from the governor, led settlers into the virgin territory,
established a trading post, and convinced Governor Esteban
Miro to provide the things needed to build the fort.
Jean Filhiol's early military service in Louisiana was
rewarded by a grant of land as well as a commission as a
"Capitaine des Milice" who served as "Commandant Civil et
Militaire" of the Ouachita Post.51
On July 7, 1787, Filhiol convoked a local assembly at
his new post to tell them that the
governor-general has conferred on me the command 
of this post in order to safeguard the 
tranquillity of the inhabitants who are dependant 
and to look after all who contribute to their 
greatest well-being.52
51 James Fair Hardin, "Don Juan Filhiol and the Founding 
of Fort Miro, the Modern Monroe, Louisiana," Louisiana 
Historical Quarterly. 20 (1937): 464.
52"Address to an Assembly of Inhabitants of the 
Ouachita Post," July 7, 1787 in AGI, PC, leg. 188-c.
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As a civil administrator Filhiol exercised royal authority 
by performing the functions of mayor, sheriff, judge, jury, 
and notary in his jurisdiction. Local inhabitants appeared 
before him with petitions for services that included 
agricultural improvements, repair of the jail, bills of 
sale, and regulation of prices.53
Filhiol's correspondence with Governor Miro illustrates 
how the captain functioned as a channel of royal authority. 
A letter of August 25, 1790, for example, indicates that
difficulties of communication called for the exercise of 
initiative on the part of the captain. Filhiol informed the 
governor that the people had requested a fort to provide a 
refuge for families and a place of retreat for hunters and 
those who worked in the wilderness. He then explained that 
he had made the decision to build the fort because he had 
not yet received a response to his last letter, and it would 
be too late in the season to begin after the governor's 
reply, which he did not expect to receive until the next 
spring. Captain Filhiol also told Miro that he could depend 
on the lieutenant of his company to help to construct the 
fort if the local people failed to follow through on their 
committment to the project. The inhabitants proved to be
53See documents in Natchez Trace Collection, University 
of Texas at Austin, Barker Archives, Box #1.
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somewhat obstinate, and Filhiol reported in October that the 
Fort would not be completed until January.54
The relationship between the captain and the local 
community depended to a large extent on what he could do for 
the people and what the people were willing to do for him.
The new Spanish rulers held their French captains 
responsible for control of Indians, settling of disputes, 
maintenance of enterprise, stalwart generalship, accurate 
reportage and constant, subtle intertribal and inter-trader 
diplomacy. In short, the captain was required to lead or 
direct all aspects of regional administration. Filhiol 
lived long enough to perform these services for the United 
States as well.
The ancien capitaine clearly presented himself as the 
pivotal link between the king and his people. The effective 
frontier commandant was a royal officer who could command 
the loyalty of the fictive kinship groups surrounding his 
post. By offering protection, provision, and justice, the 
old captain would lead his people to clothe themselves with 
a new French or Spanish identity. Taking command of a post 
required the royal officer to forge a link in the chain by 
winning the loyalty of the little captains or chiefs and
54Filhiol to Miro, August 25, 1790 and October 12,
1790, in Hardin, "Don Juan Filhiol and the Founding of Fort 
Miro," 468-69.
establishing a good working relationship with the local 
militia captain. The use of words and force by the ancien 
capitaine forged the strong link of the chain that tied the 
people— families, tribes, and traders— of the captain's post 
to the kingdom, confederacy, or federal republic which was 
best able to defend and protect his people and supply their 
needs.
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APPENDIX
THE BALLAD OF ST. DENIS*
In days of old, the king of 
France 
Sent a band of pioneers 
Across the sea, to guard a 
land
Beset with trials and tears 
And hostile redmen who had 
ruled
This strange great land for 
years.
Then to old Louisiana
This band of brave men came 
Led by a valiant Frenchman,
St. Denis was his name—
A bold commander who aspired
to prove his monarch's claim.
Day after day, he led his men 
Thru this unsettled land 
And when they grew morose or tired 
"Twas he who cheered the band,
For he was gifted with the strength 
Men need when they command.
One day St. Denis led his men
Thru forest gloom and shade 
And there they came upon a camp 
And Indian tribe had made—
And there they settled on a bluff 
That rose above this glade.
And there they built, of sturdy pines, 
A small fort, crude and low,
*Reprinted from Portre-Bobinski, Natchitoches. 1936.
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Upon the bluff that overlooked 
The redmen's camp below,
Where lazily the waters of
The old Red River flow.
Not many moons had waxed and waned 
Before this kindly man 
Had won the secrets and the hearts 
Of the wild neighboring clan, 
Known as the tribe of Natchitoches,
A mighty, fearless clan.
The King of Spain had sent his men 
Across the Rio Grande 
And from Presidio del Norte
They threatened all the land 
Where bold St. Denis was ensconced 
With his intrepid band.
A rumor reached St. Denis' ears
The Spaniards planned to wage 
War on the tribe of Natchitoches
So he, their friend and sage,
Set out upon his perilous way,
The Spaniards strength to gauge.
At last he reached the Spanish fort 
Where ruthless foes of France 
Were deep in making heartless schemes 
Of their proposed advance 
But here, alas! St. Denis fell 
A victim of romance.
Strange are the hearts of fearless men 
Strange are the ways of Fate—
St. Denis fell in love with one
Whose sire he could but hate—  
Commandant of the gate!
The course of true love often runs 
Upon a troublous way 
But after trying times, Maria 
Became his bride one day,
And they set out to join his men 
Who waited far away.
There he rejoined his loyal men 
And ably did defend
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The fort from many hostile troops 
That sought his rule to end.
The redmen now were his allies—
And he, their truest friend.
He later founded, near this fort,
The quaint old trading post 
Of Natchitoches, where good folks like 
To sit around and boast 
Of those exciting days when he
Was their forefathers' host.
He lived and fought and died, a man, 
Beloved and revered-- 
True patriot, who never knew 
An enemy he feared—
True pioneer, whose name to us 
Forever is endeared.
L'ENVOI
Sleep on, O valorous soldier,
And peaceful be thy rest!
Sleep on, 0 valiant pioneer,
Among God's happy blest 
No nobler dust than thine lies on 
Louisiana's breast!
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